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INTRODUCTION
“A people inspired by democracy, human rights and economic opportunity will turn their
back decisively against extremism.” (Benazir Bhutto)
Citizens’ support of liberal democracy is crucial for the stability of the political sys-
tem and economic prosperity. This support seems to have deteriorated across the
developed world in recent years. Headlines such as “Across the Globe, a Growing
Disillusionment with Democracy” (New York Times, September 2015), “Have Mil-
lennials Given Up on Democracy?” (The Guardian, March 2016), “Across Europe,
Distrust of Mainstream Political Parties is on the Rise (The Guardian, May 2016), or
“Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?” (The New York Times, December 2016),
shocked liberal minds who have taken a stable democratic order in the western world
for granted. A discontent with the current political system also has been manifested
in the electoral breakthroughs of populist parties in several European countries, such
as PiS in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary, as well as in the election of Donald Trump
as US President. These authoritarian parties and politicians threaten the freedom of
the press, show little respect for the separation of powers and use populist rhetoric
to capitalize on economic and social problems. This kind of political extremism does
not only destabilize political institutions but also leads to poorly conceived and un-
sustainable economic and social policies, which may harm society severely.
Support for democratic institutions may be even more important in developing coun-
tries. It has been shown that democracy fuels economic growth, and thus increases
living standards (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Ace-
moglu et al., 2018). Many developing countries have however not yet democratized
and often suffer from state capture by individuals, corruption and weak enforcement
of property rights. This is a stumbling block not only to economic development but
also to peace (Sunde and Cervellati, 2014), the likelihood of economic reforms (Giu-
liano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, 2013), educational improvements (Ansell, 2010) and
better health outcomes (Kudamatsu, 2012).
There is a large literature highlighting the effect of support for democracy on the
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stability of democratic systems. Early work in this field focused on the importance
of ‘civic culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1963) and ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 1994) for
good institutional performance. Both concepts assume that citizens’ support of core
democratic values and civic engagement are key for the establishment of a stable
democratic system. Linz and Stepan (1996) confirm this idea and emphasize that a
country can only achieve democratic consolidation if its citizens culturally support
its political institutions. Larry Diamond summarizes these findings: “It is by now a
central tenet of empirical democratic theory that stable democracy also requires a belief
in the legitimacy of democracy.” (Diamond, 1999).
This thesis therefore focuses on economic, institutional and demographic determi-
nants of political attitudes, which are key for the stability of institutions and sustain-
able economic and social policies. Empirically it is difficult to identify the determi-
nants of political attitudes because randomization of potential causes such as educa-
tion, income or experience with democracy is often not feasible. I therefore apply a
variety of economteric techniques including an instrumental variable approach, spa-
tial regression discontinuity design, panel data methods and difference-in-difference
estimation to uncover causal factors that shape political attitudes.
In Chapter one I examine labour market conditions in Europe and their effect on
support for the European Union and voting for eurosceptic parties in European Par-
liament elections. This study thereby contributes to the debate about determinants of
populism in Europe, which is often built on anti-globalization sentiment. It opposes
the EU as institution, which symbolizes open markets, free movement of labour and
trans-national solidarity and cooperation. I identify the lack of economic perspec-
tives as an important factor contributing to this euroscepticism. To do so, I combine
industry-specific employment data for roughly 260 European regions with individual-
level Eurobarometer survey data and regional voting results for the past 20 years.
I apply panel data and instrumental variable methods. For the latter I construct a
Bartik-style instrument, which predicts employment changes on the basis of regional
industry specialization and Europe-wide sector specific employment growth rates. I
find that decreases in the change of the employment rate lead to lower support for the
EU and increased voting for eurosceptic parties. The effect of employment changes on
attitudes toward the EU is particularly strong for unemployed and low-skilled work-
ers in regions with a high share of migrants from other European member states,
which supports the narrative that ‘losers of globalization’ tend to be more skeptical
toward economic and political integration.
InChapter two LachlanMcNamee and I analyse the effect of historical political institu-
tions and their persistence in Namibia. In line with a body of literature that highlights
the importance of forms of colonialism for contemporary political and economic out-
comes (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; Lange, 2009; Iyer, 2010; Hariri, 2012),
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this chapter argues that indirect and direct colonial rule are important factors in shap-
ing contemporary support for democracy. Specifically, we examine indirect and di-
rect colonial rule as causal factors in shaping support for democracy by exploiting a
within-country natural experiment. Throughout the colonial era, northern Namibia
was indirectly ruled through a system of appointed indigenous elites whereas colo-
nial authorities directly ruled southern Namibia. This variation originally stems from
where the progressive extension of direct German control was stopped after a rinder-
pest epidemic in the 1890s, and thus constitutes plausibly exogenous within-country
variation in the form of colonial rule. Using this spatial discontinuity, we find that
individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support democracy and turnout
at elections. We explore potential mechanisms and find suggestive evidence that the
greater influence of traditional leaders in indirectly ruled areas has socialized individ-
uals to accept non-electoral bases of political authority. Thus, the ongoing parallel ex-
istence of undemocratic local governance structures can partially undermine support
for democracy even in the context of a functional, largely successful national demo-
cratic polity. This has potentially broad implications for democratization processes
in other sub-Saharan African countries, where systems of traditional leadership still
play an important role in local governance and national democracy is not as consoli-
dated as in Namibia. This chapter is accepted for publication in Comparative Political
Studies (SAGE Journals).
In Chapter three Uwe Sunde and I study the effect of demographic patterns on demo-
cratic attitudes across the world. Macro-determinants and retrospective experiences
have been shown to affect the support for democracy at the individual level. In
this chapter we investigate whether and how future orientation and the individual
life horizon, in terms of life expectancy and age, affect individual attitudes toward
democracy. Combining information from period life tables with individual survey
response data spanning more than 260,000 observations from 93 countries over the
period 1994–2014, we find evidence that the expected remaining years of life influ-
ence the attitudes toward a democratic political regime. The statistical identification
exploits variation in age-specific life expectancy across genders, countries, and time,
and decomposes the influence of age from the influence of the expected proximity
to death. The evidence shows that support for democracy increases with age, but de-
clines with expected proximity to death. This implies that increasing longevity might
help fostering the support for democracy. Increasing age while keeping the remain-
ing years of life fixed as well as increasing remaining years of life for a given age
group both contribute to the support for democracy. These results have important
implications for policy. Individual democratic attitudes are key for the viability of
democratic regimes and these attitudes appear to be weakened by short life horizons.
Many developing countries exhibit poor health conditions, high mortality, violent
conflicts, and generally gloomy perspectives for individual lives. These conditions
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thus constitute a stumbling block to democratic consolidation.
In contrast to the first three chapters, which examined political attitudes, in Chap-
ter four Miriam Breckner and I investigate economic development. This chapter il-
lustrates the negative environmental effects of urbanization and industrialization in
Egypt and emphasizes the importance of stable institutions that allow for environ-
mental protection and its enforcement. In the course of economic development cities
grow rapidly and industries flourish. People are attracted to these hotspots of new
opportunities but pollution is a significant downside when political institutions are
weak and do not enforce environmental protection. We study the impact of urban-
ization and industrialization through water pollution on the health of children living
along the Nile in Egypt. For our analysis we exploit spatial and temporal variation in
factory presence and urbanization, using a newly constructed, finely gridded panel
dataset that is based on geo-coded health, factory and population density data. We
find that children living in households downstream of urban areas suffer from higher
risks of disease than children living upstream. For industrial plants we also find
strong negative health effects on children living downstream while children living
upstream remain widely unaffected. The negative health effect on the downstream
population can be mitigated by access to clean drinking water.
This thesis broadens our knowledge about the formation of political attitudes and
economic development. I identify regional employment changes, exposure to auto-
cratic governance systems and life expectancy as important determinants of political
attitudes. So far there exist relatively few studies that empirically establish causal
links between socio-economic factors and political attitudes. These findings thus con-
tribute to the academic literature in this field and are at the same time highly policy
relevant. In addition, I show that economic development (in the form of urbanization
and industrialization) has geographically asymmetric health consequences. Pollution
is a common phenomenon in developing countries and is often due to weak political
institutions. The last chapter of this thesis therefore illustrates the importance of
stable political institutions for developing countries.
The four chapters in this thesis are self contained and can be read independently.
Each chapter is followed by an Appendix and the combined Bibliography of all four
chapters can be found after chapter four.
1
EMPLOYMENT SHOCKS AND ANTI-EU
SENTIMENT
1.1 Introduction
Populist parties in many European countries, such as UKIP in the UK, FN in France,
PVV in the Netherlands or AfD in Germany havemade electoral breakthroughs. Such
parties espouse a nationalistic agenda and oppose globalization. This populism is of-
ten manifested as Euroscepticism, with populist parties and their supporters seeing
the EU as an institutional symbol of globalization. These eurosceptic ideologies can
be harmful as support for the EU is key for its legitimacy and effectiveness (Hobolt
and Vries, 2016), which in turn fosters political stability and economic prosperity
(Schmidt, 2013). It is therefore important to better understand determinants of sup-
port for the EU. In the public debate, rising unemployment and the lack of economic
perspectives are among the most frequently mentioned reasons for the success of
these views.1 Even the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, has
emphasized the importance of policies which aim at mitigating economic inequality
and job insecurity in the EU to prevent the rise of populism.2
1. “Brexit is a rejection of globalisation” (Guardian, June 2016). “People who are left behind by
structural change and so-called ‘losers of globalization’ are prone to the rhetoric of the AfD”. In Ger-
man: “vom Strukturwandel Abgehängte und sogenannte ’Globalisierungsverlierer’ seien anfällig für
die Rhetorik der AfD.” (WirtschaftsWoche, February 2018). Angela Merkel in a governmental statement
about Brexit: “We have to make Europe more competitive and close the gap between losers and win-
ners of globalization”. In German: “[wir müssen uns] gemeinsam dafür einsetzen, Europa wettbewerbs-
fähiger zu machen und die Kluft zwischen Globalisierungsgewinnern und Globalisierungsverlierern zu
verkleinern.” (Regierungserklärung Angela Merkel, June 2016).
2. “In unusually political remarks, Mr Draghi called on Brussels to pay more attention to redistribu-
tion and address concerns- such as economic inequality and job insecurity- that have played into the
5
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I contribute to this debate by showing that regional labor market conditions af-
fect support for the EU. I document that regions experiencing negative employment
changes tend to vote for more eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections
and also show a higher attitudinal euroscepticism. Support for the EU and euroscep-
ticism are defined as two sides of the same coin encompassing attitudes toward the
European Union as a regime and its principles. I focus my analysis on attitudinal
euroscepticism because it is comparable across countries (as opposed to political par-
ties) and captures the distinct nature of anti-EU attitudes, which is not the case with
political parties that campaign on several platforms. In order to quantify attitudinal
euroscepticism I analyze Eurobarometer survey data and combine themwith regional
employment data. The Eurobarometer questions ask about the respondents’ image of
the EU, the respondents’ assessment of the benefits from the EU and the respondents’
evaluation of their country’s EU membership.
There are huge differences in these attitudes across regions but it is difficult to dis-
tinguish economic factors from other factors such as culture, regional institutions or
local politics, which are correlated with both labor market conditions and attitudes. I
therefore apply panel fixed effect estimation methods, which exploit variation within
regions over time, thereby conditioning on region-specific and time-specific unob-
served heterogeneity. I also include lagged dependent variables in order to account
for feedback effects from past attitudes on employment. Finally, I control for a num-
ber of factors that may be correlated with labor market conditions and support for
the EU such as education, demography and migration.
Regional employment changes may nevertheless be still endogenous to attitudes due
to third factors that are neither region-specific nor time-constant and are not captured
by the control variables. To account for that I construct a Bartik-style shift-share
instrument (Bartik, 1991) that predicts regional employment changes on the basis
of Europe-wide sectoral employment growth and regional industrial specialization.3
This instrument provides plausibly exogenous variation in regional employment and
allows me to identify a causal effect.
In all specifications I find a significantly positive effect of employment changes on
support for the EU.This effect is driven by variation in negative employment changes
rather than positive ones. In an attempt to identify a potential mechanism, I further
analyze interaction effects with education, occupation and migration. The theoretical
literature has suggested that nationalist ideology appeals in particular to ‘moderniza-
tion losers’ (Golder, 2016; Garry and Tilley, 2009). Hence, those who are threatened
hands of populist anti-European parties across the EU.” in “Do more to help globalisation’s losers, say
champions of liberalism” (Financial Times, September 2016).
3. For applications see also Blanchard and Katz (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Holzer
(2000) and Autor et al. (2016).
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to lose most from further European integration, such as unskilled people in regions
with a lot of low-skilled EU migration, are most likely to be eurosceptic. Consis-
tent with this, I find that both unemployed and low-skilled workers react particularly
strongly to employment changes. Moreover, the triple interaction between employ-
ment changes, an unskilled worker dummy and EU migration is statistically signifi-
cant. This finding indicates that unskilled are particularly sensitive to employment
changes in regions with high shares of EU migration.
This paper contributes to the literature on several dimensions. First, I exploit varia-
tion across 260 European regions over a long time horizon (1996–2014) and am there-
fore able to control for region and time specific factors that may cause bias. Second,
I analyze three different attitudinal dimensions of euroscepticism, which account for
its ‘multifaceted nature’ (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Other studies have often only
focused on one aspect, for example trust in institutions. Moreover, I present results
for voting behavior in European Parliament elections using administrative voting
data rather than self-reported ones as in other studies (Guiso et al., 2017; Hernández
and Kriesi, 2016). Third, I construct a Bartik-style instrument for European regions,
which arguably extracts the exogenous component in employment changes. This in-
strument has not been applied to the European context before. Fourth, I investigate
potential mechanisms such as occupation and education as well as their interaction
with regional migration.
There is a large literature emphasizing the link between economic insecurity and
anti-globalization sentiment (see Anderson (2007) for an overview). A recent strand
of literature examines effects of globalization, most notably trade shocks on political
polarization and extreme voting. Autor et al. (2016) find that US districts exposed
to high import competition tend to remove moderate representatives from office.
They conclude that “employment consequences of trade [are] acutely recognizable
and therefore politically actionable” (p.45). Similarly, Che et al. (2016) show that US
counties exposed to import competition from China experience increases in turnout
and are more likely to be represented by a Democrat. Colantone and Stanig (2018)
examine the effects of import competition on western Europe and also find that im-
port shocks lead to an increase in support for nationalist parties and a general shift
to the right in the electorate. Dippel, Gold, and Heblich (2015) present causal evi-
dence for the effect of trade integration on extreme right voting for Germany. All of
these studies apply an instrumental variable strategy exploiting variation in import
penetration from China depending on the local industry structure, which is advanced
in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). Guiso et al. (2017), Algan et al. (2017) and Dust-
mann et al. (2017) provide evidence that economic factors are important determinants
of support for right-wing populist parties in Europe.
Right-wing voting is often associated with nationalist ideologies. Therefore another
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strand of literature focuses on the effects of economic conditions on attitudes mea-
sured in surveys. Hobolt and Vries (2016) provide an extensive overview over the lit-
erature about origins of public support for European integration and its consequences.
Roth, Otter, and Nowak-Lehmann (2013), Frieden (2016), Dustmann et al. (2017) and
Algan et al. (2017) document a decline in trust in European and national institutions as
a consequence of the financial crisis. Roth, Otter, and Nowak-Lehmann (2013) show
that the economic crisis of 2008–2012 had a particularly pronounced negative effect
on trust in the European Commission and European Parliament in the four periph-
ery countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland). Dustmann et al. (2017) and Algan
et al. (2017) confirm that the economic crisis reduced trust in national and European
institutions and was associated with the rise of anti-establishment parties. In terms
of labor market conditions Dustmann et al. (2017) find for the EU15 that the unem-
ployment rate has a negative- albeit not significant- effect on support for European
integration and a negatively significant effect on trust in the European Parliament
and on the vote share of pro-EU parties. Algan et al. (2017) present evidence that
underpins these results. Increases in unemployment are associated with voting for
non-mainstream parties and a decline in trust in national and European institutions.
In order to causally identify this effect they use the share of pre-crisis construction
as instrument for employment changes during the economic crisis. The Bartik-style
instrument applied in this paper however goes beyond their instrument as it uses
both variation across sectors and over time rather than only variation across regions.
All these studies focus on trust in institutions asmain attitudinal outcomes. My analy-
sis complements this by focusing on the image of the EU, the perceived benefit from
the EU and the evaluation of EU membership in general and thereby disentangles
the effect of labor market conditions on mistrust in institutions and euroscepticism.
There are a few studies which analyze the effect of economic conditions on this ‘atti-
tudinal euroscepticism’.4 Both Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia (2013) and Gomez
(2015) establish a link between the financial crisis and euroscepticism measured with
the Eurobarometer membership question. While Gomez (2015) finds a strong effect
of economic variables such as GDP growth, unemployment rate and interest rates
on support for the EU in the context of the financial crisis, Serricchio, Tsakatika, and
Quaglia (2013) conclude that economic indicators have very limited power in explain-
ing euroscepticism. They instead attribute the effect of the financial crisis to national
identity and political institutions. Both approaches however have analytical short-
comings. Their time frame is rather short (2007–2011 in Gomez (2015) and only 2007
4. Other papers have studied macroeconomic and socioeconomic determinants of euroscepticism.
The following factors are particularly important in determining euroscepticism: inequality (Kuhn et al.,
2016), regional transfers from EU structural funds (Osterloh, 2011), social class (Lucassen and Lubbers,
2012), perceived threat from immigrants (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; De
Master and Le Roy, 2000), education (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010), age (Down and Wilson, 2013).
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and 2010 in Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia (2013)) and the unit of analysis is the
country-level. Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) examine the evolution of euroscepti-
cism for the pre-crisis period (1994–2004) and find that changes in economic growth,
inflation and unemployment are hardly related to euroscepticism. Their analysis is
also conducted on a country level. A regional-level analysis over a long time span
examining the effect of labor market conditions on different aspects of ‘attitudinal
euroscepticism’ is still missing from the literature.
The chapter is structured as follows: I first describe the political attitude, voting, and
regional employment data (Section 1.2). I then discuss both the fixed effect and the
instrumental variable estimation strategies (Section 1.3). The main analysis is con-
ducted in Section 1.4 measuring euroscepticism with survey data. I present results
from the panel analysis including effect heterogeneity and also from instrumental
variable estimations. Finally, I present results about the relationship between labor
market conditions and voting behavior in European Parliament elections in Section
1.5.
1.2 Data
The dataset is a panel containing political attitude, voting and employment informa-
tion for 265 European NUTS II regions in 25 countries between 1994 and 2014.5 Data
for new member states is available since 2004.6 European Parliament election data is
available for the years 1994 (EU12), 1999 (EU15), 2004 (EU25), 2009 (EU25) and 2014
(EU28).
1.2.1 Political Attitude Data: Eurobarometer
Analyzing attitudes toward the European Union is important because they ultimately
affect voting decisions as voting is a form of revealing preferences. While it is hard
to disentangle dissatisfaction with EU from other reasons why people vote for right-
wing, populist parties (e.g. dissatisfaction with national governments) survey evi-
dence is able to pinpoint the anti-European nature of dissatisfaction. The main part
of the analysis in this paper will therefore focus on the determinants of satisfaction
with the EU measured with survey responses. It is reassuring that anti-EU voting
and attitudinal euroscepticism measured with survey questions are correlated with
correlation coefficients around 0.4 (Table A5 in the Appendix).
In order to measure political attitudes I use the Euobarometer survey (European Com-
5. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finaland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.
6. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia.
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mission, 2017)7, which asks 1000 representative respondents per EU member country
twice a year about their opinion on various EU related topics.8 The measures for re-
spondents’ attitudes toward the EU ask whether the respondent thinks that his/her
country has benefited from EU membership, whether his/her country’s EU member-
ship is a good or bad thing and whether the EU conjures up a positive or negative
image (see exact wording of questions and summary statistics in Appendix Section
A.1). Boomgaarden et al. (2011) emphasize that EU attitudes are of ‘multifaceted na-
ture’ and therefore focusing on one aspect would fall short of a comprehensive char-
acterization of euroscepticism. The membership questions has been widely used in
previous literature (Frieden, 2016; Kuhn et al., 2016; Gomez, 2015; Osterloh, 2011; Lub-
bers and Scheepers, 2010). Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) classified the membership
and benefit questions as ‘instrumental euroscepticism’ reflecting cost/benefit consid-
erations. The image variable is characterized as ‘evaluative’ dimension of pro-/anti-
European sentiment by Fernandez, Eigmüller, and Börner (2016) and is less frequently
used in the literature. One reason might be that it was only introduced to the Euro-
barometer questionnaire in 2001. The questions are not all asked in each survey round.
While the benefit and membership questions are available between 1994 and 2011,
the image question was asked between 2001 and 2014. For the years 2001 to 2011 I
combine information from all three variables using the first principal component and
create a “EU Support Index”. In order to use as much variation over time as possible
the main specifications are estimated for each outcome variable separately. To make
the dependent variables comparable all three are binarized. I also extract data on the
evaluation of national institutions (trust in national government and trust in national
parliament) from the survey as these constitute important control variables. These
variables are also binarized as to make them comparable.
Eurobarometer also contains information about the region of residence (NUTS II9)
of the respondent so that the data can be linked to other regional data. I aggregate
the variables to annual intervals by averaging the values by region over all survey
rounds that contain the respective survey question in that year. Finally, I standardize
the variables to lie between 0 and 100, so that the values can be interpreted as %
of people in a given region in a given year who have a positive image of the EU/
think that their country benefits from EU membership/ believe that their country’s
EUmembership is a good thing. Figure 1.1 displays the distribution of support for the
EU as measured by the image variable and averaged over the years 2010-2014 across
7. Eurobarometer thus provides much more frequent data covering a longer time span than the Eu-
ropean Social Survey (ESS), which is used in many other studies (Dustmann et al., 2017; Algan et al.,
2017). ESS is a bianual survey, which starts in 2002.
8. PSUs are selected from each of the administrative NUTS II regions in every country so that each
region is represented in the sample. “PSU selection was systematic with probability proportional to
population size, from sampling frames stratified by the degree of urbanization” (Eurobarometer, 2017).
9. For Germany and UK only NUTS I level available from 2004 onwards.
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Figure 1.1. Distribution of image of EU across NUTS II regions
European regions. Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates the evolution of attitudes
toward the EU over time. Summary statistics of the regional-level characteristics are
provided in the Appendix in Table A1.
The survey also asks about individual characteristics such as age, gender and educa-
tion, which are important determinants of political attitudes and thus important con-
trol variables and possibly interesting interacting factors. I therefore also estimate a
model using all individual level observations rather than the region aggregates. Sum-
mary statistics of the individual-level variables can be found in the Appendix in Table
A2.
1.2.2 Voting Data
The voting data for the years 1994–2009 stem from the European Election Database
(EED), which contains voting data on a regional level (NUTS II) for European Par-
liament Elections for the years 1994, 1996 (Austria and Finland), 1999 (EU15), 2004
(EU25), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2009 (EU27). I added missing data based on
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national databases.10 For the 2014 EP election I collected data for all 28 EU member
states based on national databases (see Appendix Table A3 for sources). In order to
identify pro-EU parties I use results from the Euromanifesto Study, which allocates
each party a score on a pro/anti- EU scale based on content analysis of party pro-
grams (‘𝑃𝑟𝑜 𝐸𝑈 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒’).11 This pro-/anti-EU score is highly correlated (0.73) with
expert evaluations of parties’ position toward European integration (Chapel Hill Ex-
pert Survey, Bakker et al. (2015)). I then multiply each party’s pro-EU score with the
vote share that this party gained in region i in election year t. As I cannot allocate
scores to each party (Euromanifesto only coded ‘relevant’ parties) the vote shares do
not sum up to 1. I therefore weight the final measure with the inverse of the total
vote share of all parties that are coded in region i in year t.
𝑃𝑟𝑜 𝐸𝑈 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∑
𝑝
𝑃𝑟𝑜 𝐸𝑈 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑉 𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗
1
∑𝑝 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡
This index ranges from -18 (anti-EU) to 24 (pro-EU) with a mean of 6.7 and is avail-
able for 234 regions in the 28 EU countries. For ease of interpretation and to allow
comparability with the other outcomes I standardize the variable to lie between 0 and
100. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of pro-EU voting across Europe. The strongest
anti-EU voting behavior was observed in the East Midlands, UK in 2004 (the strongly
eurosceptic UKIP received 26% of the votes and the BNP 6.5%). See summary statistics
of the Pro EU Vote Score in Appendix Table A4.
1.2.3 Employment Data
The employment data used in this study comes from Cambridge Econometrics, which
combines regional and sectoral data from both Eurostat’s REGIO database andAMECO,
which is provided by the European Commission’s Directorate General Economic and
Financial Affairs. The disaggregated data is available for 286 NUTS II regions in 27
EU countries (all EU member states except Malta) and 6 sectors since 1990.12 The
10. I compiled regional voting data for the following countries: Poland, Portugal, and UK.
11. Euromanifesto evaluates quasi-sentences in party programs. “A classification scheme with in-
variant general categories is used to cover the total content of election programs by identifying the
statements of preference expressed in the programs. […] Thus, the coding procedure comprises a quan-
tification (how many statements do parties make?) and a classification (what kind of statements do
parties make?) of election programs” (Braun et al., 2015, p. 22). The ‘Pro EU’ variable represents the
dimension pro versus contra European integration and is the sum of prointegration codes (16 variables)
minus the sum of integration-sceptic codes (19 variables). It ranges from -100 (anti-EU) to 100 (pro-EU).
12. A (agriculture, forestry and fishing), B-E (industry), F (construction), G-J (wholesale, retail, trans-
port, accommodation & food services, information and communication), K-N (financial and business
services) and O-U (non-market services).
EMPLOYMENT SHOCKS AND ANTI-EU SENTIMENT 13
Figure 1.2. Distribution of pro-EU voting across NUTS II regions in 2014 European
Parliament elections
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main variable of interest is employment, which “covers all persons engaged in some
productive activity (within the production boundary of the national accounts)”. As
changes in employment may simply reflect changes in the working-age population
I adjust this measure by dividing by the active population.13 The main explanatory
variable in this study is the change of the employment rate in region i over the past
five years. I expect the change of the employment rate to affect attitudes rather than
levels as people are more likely to react to changes, which is confirmed by Algan et
al. (2017) findings. The 5-year time horizon was chosen to capture variations that are
not only driven by short-term events but represent significant changes in the labor
market that people have noticed and can still remember. Moreover it corresponds to
the 5-year interval between European Parliament elections. I show that the effects
do however not depend on the time horizon.
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 −
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−5
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−5
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−5
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−5
⋅ 100
Employment changes for all region-year pairs are close to normally distributed (see
Figure A2 in the Appendix) and its mean over the period 1994–2014 is slightly above
zero. Both positive and negative outliers (smallest and highest 1%) were excluded
from the sample. The largest drop in employment occurred in Greece between 2008
and 2013 (-16%) and the biggest increase occurred in Portugal between 1993 and 1998
(+16%). Figure A3 in the Appendix illustrates the evolution of the change of the em-
ployment rate over time for different country sub-samples. Detailed summary statis-
tics can be found in Appendix Table A6.
1.2.4 Additional Data
In addition I use migration data extracted from the EU Labor Force Survey (LFS),
which provides information on regional employment, nationality and educational
attainment of respondents. For the purposes of my analysis I distinguish between
nationals of the reporting country, EU nationals and non-EU nationals. To identify
low-skilled respondents I use the 3 step education measure (high, middle and low)
based on the Intentional Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). These data
is only available since 2006 for EU nationals (which is the most relevant group of
migrants) and is therefore most suitably combined with the image outcome so that
13. The active population includes both employed and unemployed people, but not economically in-
active, such as students and pensioners. Employment relative to active population can be greater than
1 in regions where many people work in a different region than they live, such as Brussels (BE10) or
Luxembourg (LU00).
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data for 9 overlapping years is available for analysis. Summary statistics are provided
in Table A7 in the Appendix.
Finally, I use data on education (share of population between 15 and 65 with primary,
secondary and tertiary education), median age and old-age ratio (above 65 year olds
compared to 15-65 year olds) and net migration rate on NUTS II level from Eurostat.
These data is available since 2000.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
Figure 1.3 demonstrates that there is a clear positive relationship between changes in
regional employment and support for the EU. It is however difficult to identify a causal
effect of changes in employment on support for the EU as labor market conditions
are not assigned randomly. To the contrary, labor market conditions are related to
policies, political and economic institutions and crisis which may all be correlated
with support for the EU at the same time. I therefore apply two different estimation
strategies to tackle these problems.
First, I estimate a panel model including time and region fixed effects to account
for all region- and time-specific factors. In the primary specification, I estimate the
following model:
𝐸𝑈 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝜏 + X
′
𝑖𝑡𝜸 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
Here, 𝐸𝑈 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 denotes the mean attitude toward the EU in region r at time
t and pro-EU voting score in region i at time t respectively. Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝜏
is the change of employment rate between t and t-5 and 𝛽 is the main coefficient
of interest. X𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables (level of employment rate, national
institutions, migration, demography, education), which are successively included. 𝜇𝑡
are year fixed effects and 𝛿𝑖 are region fixed effects. The estimation is conducted by
least squares and the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 allows for clustering at the regional level. This
model accounts for region-specific factors such as institutions, culture or experience
with the EU, which are correlated with both labor market outcomes and attitudes
toward the EU. The region-specific fixed effects also capture EU funding, which is
targeted at less developed regions and hardly varies over time.14 Moreover, time fixed
effects capture year-specific events that affect all European regions as for example
the financial crisis. In an additional specification, I also control for country specific
14. The goal of EU transfers is to achieve equalization among European regions and the biggest part
of all transfers is spent by the Structural Funds Programme (Becker, Egger, and Ehrlich, 2010). There
are three funding periods covering the time span of my sample: 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.
Regions defined as “less developed” receive the vast majority of funds. These tend to be the same ones
in all funding periods (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/).
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Figure 1.3. Employment changes and image of EU
Change of employment rate (rounded to closest integer) and image of EU (averaged over each bin). Size
of bubbles corresponds to number of region-year observations per bin.
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linear time trends, which capture country specific changes over time (for example
years since a country joined the EU).
In order to rule out reversed causality issues, i.e. past attitudes affecting contempo-
rary labor market conditions (for example through elected politicians) I control for
the fifth time lag of the dependent variable. In order to account for potential Nickell
bias (Nickell, 1981) I also present specifications using a bias corrected LSDV dynamic
panel data estimator (Bruno, 2005).
As robustness check, I test the sensitivity of the results with respect to the defini-
tion of the explanatory variable. I use different time horizons for the change of the
employment rate, I binarize the explanatory variable to only distinguish between neg-
ative and positive changes, I control for absolute employment changes and changes
in active population separately and I also control for the level of the employment rate.
In addition, I show a robustness check using the EU support index as dependent vari-
able, which comprises all three dimensions of the other dependent variables. To rule
out that the effect is driven by third variables such as general disappointment with
politicians, education, demographic patterns or migration I control for these factors.
They may however be considered ‘bad’ controls in the Angrist & Pischke sense (An-
grist and Pischke, 2008) as they are outcomes of the treatment themselves and are
therefore not included in the main specifications.
I also explore potential mechanisms driving this effect. The literature has shown that
cost/benefit considerations are important in forming an attitude about the European
Union (Frieden, 2016; Foster and Frieden, 2017). I therefore expect people who fear to
loose from further integration such as unemployed or low-skilled workers to be more
sensitive toward employment changes than others. I analyze whether the effects are
driven by positive or negative employment changes by splitting the sample. This
helps to understand whether people distinguish between positive and negative labor
market outcomes in attributing the changes to the EU. I also compare the labormarket
effects to migration effects and evaluate the interaction between the two. I then take
advantage of the individual level data provided by Eurobarometer, which allows me
to identify groups by employment status, age and education and their responsiveness
to changes in employment.
Secondly, I apply an instrumental variable approach using a sector-specific Bartik
(also known as shift-share) instrument (Bartik, 1991). It predicts regional employ-
ment changes on the basis of Europe-wide employment growth across industries
and exploits the fact that regions differ in their industrial specialization, and that
employment rises and falls unevenly across industries over time. The instrument is
constructed in the following way:
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𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑘 Δ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∑
𝑗
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡−5
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−5
∗ Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑖𝑗𝜏
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡−5
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−5 denotes the share of total employment in active population in
industry j in region i in year t-5. Using the fifth lag ensures that specializa-
tion patterns are not themselves the consequence of changes is certain industries.
Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑖𝑗𝜏 is the change of the employment rate in industry j between
t and t-5 for all European regions (excluding region i). The variation thus stems
from different sectoral compositions across regions in combination with changes in
Europe-wide industry conditions. As employment varies unevenly across industries
and over time and regions differ in their industrial specialization, regions are dif-
ferently exposed to Europe-wide industry shocks. These shocks are assumed to be
exogenous to economic and political conditions in region i as they reflect changes
in other regions rather than regional circumstances, which could be correlated with
support for the EU (for example regional party politics or regional transfers from the
EU).
The exclusion restriction underlying this instrumentation strategy thus requires that
Europe-wide industry-specific employment growth rates are uncorrelated with re-
gional labor market conditions. It is plausible that no region is large enough to
cause Europe-wide changes in an entire industry. The German region North Rhine-
Westphalia is the region with the highest employment in a single sector (2.6 Mio
employees in sector group G-J15) and only accounts for 4% of total employment in
that industry in 2014. Shocks to that industry in North Rhine-Westphalia are thus un-
likely to cause employment changes in that industry in all of Europe. I also present
robustness checks excluding not only the own region but the entire country from the
calculation of total employment changes in industry j. That ensures that country spe-
cific relations to the EU, which may also be correlated with the national labor market
are not introducing a bias.
Moreover, sectoral shares have to be exogenous as well (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin,
and Swift, 2017). A region’s sectoral composition may however be driven by some
factors, which are correlated with attitudes toward the EU, such as historical events,
education and demography. To address these concerns I add region fixed effects and
also a set of control variables (education, demography and migration) to the regres-
sion. When adding year fixed effects the first-stage results turn insignificant due to
high multicollinearity between the Bartik instrument and the fixed effects. Instead
15. Sector group G-J according to NACE Rev. 2 includes wholesale, retail, transport, accommodation
and food services, information and communication
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of using sectoral shares multiplied by Europe-wide growth rates I therefore only use
the first part of the instrument (sectoral shares) as instruments in Section 1.4.4. They
are strong instruments even when including time and region fixed effects. This is
similar to the instrumentation strategy proposed by Algan et al. (2017).
Another threat to the validity of the instrument may be EU policies specifically
targeted at regions with sectoral compositions that particularly suffer from recent
changes in economic conditions. These policies may determine support for the EU
and sector-specific employment changes in other regions at the same time. The EU
does however not have many policy tools available which could affect sector-specific
regional employment to a large extent. One of its main tools are funding programs,
which are supposed to foster regional convergence (Structural Funds and the Cohe-
sion Fund). If it was the case that the EU targeted certain region-specific industries
the coefficient of interest would however be downward biased because the EU would
support regions and sectors with negative employment changes, and the interven-
tions would most likely have a positive impact on attitudes.
In addition, the EU could affect employment through regulations such as REACH
(regulation addressing the production and use of chemical substances), Capital Re-
quirements Directives, or roaming regulations. These regulations most likely affect
employment only with a time lag (due to fixed labor contracts). I therefore present a
specification controlling for lagged attitudes to capture these effects.
A recent working paper (Jaeger, Ruist, and Stuhler, 2017) criticizes the use of shift-
share instruments in the immigration literature (as for example advanced in Card
(2001)). They argue that the exclusion restriction is violated because of high serial
correlation of the spatial distribution of immigrants and adjustment processes in re-
sponse to previous shocks. The instrument thus combines both short-term effects
of immigration and responses to previous immigrant shocks, which are endogenous.
This criticism does not apply to the setting outlined in this paper because industry-
specific employment changes are not highly serially correlated.16 Moreover, it is
implausible that people react to experienced employment changes with a lag, so ad-
justment processes are unlikely in this setting.
1.4 Main Results: Attitudes toward the EU
Eurosceptic attitudes often manifest in anti-EU voting behavior and can have detri-
mental effects on the stability of the EU and its growth prospects. In order to disen-
16. Jaeger, Ruist, and Stuhler (2017) computed that the correlation between the predicted immigrant
inflow and its lag is 0.96-0.99. In contrast, the correlation between the predicted employment change
and its lag is only 0.42. Moreover, the correlation coefficients between changes in industry-specific
employment in t and t-5 are between -0.23 (Agriculture) and -0.56 (Industry).
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Table 1.1: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ Employment (%) 0.6604*** 0.4080*** 0.1824*** 0.5941*** 0.3334*** 0.3029*** 0.3644*** 0.1914*** 0.1582**
(0.0861) (0.0631) (0.0541) (0.1026) (0.0744) (0.0618) (0.0987) (0.0723) (0.0631)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE x Year ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.05 0.63 0.69 0.03 0.63 0.69 0.01 0.60 0.69
N 2,668 2,668 2,668 2,950 2,950 2,950 2,950 2,950 2,950
Cluster 265 265 265 264 264 264 264 264 264
Mean DV 43.86 43.86 43.86 61.01 61.01 61.01 53.92 53.92 53.92
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and
100. Change of employment rate is computed over five years. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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tangle the effect on euroscepticism from other characteristics of eurosceptic parties
and to ensure comparability across countries the following section provides in-depth
analysis of labor market conditions as determinants for eurosceptic attitudes.
1.4.1 Panel Analysis
Table 1.1 presents the main results of the panel analysis. Columns (1), (4) and (7)
show correlations between employment changes and attitudes toward the EU with-
out any controls. Columns (2), (5) and (8) report my preferred specification including
region and year fixed effects and columns (3), (6) and (9) additionally include country
specific linear time trends. As I scaled the dependent variables to lie between 0 and
100, a 1 percentage point increase in the change of the employment rate corresponds
to a 𝛽1 percentage point impact on the dependent variable. I will interpret all coef-
ficients with respect to a 10 percentage point increase in the 5-year-change of the
employment rate, which is roughly analogous to a 2 percentage point increase per
year.17 All coefficients on change of employment rate are statistically significant on
the 1% level. A 10 percentage point increase in the change of the employment rate
corresponds to an increase of roughly 4 percentage points on the image scale (column
(2)), a 3 percentage point increase on the benefit scale (column (5)) and a 2 percentage
point increase on the membership scale (column (8)). These effect sizes correspond
to 0.1 to 0.3 standard deviations of the dependent variables. Compared to the means
of the dependent variables (44 for image, 65 for benefit and 61 for membership) a 10
percentage point increase in employment change raises support for the EU by 5-10%
of the sample average of the dependent variables.
In order to account for potential reversed causality problems I include lagged depen-
dent variables to the model. They capture past attitudes and also its policy reactions.
The number of observations decreases in these specifications as I loose the first four
years in each series due to the five year time lags. The specification with image as
dependent variable thus spans the period 2005–2014 and the membership and benefit
specifications the time period 1998–2011.18 The effects on image of EU and perceived
benefit are still statistically significant and of roughly the samemagnitude as the base-
line effects (Table 1.2). The effect on the assessment of the country’s EU membership
is not statistically significant anymore (p-value of 0.16).
One concern in this setting may be Nickell bias due to a mechanical correlation be-
tween the lagged dependent variable and the error term, which vanishes with an in-
creasing number of observations over time (Nickell, 1981). Judson and Owen (1999)
17. The mean negative change is -4.2% and the mean positive change is +4.2%. The standard deviation
of change of employment rate is 5.5.
18. The number of regions covered in the Eurobarometer survey decreased in 2004 (higher level of ag-
gregation for German and British regions). Therefore the number of regions covered by the regressions
also decreases.
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Table 1.2: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
(1) (2) (3)
Image Benefit Membership
Δ Employment (%) 0.4845*** 0.3247*** 0.1311
(0.0914) (0.1086) (0.0941)
Imaget-5 -0.0675
(0.0484)
Benefitt-5 0.0658**
(0.0320)
Membershipt-5 0.0392
(0.0488)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.62 0.64 0.65
N 1,570 1,742 1,742
Cluster 206 249 249
Mean DV 40.67 62.26 54.65
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables
based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0
and 100. Change of employment rate is computed over five years. Stan-
dard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
show that the bias of the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator for dynamic
panel data models is sizable even in panels with 20 time periods. I therefore present
robustness checks using a bias-corrected LSDV estimator, which estimates a boot-
strap variance-covariance matrix for the corrected estimator (Bruno, 2005) (see Table
A8 in the Appendix). Judson and Owen (1999) provide Monte Carlo evidence that the
corrected LSDV estimator performs better than traditional GMM estimators. The es-
timated effects of changes in the employment rate are very similar in the panel fixed
effect set-up and the bias corrected fixed effect estimation irrespective of whether the
correction is being initialized by the Anderson-Hsiao or Arellano-Bond estimator.
The panel results are robust to a number of checks. First, I investigate the sensitivity
of the results to the definition of the main explanatory variable. For this purpose I
estimate the effect for different time horizons of employment changes, i.e. employ-
ment changes between t and t-1, t-2, t-3 etc. up to t-10. The effect on the image of the
EU declines slightly for longer time horizons (the effect of a 1-year change amounts
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to 0.42 while the effect of a 10-year change is 0.32) but remains still statistically sig-
nificant (see Figure A4). I also binarize changes in the employment rate and thus
only distinguish between negative and positive changes. The effects on image and
benefit are still highly statistically significant and quantitatively similar to the base-
line effect. Experiencing positive employment growth rather than negative increases
the image of the EU by 3 percentage points and the perceived benefit from the EU
by 2 percentage points (see Table A9 in the Appendix). The effect on membership is
again not significant (p-value of 0.13) but quantitatively similar to the baseline. Next,
I estimate the effect of absolute employment changes and changes in active popula-
tion separately to show that the effects are indeed driven by employment dynamics
rather than population dynamics. The effects of absolute employment changes are
still highly significant and of similar size as the baseline. Changes in active popula-
tion have no significant effect on attitudes (see Table A10 in the Appendix). I then
include the level of the employment rate as control variable (see Table A11 in the Ap-
pendix). The coefficients decrease slightly in magnitude as compared to the baseline
but remain all statistically significant. The effect of the employment rate is positive
and for the image and benefit outcomes statistically significant. A 10 percentage
point increase in the employment rate corresponds to a 5 percentage point increase
on the image scale.
Second, I also estimate the effect of changes in the employment rate on a combined
EU support index, which is based on all three outcome variables and also ranges from
0 to 100. It is only available for the period 2001-2011. Here, a 10 percentage point
decrease in the change of the employment rate corresponds to a decline by 3 points
of the index, which has a sample mean of 57 and a standard deviation of 15 (see Table
A12 in the Appendix).
Third, I add a number of control variables in order to substantiate the argument. I
control for the evaluation of national institutions (national government and national
parliament) to demonstrate that I capture an effect above and beyond attitudes to-
ward politics or politicians in general (see Table A13 in the Appendix).19 The effect
of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU remains significant for the image
and benefit outcome- albeit smaller than in the baseline (around half the size). The
effect on membership becomes insignificant. I also add trust in EU parliament as an
additional outcome tomake it comparable to the questions about national institutions.
For this outcome, I also find a statistically significant effect even when controlling for
trust in national parliament and government. Hence, holding the evaluation of na-
tional institutions constant employment changes still affect attitudes toward the EU.
That shows that people explicitly attribute changes in the labor market conditions
19. Algan et al. (2017) find that changes in unemployment affect trust toward national and European
political institutions.
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at least to some degree to the European Union. Interestingly, I find a highly signifi-
cant and large positive effect of trust in national parliament on attitudes toward EU
but an insignificant and small (for membership even negative) effect of trust in na-
tional government on attitudes even though trust in national government and trust
in national parliament are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.91). Finally,
I show that the results are also robust to including education, median age, old-age
ratio and migration as control variables (see Table A14 in the Appendix).
Lastly, I explore heterogeneities of the employment effect with respect to country
groups. I find that the employment effect is strongest for southern and eastern Eu-
ropean countries (see Figure A5). It is mainly driven by Greece, Portugal, Spain and
Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary (see Figure A6). These countries suffered par-
ticularly from the financial crisis, which supports the findings of Frieden (2016), Dust-
mann et al. (2017) and Algan et al. (2017) who emphasize the negative effect of the
Great Recession on trust in European political institutions.
1.4.2 Potential Mechanisms
In this section I investigate potential mechanisms driving the effect of changes in la-
bor market conditions on attitudes. First, I distinguish between positive and negative
changes in order to determine whether the effect is driven by regions that experi-
enced a deterioration in labor market conditions or by regions that experienced an
improvement. It turns out that negative employment changes have a highly signifi-
cant and much larger effect on attitudes than the baseline (see Appendix Table A17).
A 10 percentage point decrease in the change of the employment rate, raises the im-
age of the EU by 8 percentage points and improves the evaluation of both benefit
and membership by 5 points. The effects for the sup-sample of negative employment
changes are thus roughly twice the size of the baseline effects. The effect of positive
changes is however not statistically different from zero. Fitting a quadratic model
confirms the heterogeneous effects for positive and negative changes (see Table A18
in the Appendix). The marginsplot (Figure A7 in the Appendix) shows that the re-
lationship between changes in the employment rate and attitudes toward the EU is
strongly negative for negative changes in the employment rate and flattens for val-
ues larger than zero (the 95% confidence bands overlap for positive changes in the
employment rate). These results indicate that negative changes in employment are
associated with the EU while positive changes are not. The estimation also shows
that large decreases in the employment rate affect attitudes stronger than small ones.
A 15% decline in the employment rate decreases attitudes by around 7 points more
than a 10% decline in the employment rate. In turn, a 5% decline in the employment
rate decreases attitudes only by 3 points more than no change in the employment
rate.
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Table 1.3: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Image Image Image Image
Δ Employment (%) 0.1602** 0.2289*** 0.2342*** 0.2480***
(0.0738) (0.0805) (0.0724) (0.0735)
Working age (18-65) 0.9361**
(0.4490)
Working age (18-65) × 0.1446***
Δ Employment (%) (0.0534)
Active Population 1.3948***
(0.4215)
Active Population × 0.0643
Δ Employment (%) (0.0518)
Unemployed -7.7969***
(0.4773)
Unemployed × 0.1051*
Δ Employment (%) (0.0613)
Low-skilled -11.3862***
(0.4236)
Low-skilled × 0.1672**
Δ Employment (%) (0.0705)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
N 520,233 520,104 520,233 411,137
Cluster 265 265 265 265
Mean DV 44.30 44.30 44.30 43.28
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on
Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change of
employment rate is computed over five years. Working age is defined as 18 to 65
years. Active population consists of both employed and unemployed as opposed to
students, house persons and retired people. ‘Low-skilled’ consists of people who left
education before the age of 16. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In order to understand who is particularly affected by these negative changes I ana-
lyze individual-level data in a next step. Several studies have documented that people
who benefited from European integration (educated and high-skilled citizens) have
higher support for EU membership and have higher trust in European institutions
(Foster and Frieden, 2017; Frieden, 2016; Algan et al., 2017; Becker, Fetzer, and Novy,
2017).20 I therefore analyze these characteristics in greater detail.
Table A15 presents estimates of the baseline model including individual level controls
(age, gender and education dummies) using all individual-level observations rather
than region aggregates. The effects of employment changes are all statistically signif-
icant and quantitatively similar to the baseline results.21 Here the outcome variables
are binary (instead of regional averages as in the baseline) and to account for the dis-
crete nature of the dependent variable I also show that the results hold when applying
a logit model (see Appendix Table A16). Next, I explore interaction effects between
changes in the employment rate and groups in society that may be particularly af-
fected by changes in the labor market. First, I create a dummy for the working age
population (18-65) and I find that the effect of changes in the employment rate is par-
ticularly strong for this group (Table 1.3, column (1)). Then I analyze heterogeneous
effects with respect to the active population (employed or actively seeking employ-
ment). The interaction between changes in the employment rate and active popu-
lation is positive however not statistically significant (Table 1.3, column (2)).22 The
effect of employment changes on attitudes is reinforced if someone is unemployed
(Table 1.3, column (3)). Finally I also find that the effect is particularly strong for the
low-skilled.23 While the effect of a change of the employment rate on the image of
the EU is around 0.25 for the high-skilled it amounts to 0.42 for the low-skilled (Table
1.3, column (4)). These findings support the hypothesis that the effect of labor mar-
ket changes on attitudes toward the EU is driven by the so-called ‘left-behind’. Both
unemployed and unskilled may feel threatened by a deterioration in the labor market
conditions and blame the EU.
It is difficult to identify reasons why those with gloomy perspectives on the labor
market associate changes in labor market conditions with the EU. One reason may
be fear of foreign migration. Becker and Fetzer (2016) show for the UK that increased
migration from Eastern Europe (which is relatively low-skilled) increased the vote
20. This line of argument is based on utilitarian explanations for public support of European integra-
tion (Hobolt and Vries, 2016).
21. The differences in the size of the coefficients are due to the weighting of observations. While in
the baseline each region-year pair receives equal weights, in this specification the unit of observation
are individuals.
22. Self-employed, managers, other white collar workers, manual workers and unemployed as op-
posed to house persons, retired and students.
23. People with up to 15 years of education as opposed to people with 16 or more years of education.
Students are excluded.
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Table 1.4: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU: interaction with
EU migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Image Image Image Image
Δ Employment Rate 0.5835*** 0.6020*** 0.7288*** 0.8255***
(0.1113) (0.1218) (0.1199) (0.1494)
Share EU migrants 0.8843*** 1.2694***
(0.3233) (0.4103)
Δ Employment Rate × 0.0087 0.0121
Share EU migrants (0.0097) (0.0114)
Low-skilled × Δ Employment Rate × 0.0131*
Share EU migrants (0.0070)
LS EU/LS Home 0.8692*** 0.7210***
(0.1870) (0.2573)
Δ Employment Rate × -0.0027 -0.0040
LS EU/LS Home (0.0040) (0.0041)
Low-skilled × Δ Employment Rate × 0.0152*
LS EU/LS Home (0.0079)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
N 225,099 177,401 184,183 145,343
Cluster 162 162 147 145
Mean DV 41.30 40.75 42.38 41.93
OLS estimations. The image outcome variable is based on a Eurobarometer survey question and is coded
to lie between 0 and 100. Change of employment rate is computed over five years. Interaction terms
between low-skilled and Δ employment rate and between low-skilled and share EU migrants/share low-
skilled EU migrants are included in the estimation model but not reported in the table. Standard errors
(clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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share for the eurosceptic UK Independence Party. I therefore control for the share of
EUmigration and examine an interaction effect between changes in employment and
migration. I conduct these analysis only for the image outcome as regional data on
EU migration is only available since 2006.24 The series for benefit and membership
would be too short. Surprisingly, the effect of EU migration on attitudes toward the
EU is significantly positive and the effect is even larger than the employment effect
(Table 1.4, column (1)). People living in regions with a high share of EU migrants
thus tend to have a better image of the EU. This provides support for the ‘contact hy-
pothesis’ (Allport, 1954), which states that contact is one of the most effective ways
to reduce prejudice. The interaction effect between EU migration and employment
changes is insignificant. The effect of employment changes on the image of the EU
therefore does not seem to be driven by actual migration. In the previous paragraph
I demonstrated that the effect is particularly strong for the low-skilled. This part of
society may feel particularly threatened by migration due to an increase in perceived
job insecurity and concerns about wage reductions (NAS, 2017; Dustmann, Gabbri,
and Preston, 2005; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston, 2013; Borjas, 2003). The inter-
action between low-skilled, employment change and share of EU migrants indeed
reveals a significant positive effect (Table 1.4, column (2)).25 The employment effect
is thus stronger for low-skilled people in regions with a high share of EU migrants.
These findings are in line with Dustmann et al. (2017, p. 14) conclusion from a liter-
ature review about immigration and economic adjustment: “Overall, however, it is
fair to say that negative effects on native wages, if present, are relatively modest and
are restricted to those groups that are in direct competition with immigrants.”
In a next step, I focus on low-skilled EU migration as this type of migration may
threaten local low-skilled workers most. For this purpose I include the ratio be-
tween low-skilled EU migrants to low-skilled local citizens (LS EU/LS Home) to the
model. Again, the interaction between this low-skilled migration ratio and employ-
ment changes has no effect on attitudes in general (Table 1.4, column (3)). When
interacting this term with the low-skilled dummy (Table 1.4, column (4)) the effect
becomes statistically significant. This finding demonstrates that low-skilled locals
are particularly sensitive to employment changes in the presence of a large share of
low-skilled EU migrants.
Finally, I investigate whether the effect of changes in attitudes toward the EU is re-
24. For that reason I also only observe 162 regions rather than 265 as in the previous regressions.
Since 2004 Eurobarometer data is available for fewer, more aggregated regions in Germany and the UK.
25. I estimate the fully specified model:
𝐸𝑈 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝜏 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡 +
𝛽5Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝜏 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽6Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝜏 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡 ∗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑡+𝛽8Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝜏 ∗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑈 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑡 ∗𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑡+
𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑟 + 𝑢𝑟𝑡
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lated to EU policies, i.e. EU migration, or driven by discontent with globalization in
general. As a placebo check I therefore estimate the effect of non-EU (low-skilled)
migration on attitudes toward the EU. Table A19 shows that there is neither an ef-
fect of share of non-EU migrants on image of EU (column (1)), nor interaction effects
between the share of non-EU migrants, changes in employment and the low-skilled
dummy (column (2)). I also do not find significant effects of the share of low-skilled
non-EU migrants and its interaction with employment changes and low-skilled local
workers (Table A19, columns (3) and (4)). These findings suggest that the effect of
employment changes interacted with a dummy for low-skilled locals and the EU mi-
gration rate is unique to EU migration and does not pick up effects of migration or
frustration with globalization in general.
1.4.3 Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis
In this section I present results of Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions using
regional industrial composition multiplied with Europe-wide employment changes
in those industries as an instrument. Table 1.5 shows the effect of predicted employ-
ment changes based on the the Bartik instrument on actual employment changes.26
In this model I use variation in shocks to certain industries over time (these shocks
are roughly the same for all regions in each year) and variation in the industry com-
position across regions and over time.
The first column shows the effect of predicted employment on actual employment.
A 1 percentage point increase in predicted employment change is associated with a
0.5 percentage point increase in actual employment change. The Kleinbergen-Paap
rk Wald F statistic is well above 10 and the instrument is thus highly relevant.27 In
column (2) I add region fixed effects to capture all region-specific factors, which may
affect the regional industry composition and total employment changes. I thus rely
on variation within regions over time. This yields an F-statistic of 143 and a statis-
tically significant effect of 0.9. Finally, I add socio-demographic controls (education,
demography and migration). In this specification a 1 percentage point increase in
predicted employment change is associated with a 0.8 percentage point increase in
actual employment change and the F-statistic is 58 (column (3)). I will present 2SLS
results for all specifications.
The 2SLS results confirm the findings from the panel analysis. There is a statistically
significant positive relationship between changes in the employment rate and atti-
tudes toward the EU. The effect sizes are however not comparable as specifications
differ (the 2SLS analysis does not include year fixed effects). I will discuss the com-
26. 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑘 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∑𝑗 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ Δ𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑖𝑗𝜏
27. The Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is also well above the Stock-Yogo critical values in all
specifications.
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Table 1.5: First-stage regression
(1) (2) (3)
Δ Employment Δ Employment Δ Employment
Bartik Δ Employment 0.523*** 0.892*** 0.777***
(0.0670) (0.0745) (0.102)
Region FE ✓ ✓
Controls ✓
adj. R2 0.06 0.23 0.31
N 4,366 4,366 3,095
Cluster 286 286 278
F-Test 60.98 143.44 57.92
OLS estimations for the period 1996-2014 (columns (1) and (2)) and 2000-2014 (column (3). Im-
age, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions
and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Controls include education (share of population with
primary education, share of population with secondary education, share of population with
tertiary education), demographic variables (median age and old-age ratio) and migration rate.
Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.6: 2SLS estimations: effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ Employment (%) 1.354*** 2.938*** 1.979*** -1.630* 1.609*** 1.963*** 1.232* 1.207*** 1.203***
(0.409) (0.236) (0.328) (0.893) (0.178) (0.508) (0.648) (0.172) (0.413)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
N 2,618 2,618 2,502 2,925 2,925 2,060 2,925 2,925 2,060
Cluster 265 265 261 264 264 259 264 264 259
1st stage F-Test 48.05 102.10 50.39 21.82 120.39 22.71 21.82 120.39 22.71
Mean DV 43.50 43.50 43.33 60.89 60.89 62.32 53.82 53.82 54.10
2SLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie
between 0 and 100. Change of employment rate is computed over five years. Controls include education (share of population with primary
education, share of population with secondary education, share of population with tertiary education), demographic variables (median age
and old-age ratio) and migration rate. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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parison of effect sizes using an alternative instrumentation strategy in Section 1.4.4.
In this setting, I find that a 10 percentage point increase in the change of the employ-
ment rate is associated with an increase by 14 percentage points on the image scale
relative to a mean of around 44 and a standard deviation of 15 (Table 1.6, column (1)).
It is puzzling that the effect on benefit from the EU is negatively significant (Table
1.6,column (4)). It however turns positive and becomes statistically significant when
including region fixed effects and control variables (Table 1.6, columns (5) and (6)).
The effect of changes in the employment rate on the membership outcome are also
significantly positive (Table 1.6, columns (7)-(9)).
As robustness check and to account for past attitudes I include the fifth lag of the
dependent variables to the 2SLS specifications (see Table A20 in the Appendix). Most
coefficients on change of the employment rate are highly statistically significant and
even larger than in the baseline 2SLS regressions. A 10 percentage point increase in
the change of the employment rate is for example associated with a roughly 30 per-
centage point increase on the image of the EU scale (column (1)). Column (3) displays
the effect of changes of the employment rate on perceived benefit from the EU and
this effect is now positive (as opposed to the specification without lagged dependent
variable) however not statistically significant (p-value of 0.16). Not surprisingly, the
lags of the dependent variable have a positive and quite sizable (coefficients between
0.1 and 0.6) effect on contemporary attitudes.
As an additional robustness check I exclude the own country in the calculation of
the Bartik instrument (Table A21 in the Appendix). The results are very similar to
the 2SLS baseline. Gaining a bit more credibility for the exclusion restriction comes
at the expense of relevance. The F-statistic is only slightly greater than 10 in some
specifications (i.e. 10.03 in the specification without any fixed effects for the benefit
and membership outcomes). Finally, I also estimate the 2SLS model with individual
level observations and individual characteristics as controls. Again, the results also
hold in this setting (see Table A22 in the Appendix).
1.4.4 Comparison of Panel and 2SLS Results
The coefficients on the 2SLS regressions in Section 1.4.3 are not comparable with
those of the OLS regressions in Section 1.4.1, because of differences in specification.
The preferred specification in the panel setup was to use both region and year fixed
effects. This specification does not lend itself to a Bartik-type instrument, because the
inclusion of year fixed effects absorbs explanatory power from the Bartik instrument
and it becomes weak (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic for the first stage falls to
4.3).28 The first-stage however improves drastically when only using the first part
of the Bartik instrument, the lagged sectoral shares to predict employment changes
28. The vector inflation factor for the Bartik instrument is around 16.
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Table 1.7: Comparison between panel and 2SLS results
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel IV Panel IV Panel IV
Δ Employment (%) 0.2972*** 0.5090*** 0.2971*** 0.4795*** 0.1836** 0.2017*
(0.0657) (0.1136) (0.0906) (0.1410) (0.0867) (0.1217)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
N 2,552 2,552 2,083 2,083 2,083 2,083
Cluster 261 261 259 259 259 259
Mean DV 43.71 43.71 62.46 62.46 54.23 54.23
F-Test 42.44 44.26 44.26
Panel and 2SLS estimations including year and region fixed effects. Image, Benefit and Membership are out-
come variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change of
employment rate is computed over five years. Instruments for the change of employment rate are employ-
ment share in agriculture, employment share in industry, employment share in construction, employment
share in wholesale, employment share in financial services and employment share in non-market services.
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic reported for 2SLS estimations. Control variables include share of popula-
tion with primary education (in %), share of population with secondary education (in %), share of population
with tertiary education (in %), median age, old age ratio (65 and above compared to 15-65 year olds) and crude
rate of net migration plus adjustment. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is 51.4). By using the fifth lag of the sectoral
shares as instruments I isolate the component of employment changes stemming from
industrial specialization and account for year effects separately (the Bartik instrument
combines these two dimensions as Europe-wide industry-specific growth rates are
constant for all regions). It seems plausible that the impact of sectoral specialization
on support for the EU works mainly through the labour market, especially in the
short term. Just as for the Bartik instrument, regional demography, education and
migration may nevertheless constitute threats to the validity of the instruments. I
therefore include these factors as controls in the panel and 2SLS setting.
Table 1.7 presents the results of the panel and IV models using sectoral shares as in-
struments. While I find in the panel analysis that a 10 percentage point increase in
the change of the employment rate is associated with a 3 percentage point increase
on the image scale (column (1)) I estimate an increase by 5 percentage points in the
2SLS setting (column (2)). I also find larger 2SLS coefficients for the benefit and mem-
bership outcomes (columns (3)-(6)).
The fact that ̂𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 < ̂𝛽2𝑆𝐿𝑆 indicates that the OLS estimates may have been downward
biased. This could be the case if for example EU policies were targeted at regions
with extremely negative employment changes and thereby mitigated the effect that I
estimated in the panel specification. Other omitted factors in the panel analysis may
include media reporting or activities of local politicians. It is however reassuring that
I find qualitatively a similar pattern- a positive effect of changes in the employment
rate on attitudes toward the EU- in both setups.
1.5 Additional Results: Voting
Empowering nationalistic anti-globalization partiesmay have dramatic consequences
for trade policies, immigration policies and international cooperation and thus growth
prospects. It is therefore not only important to better understand the determinants
of attitudinal euroscepticism but also of eurosceptic voting behavior. This analysis
is therefore based on voting behavior in five European Parliament elections (1994,
1999, 2004, 2009, 2014). Throughout all different specifications I find significantly
positive effects of changes in the employment rate on pro-EU voting. A 10 percent-
age point increase in the change of the employment rate raises the pro-EU voting
index by roughly 4 points on a scale from 0 to 100 (Table 1.8, column (1)). Greece for
example had a rather low pro-EU index in 2014 (37 as compared to a Europe-wide
mean of 56). Between 2009 and 2014 it experienced a decline in the employment rate
of 13 percentage points. Had the employment rate only decreased by 3 percentage
points and holding everything else constant, the pro-EU index would lie around 41
according to the model. A 10 percentage point increase in the change of the employ-
ment rate would have thus corresponded to a roughly 10% improvement in Greece’s
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Table 1.8: Effect of employment changes on pro-EU voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pro EU Voting
OLS
Pro EU Voting
OLS
Pro EU Voting
OLS
Pro EU Voting
2SLS
(Bartik)
Pro EU Voting
2SLS
(Sectoral Shares)
Δ Employment (%) 0.3813*** 0.3802*** 0.3552*** 2.7035*** 0.4699***
(0.0912) (0.0978) (0.0881) (0.6734) (0.1602)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE x Year ✓
F-Test 11.81 22.72
N 780 780 780 765 780
Cluster 234 234 234 234 234
Mean DV 56.41 56.41 56.41 56.30 56.41
OLS and 2SLS estimations. The pro-EU voting index is based on a party’s pro-EU score (assigned by Euromanifesto) and its vote
share in the EP elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. It is scaled to lie between 0 and 100. Change of employment rate is
computed over five years. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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pro-EU voting index. When including region and year fixed effects (column (2)) and
country specific linear time trends (column (3)) the size of the coefficient remains
constant and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is also highly
significant in the 2SLS specification using the Bartik instrument (column (4)). The
coefficient should however be interpreted with caution as the first-stage F-statistic is
only marginally above 10 (11.8) and the instrument may therefore be weak. When us-
ing sectoral shares as instruments the effect is still statistically significant and around
18% larger than the OLS coefficients. A 10 percentage point increase in the change
of the employment rate raises the pro-EU voting index by roughly 5 points (column
(5)). These results indicate that bad labor market conditions translate into voting for
parties campaigning on an anti-EU platform.
I also estimate the effect on turnout as participating in European Parliament elections
may be another way to express dismay or approval of the EU (see Guiso et al. (2017)).
I do not find any statistically significant effect on turnout in the unconditional model
(Table A23, column (1)). When adding region and year fixed effects (column (2)) as
well as country specific linear time trends (column (3)) the effects become highly sta-
tistically significant (a 10 percentage point increase in the change of the employment
rate corresponds to a increase in turnout of roughly 2 percentage points). While
the 2SLS estimate using the Bartik instrument is negatively significant the estimate
using sectoral shares as instruments is positively significant. These results thus only
provide suggestive evidence that the decision to turnout at European Parliament elec-
tions is driven by labor market conditions.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that regional employment changes affect support for the EU
by affecting voting behavior and attitudes. Applying both panel and instrumental
variable estimation strategies I find that a decrease in the change of the employment
rate is associated with voting for more anti-EU parties and a deterioration of the
image of the EU, perceived benefit from the EU and evaluation of the EU membership
of one’s country. These effects are particularly strong for ‘losers of globalization‘, i.e.
unskilled and unemployed people. I also find that the effect of employment changes
on the image of the EU is most pronounced for unskilled workers living in regions
exposed to high EU migration.
In estimating these effects I take advantage of Eurobarometer survey data which al-
lows linking respondents to their region of residence as well as regional employment
data. My analyses are thus based on a novel panel covering roughly 260 European re-
gions over 20 years. In addition, I introduce a Bartik-style instrument, which exploits
variation in industry specializations across regions in combination with Europe-wide
sector-specific shocks. All different estimation approaches, including fixed effects
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models, lagged dependent variables and the IV model, confirm the relationship be-
tween labor market conditions and support for the EU. It is however difficult to deter-
mine the mechanisms underlying this effect. I provide some suggestive evidence that
fear of EU migration may be a concern linking labor market conditions to attitudes
toward the EU. Further research is however needed to better understand whether
(low-skilled) EU migration is a real threat for low-skilled local workers and whether
policies or communication strategies can mitigate this concern.
In times of Brexit and the success of anti-EU parties in many European countries
public support for the European endeavor is more important than ever to ensure the
stability of the union. Policy makers should therefore emphasize the economic bene-
fits from political and economic integration and aim at redistributing the gains from
globalization. More generally, it is important to avoid that regions are left behind and
policy makers thus have to tackle inequalities in labor market opportunities. The IMF
concluded in its fiscal monitor that “excessive inequality can erode social cohesion,
lead to political polarization, and ultimately lower economic growth” (IMF, 2017). The
findings of this paper thus do not only have implications for the political future of
the EU but also for its growth prospects.
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Appendix A.1: Eurobarometer Data
Benefit: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY)
has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union ?
• 0: not benefited
• 1: benefited
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Period covered Regions
0.44 0.50 546,291 2001-2014 260
Membership: Generally speaking, do you think that (OURCOUNTRY’S) membership
of the European Union is … ?
• 0: A bad thing
• 0: Neither good nor bad
• 1: A good thing
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Period covered Regions
0.65 0.48 533,722 1994-2011 260
Image: In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?
• 0: Very negative
• 0: Fairly negative
• 0: Neutral
• 1: Very positive
• 1: Fairly positive
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Period covered Regions
0.55 0.49 567,567 1994-2011 260
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Table A1: Summary statistics: Eurobarometer data (aggregated to regional level)
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Image 43.60 15.40 0 93 2,827
Benefit 60.94 17.03 0 100 3,091
Membership 53.93 16.07 0 100 3,091
EU Support Index 56.90 14.82 0 100 2,151
Trust national government 36.36 17.02 0 100 3,014
Trust national parliament 38.99 19.53 0 100 3,014
Trust EU Parliament 60.53 17.32 0 100 3,014
Table A2: Summary statistics: Eurobarometer data (individual-level data)
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Age 46.85 18.24 15 99 805,578
Gender 1.54 0.50 1 2 832,290
Education 2.19 0.89 1 4 749,618
Unemployed 0.07 0.26 0 1 833,226
Low-skilled 0.26 0.44 0 1 689,023
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Figure A1. Evolution of image of EU, benefit from EU and evaluation of EU membership over time
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Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland and Sweden. EU Center: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands. Eastern Europe: Bulgaria,
Czech Rep., Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Southern Europe: Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
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Appendix A.2: Voting Data
Table A3: Sources: European Parliament Election results 2014
Austria http://euwahl2014.bmi.gv.at
Belgium http://polling2014.belgium.be
Bulgaria http://results.cik.bg/ep2014
Croatia http://www.izbori.hr
Cyprus http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results
Czech Republic http://www.volby.cz
Denmark http://dst.dk/valg
Estonia http://ep2014.vvk.ee/voting-results-en.html
Finland http://stat.fi/tup/tilastotietokannat/index_en.html
France http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Europeennes
Germany http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/europawahlen/2014.html
Greece http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/
Hungary http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2014/
Ireland http://electionsireland.org/results/europe/index.cfm
Italy http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
Latvia http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results
Lithuania http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results
Luxembourg http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results
Netherlands http://www.nlverkiezingen.com/EP2014P.html
Poland http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl/pl/
Portugal http://www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt
Romania http://www.roaep.ro/bec_europ2014
Slovakia http://volby.statistics.sk/ep/ep2014/
Slovenia http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/volitve/evropski-parlament
Sweden http://www.val.se/val/ep2014/slutresultat/E/rike/index.html
Spain http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/
United Kingdom http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu-regions/E15000004
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Table A4: Summary statistics: voting in European Parliament elections
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Pro EU Voting 56.68 14.58 0 100 819
Turnout 46.67 17.70 0 94 740
Table A5: Correlation between different aspects of euroscepticism
Pro EU Score (EED) Membership Benefit Image
Pro EU Score (EED) 1.00
Membership 0.44 1.00
Benefit 0.34 0.83 1.00
Image 0.40 0.77 0.74 1.00
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Appendix A.3: Employment Data
Figure A2. Histogram of change of employment rate
Table A6: Summary statistics of change in employment rate
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Period covered Regions
0.015 0.08 6,955 1980-2014 285
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Figure A3. Evolution of change in employment rate over time
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Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland and Sweden. EU Center: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands. Eastern Europe: Bulgaria,
Czech Rep., Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Southern Europe: Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
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Table A7: Summary Statistics: employment and migration data
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Δ Employment (%) -0.13 5.47 -16 16 4,450
Share EU migrants 3.41 6.07 0 73 1,326
Low-skilled EU/Low-skilled Home 3.84 6.30 0 67 1,146
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Appendix A.4: Robustness Checks
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Table A8: Bias corrected fixed effect estimator
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FE CFE-AH CFE-AB FE CFE-AH CFE-AB FE CFE-AH CFE-AB
Δ Employment (%) 0.3171*** 0.3049*** 0.2940*** 0.2135*** 0.1951*** 0.1919*** 0.1222** 0.1102* 0.1117*
(0.0580) (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0650) (0.0578) (0.0571) (0.0601) (0.0575) (0.0571)
Imaget-5 0.2306*** 0.3283*** 0.3318***
(0.0356) (0.0231) (0.0218)
Benefitt-5 0.3172*** 0.4207*** 0.4168***
(0.0360) (0.0125) (0.0121)
Membershipt-5 0.3066*** 0.4071*** 0.4060***
(0.0371) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N 2,429 2,429 2,429 2,706 2,706 2,706 2,706 2,706 2,706
Mean DV 43.73 43.73 43.73 46.31 45.41 45.41 46.31 45.41 45.41
Bias corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator. Columns (1), (4) and (7) present results using a fixed effect estimator. In columns (2), (5) and (8) bias
correction is initialized by Anderson-Hsiao estimator and in columns (3), (6) and (9) by Arellano and Bond estimator. Image, Benefit and Membership are
outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five
years. Bootstrapped standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A4. Emplyoment change over various years
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Coefficients from baseline OLS regression (including region and year FE) and 95% confidence bands for different time horizon
of explanatory variable.
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Table A9: Effect of binary employment changes on attitudes to-
ward the EU
(1) (2) (3)
Image Benefit Membership
Δ Employment (Binary) 2.9088*** 2.1608*** 1.0779
(0.6285) (0.7053) (0.7046)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.63 0.62 0.60
N 2,668 2,950 2,950
Cluster 265 264 264
Mean DV 43.86 61.01 53.92
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based
on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100.
Change in employment rate is binary (1 if positive over past 5 years, 0 if negative
over past five years). Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A10: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
(1) (2) (3)
Image Benefit Membership
Δ Absolute Employment (%) 0.4487*** 0.4256*** 0.2211***
(0.0611) (0.0579) (0.0601)
Change Active Population (%) -2.8778 12.0728 -4.0525
(7.2219) (9.8012) (9.4951)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.63 0.64 0.60
N 2,715 2,980 2,980
Cluster 265 264 264
Mean DV 43.73 61.04 53.91
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit andMembership are outcome variables based on Euro-
barometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Absolute change in
employment is computed over five years. Additional control variable is change in active
population over the same time. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A11: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward
the EU
(1) (2) (3)
Image Benefit Membership
Δ Employment (%) 0.1701** 0.2161** 0.1615*
(0.0788) (0.1027) (0.0923)
Employment Rate (%) 0.5543*** 0.3053* 0.0778
(0.1180) (0.1816) (0.1523)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.64 0.63 0.60
N 2,668 2,950 2,950
Cluster 265 264 264
Mean DV 43.86 61.01 53.92
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables
based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0
and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Level of
employment rate is added as additional control. Standard errors (clustered
by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A12: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
(1) (2) (3)
EU Support Index EU Support Index EU Support Index
Δ Employment (%) 0.3102*** 0.2422*** 0.4098***
(0.0768) (0.0682) (0.1140)
EU Support Indext-5 -0.0482
(0.0661)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE x Year ✓
adj. R2 0.63 0.67 0.68
N 2,030 2,030 936
Cluster 263 263 190
Mean DV 46.45 46.45 44.33
OLS estimations. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. EU Support index is first
principal component of image, benefit and membership variables and scaled to lie between 0 and 100.
Column (3) includes fifth lag of EU support index as control variable. Standard errors (clustered by
region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A13: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Image Benefit Membership
Trust
EU Parliament
Δ Employment (%) 0.1686*** 0.2010** 0.0731 0.1722***
(0.0491) (0.0783) (0.0725) (0.0542)
Trust in national government 0.0083 0.0024 -0.0471 -0.0564
(0.0419) (0.0445) (0.0442) (0.0412)
Trust in national parliament 0.3828*** 0.3429*** 0.3535*** 0.5824***
(0.0412) (0.0443) (0.0422) (0.0424)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.73
N 2,668 2,213 2,213 2,851
Cluster 265 263 263 265
Mean DV 43.86 62.67 54.44 54.44
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey
questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years.
Additional controls include trust in national government and trust in national parliament. Standard errors
(clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A14: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU including control variables
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ Employment (%) 0.3346*** 0.3520*** 0.2972*** 0.3168*** 0.3561*** 0.2971*** 0.1642** 0.2082** 0.1836**
(0.0617) (0.0627) (0.0657) (0.0864) (0.0870) (0.0906) (0.0798) (0.0820) (0.0867)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Education Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Demographic Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Migration Control ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66
N 2,588 2,588 2,552 2,118 2,118 2,083 2,118 2,118 2,083
Cluster 261 261 261 259 259 259 259 259 259
Mean DV 43.91 43.91 43.71 46.59 46.59 46.35 46.59 46.59 46.35
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and
100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Education controls include primary education (in%), secondary education (in%) and tertiary
education (in%). Demographic controls include median age and old age ratio (65 and above compared to 15-65 year olds). Migration is crude rate of net
migration plus adjustment. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A15: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU: individual-level observations
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ Employment (%) 0.2636*** 0.2831*** 0.1662*** 0.3425*** 0.3612*** 0.2816*** 0.2141** 0.2151** 0.1204**
(0.0734) (0.0717) (0.0551) (0.0893) (0.0864) (0.0588) (0.0842) (0.0858) (0.0546)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ind. Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE x Year ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.11
N 520,233 422,610 422,610 513,015 450,974 450,974 544,846 476,720 476,720
Cluster 265 265 265 264 264 264 264 264 264
Mean DV 45.34 45.79 45.79 61.25 61.09 61.09 54.91 54.96 54.96
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and
100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Individual level control variables include age, gender and education. Estimation sample
based on individual level observations. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A16: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward
the EU: logit estimations
(1) (2) (3)
Image Benefit Membership
Δ Employment (%) 0.0108*** 0.0179*** 0.0094**
(0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0038)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.08 0.05
N 520,233 513,015 544,846
Cluster 265 264 264
Mean DV 44.30 65.36 55.49
Logit estimations. Image, Benefit andMembership are outcome variables
based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0
and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Stan-
dard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Figure A5. Country-group-specific effect heterogeneity
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Change Employment Rate + 
 Change Employment Rate x Country Group Dummy
Interaction coefficients from fixed effect regressions of change in employment rate
on image outcome including country group and year fixed effects and interactions
between country dummies and change in employment rate. Figure shows base effect
of change employment rate plus interaction effect. Base category is EU Center. Image
outcome variable is based on Eurobarometer survey questions, and is aggregated by
region and year and coded to lie between 0 and 100.
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Figure A6. Country-specific effect heterogeneity
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outcome variable is based on Eurobarometer survey questions, and is aggregated by
region and year and coded to lie between 0 and 100.
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Table A17: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change<0 Change>0 Change<0 Change>0 Change<0 Change>0
Δ Employment (%) 0.8481*** -0.1730 0.5011*** 0.0616 0.5138*** 0.0521
(0.1500) (0.1245) (0.1869) (0.1163) (0.1731) (0.1095)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.62 0.70 0.58 0.69 0.62 0.64
N 1,320 1,348 1,380 1,570 1,380 1,570
Cluster 233 244 235 241 235 241
Mean DV 40.72 46.94 58.07 63.60 52.13 55.49
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer survey questions and
are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Estimations for sub-samples.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) focus on regions that experienced a negative change in the employment rate over past five years
and columns (2), (4) and (6) focus on regions that experienced a positive change in the employment rate over past 5 years.
Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A18: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward
the EU: quadratic model
(1) (2) (3)
Image Benefit Membership
Δ Employment (%) 0.3944*** 0.3619*** 0.2106***
(0.0607) (0.0748) (0.0716)
Δ Employment (%) 2 -0.0416*** -0.0205*** -0.0138**
(0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0062)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.64 0.63 0.61
N 2,668 2,950 2,950
Cluster 265 264 264
Mean DV 43.86 46.45 61.01
OLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables
based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and
100. Change in employment (in %) rate is computed over five years. Standard
errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure A7. Marginsplot: quadratic model
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Table A19: Effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the EU: interaction with
non-EU migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Image Image Image Image
Δ Employment Rate 0.2278 0.2837** 0.3359 0.3811
(0.1543) (0.1322) (0.2176) (0.2324)
Share Non-EU migrants 14.2916 18.9964
(11.9242) (12.3160)
Δ Employment Rate × 0.2761 0.1133
Share Non-EU migrants (1.1828) (1.2014)
Low-skilled × Δ Employment Rate × -1.2013
Share Non-EU migrants (1.8053)
LS Non-EU/LS Home 20.6648 9.6420
(17.4045) (16.6549)
Δ Employment Rate × -0.0949 -0.3016
LS Non-EU/LS Home (1.8771) (2.0650)
Low-skilled × Δ Employment Rate × -1.1352
LS Non-EU/LS Home (1.7791)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
N 278,413 218,374 244,857 193,280
Cluster 166 166 162 162
Mean DV 40.74 39.88 40.36 39.65
OLS estimations. The image outcome variable is based on a Eurobarometer survey question and is
coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Standard errors
(clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A20: 2SLS estimations: effect of employment changes on attitudes toward the
EU
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Employment (%) 2.764*** 3.548*** 1.206 2.243*** 4.244** 1.822***
(0.412) (0.341) (0.864) (0.447) (1.681) (0.397)
Imaget-5 0.535*** -0.0632
(0.0477) (0.0631)
Benefitt-5 0.576*** 0.181***
(0.0328) (0.0529)
Membershipt-5 0.569*** 0.102*
(0.0691) (0.0555)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
N 1,556 1,556 1,732 1,732 1,732 1,732
Cluster 206 206 249 249 249 249
1st stage F-Test 59.24 77.18 7.07 31.76 7.91 33.05
Mean DV 40.56 40.56 62.16 62.16 54.54 54.54
2SLS estimations. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables based on Eurobarometer sur-
vey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change in employment rate is computed over five
years. Kleibergen-Paap rkWald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A21: 2SLS estimations: effect of employment changes on attitudes toward
the EU. Own country excluded in calculation of Bartik instrument.
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Employment (%) 1.430** 3.520*** -3.292* 1.970*** 1.402 1.559***
(0.566) (0.385) (1.698) (0.296) (0.966) (0.283)
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
N 2,615 2,615 2,922 2,922 2,922 2,922
Cluster 265 265 263 263 263 263
1st stage F-Test 27.52 57.31 10.03 71.29 10.03 71.29
Mean DV 43.51 43.51 60.89 60.89 53.81 53.81
2SLS estimations. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by re-
gion) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A22: 2SLS estimations with individual-level data: effect of employment
changes on attitudes toward the EU
Image Benefit Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Employment (%) 1.252*** 2.211*** -0.930 0.998*** 2.089** 0.647***
(0.475) (0.254) (1.169) (0.173) (0.973) (0.182)
Ind. Controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
N 509,039 412,906 506,912 445,337 538,327 470,730
Cluster 265 265 264 264 264 264
1st stage F-Test 26.37 103.70 9.79 67.33 7.63 69.72
Mean DV 44.98 45.43 61.15 60.99 54.84 54.88
2SLS estimations using individual-level data. Image, Benefit and Membership are outcome variables
based on Eurobarometer survey questions and are coded to lie between 0 and 100. Change in employ-
ment rate is computed over five years. Individual controls include age, gender and education dummies.
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A23: Effects of employment changes on turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turnout
OLS
Turnout
OLS
Turnout
OLS
Turnout
2SLS
(Bartik)
Turnout
2SLS
(Sectoral Shares)
Δ Employment (%) -0.1346 0.1916** 0.2058*** -2.9302*** 0.6091***
(0.1495) (0.0786) (0.0707) (1.1042) (0.1164)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE x Year ✓
N 704 704 704 691 704
F-Test 7.36 15.68
Cluster 225 225 225 225 225
Mean DV 46.85 46.85 46.85 46.54 46.85
OLS and 2SLS estimations. Turnout (in %) at European Parliament elections in 1994, 1999, 2004,
2009 and 2014. Change in employment rate is computed over five years. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by region) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.

2
INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE UNDERMINES
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: EVIDENCE FROM
A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN NAMIBIA
2.1 Introduction
“The authority of the chief thus fused in a single person all moments of power: judicial,
legislative, executive, and administrative” (Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject:
Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, p.23)
What factors shape individual and community attitudes toward democracy? There
is substantial cross-national and within-country variance in individual support for
democratic institutions. This component of the political or ‘civic’ culture of a society
has long been shown to play a important role in affecting both the sustainability and
success of democratic institutions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1994; Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005). Yet, beyond a number of recent findings that show that support
for democracy is endogenous to exposure to national democratic institutions (Persson
and Tabellini, 2009; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015; De Aquino, 2015) we have
relatively little quantitative evidence for other factors behind variation in individual
support for democratic institutions. In line with a body of literature that highlights
the importance of forms of colonialism for contemporary political and economic out-
comes (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; Lange, 2009; Iyer, 2010; Hariri, 2012),
this study argues that indirect and direct colonial rule are important factors in shap-
ing contemporary support for democracy.
The difficulty in demonstrating the effects of direct and indirect colonialism on con-
temporary democratic attitudes is, of course, that colonial strategies were not as-
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signed randomly. For example, because indirect colonialism tended to be conducted
in pre-colonial states that were more centralized (Gerring et al., 2011; Hariri, 2012),
we usually cannot rule out that pre-state centralization also affects political culture
through channels beyond the form of colonial rule (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2013; 2015). To address this endogeneity issue, this paper introduces a novel empir-
ical design that exploits a within-ethnic group natural experimental setting in the
sub-Saharan country of Namibia. In Namibia, as in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole,
colonial authorities instituted systems of direct rule in those areas settled by white
Europeans whereas in those areas where indigenous population was not dispossessed
colonial authorities ruled through a indirect system of local ‘tribal’ elites (Miescher,
2012). Unlike elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, however, Europeans did not settle
and directly rule only the most agriculturally fertile areas of Namibia (Werner and
Odendaal, 2010) but rather settled in the more arid southern areas of Namibia which
were hardest hit by an 1897 rinderpest epidemic. In order to protect German herds
from future epidemics, a veterinary cordon fence was introduced at the spatial extent
of direct German control in 1897 that divided northern and southern Namibia. In the
face of stringent financial constraints, the German colonists then never completely
expanded their settlement territory to the northern areas of the country (Eckl, 2007)
but rather ruled indirectly through a system of appointed traditional authorities.
Hence, whilst indirectly ruled areas of Namibia were governed through a system of
appointed traditional authorities, traditional authorities were given no formal politi-
cal role in the directly ruled central and southern areas of Namibia. After Namibian
independence in 1990, these regional differences in the influence of traditional leaders
still persist; traditional leaders play an extremely important formal role in land allo-
cation and customary law enforcement in northern Namibia whilst playing a largely
symbolic role in central and southern Namibia (Keulder, 2000).
Given that this colonial-era dividing line, progressively formalized throughout the
20th century, was drawnwith little reference to existing indigenous territorial bound-
aries, Namibia provides an ideal setting to examine the effect of direct and indirect
colonial rule on contemporary democratic attitudes. We can identify the effect of
forms of colonial rule on individual support for democracy using the spatial discon-
tinuity that exploits the exogenous border between formerly indirectly and directly
ruled areas of Namibia with a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD). Our re-
sults suggest that that individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support
democracy as a system of governance, and less likely to participate in voting.
By analyzing individual-level survey data, we are able to provide evidence for the
potential mechanisms through which indirect and direct colonial rule affect contem-
porary political attitudes. We find that people living in formerly indirectly ruled ar-
eas tend to contact traditional leaders more and respect authority to a greater extent.
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This suggests that traditional leaders still play an important role in the local gover-
nance in indirectly ruled areas and we theorize that this is an important mechanism
through which the form of colonial rule likely affects contemporary democratic atti-
tudes. In this way, our findings advance a long-standing debate over whether there
is a trade-off between the consolidation of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ institutions in
sub-Saharan Africa (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Williams, 2004; 2010; Logan,
2008; 2009; Baldwin, 2015) by suggesting that the institutional legitimacy held by
traditional leaders in indirectly ruled areas has socialized individuals to accept non-
electoral systems of governance.
2.2 Theory
How might the form of colonial rule affect contemporary political attitudes? We fol-
low Lange (2009) by defining indirect rule as “domination via collaborative relations
between a dominant colonial center and several regionally based indigenous institu-
tions” (p.28) and direct rule as a “system of colonial domination in which both local
and central institutions are well integrated and governed by the same authority and
organizational principles” (ibid.). In sub-Saharan Africa, the existence of collabora-
tive relations between traditional leaders1 and colonial bureaucrats is a key factor
distinguishing directly and indirectly ruled colonies. Directly ruled colonies were
administered by imperial bureaucrats who enforced written laws whereas indirectly
ruled colonies were administered through local ‘chiefs’ who were given the authority
to informally enforce customary or ‘traditional’ law (Lange, 2004; Acemoglu, Reed,
and Robinson, 2014).2
There are striking cross-national correlations linking different forms of colonial rule
with contemporary levels of democracy. Countries with stronger pre-colonial states
tended to experience indirect colonial rule and states that experienced indirect rule in
turn tend to be less democratic today (Lange, 2009; Hariri, 2012; Gerring et al., 2011).
Hariri (2012) influentially argued that indirectly ruled countries are less democratic
today because indirect colonial rule reinforced traditional bonds of political authority
and did not facilitate the transplantation of participatory democratic institutions from
Europe.
The institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule have largely persisted to the current
day at a local level in sub-Saharan Africa, even as countries such as Namibia or Sierra
1. We do not mean to imply an endorsement of claims to traditional notions of legitimacy when
using the term traditional leader. Rather, we follow Baldwin (2015) by defining traditional leaders with
reference to contemporary customs i.e. as ‘rulers’ who have power by virtue of their association with
the customary mode of governing a place-based community” (p.21).
2. See Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015) for a overview of the literature about the role of tra-
ditional leaders in Africa.
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Leone have democratized at a national level. Barring a radical post-colonial upheaval
in local governance of the kind that occurred in Tanzania (Miguel, 2004), traditional
leaders still today enjoy unparalleled political, social and economic authority in local
governance in indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa (Düsing, 2002; Baldwin,
2014; Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014). As highlighted bymanyAfrican scholars
and political leaders (e.g. Mboya 1956; Luthuli 1962; Ntsebeza 2005), the institution
of traditional leadership is incongruous with procedural democratic notions of rule
of law, the primacy of individual over group rights, and the electoral accountability
of authority; indeed, Mahmood Mamdani goes so far as to call traditional leadership
a system of ‘decentralized despotism’ (Mamdani, 1996).
The existence of an undemocratic3 parallel governance system at the local level has
important implications for the development of different kinds of political culture in
directly and indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa. The inclusiveness of colo-
nial rule - broadly defined as the extent to which a broad range of political actors
are involved in policy formulation and implementation - is a key mechanism linking
the form of colonial rule to contemporary political and economic outcomes (Lange
2009). The differential inclusiveness of colonial governance systems across direct and
indirectly ruled areas shapes both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ of post-colonial democ-
racy. Emphasizing the institutional supply-side, Lange (2009) argues that less inclu-
sive colonial institutions in indirectly ruled areas ultimately fostered the development
of autocracy because low inclusiveness impeded the ability of the post-colonial state
to manage competing social demands and incentivized the use of coercion as a means
of regulating social relations.4
We build on this argument by demonstrating that the legacy of less inclusive colonial-
era institutionsmay also be felt in a lower general ‘demand’ for procedural democracy.
The appointment of political leaders through elections is not necessarily the most
effective or legitimate means of allocating political office. Rather, in sub-Saharan
Africa, traditional leaders are actually the most widely supported and trusted politi-
cal actors in society and appear to have an independent, non-electoral base of politi-
cal legitimacy (Logan, 2008).5 Traditional leaders don’t appear to rely on coercion to
sustain their rule; rather, traditional leaders have proven deft at managing compet-
3. In using the term ‘undemocratic’ to describe traditional leadership we are only referring to its lack
of procedural democracy and make no claim about the substantive democratic qualities of traditional
leaders, which may exceed those of elected political leaders (Baldwin, 2015).
4. Lange (2009) provides persuasive evidence for this structural or ‘supply-side’ mechanism by com-
paring how different levels of institutional inclusiveness during the colonial transition in Guyana
and Mauritius ultimately set these two states on different political trajectories as politics in post-
independence Guyana retained a confrontational, zero-sum and autocratic character.
5. Logan (2008) explores a number of reasons for this legitimacy including the greater symbolic
resonance, responsiveness, proximity to and overall effectiveness of traditional leaders at performing
governance functions in their communities compared to elected officials.
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ing constituencies as informal social ties have kept such leaders highly accountable
and close to their communities (Baldwin, 2015). Given the legitimacy and support
possessed by traditional leaders, often exceeding those of elected leaders, it may be
that a key legacy of indirect rule has also been to socialize individuals to demand less
formally inclusive systems of government relative to individuals living under demo-
cratic local institutions.
Indeed, in a more general sense, political attitudes are endogenous to exposure to
forms of governance. Individuals who live under democracies are more likely to
become socialized to accept democratic notions of electoral legitimacy whereas in-
dividuals who live under autocracies are more likely to become socialized to accept
non-democratic bases for legitimacy - hence, support for electoral democracy has
been shown to increase the longer that individuals live under a democratic govern-
ment (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015; De Aquino, 2015). Given the legitimacy
possessed by traditional leaders, we expect that ongoing exposure to the institution
of traditional leadership in indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa has socialized
individuals to accept non-democratic systems of government even as national politi-
cal leaders are increasingly democratically elected. We also expect that, because the
institution of traditional leadership is a hierarchical form of governance, individuals
in indirectly ruled areas have been socialized to be less willing to question author-
ity in general. Finally, given that voting is the essential participatory exercise in a
democracy and civic norms of participation have been shown to be crucial in mo-
tivating individuals to sustain the cost of voting in Southern Africa (e.g. De Kadt
2017; Roberts, Struwig, and Gordon 2014), we expect weaker civic norms of electoral
participation to be reflected in lower turnout in indirectly ruled areas.
In articulating and testing whether the institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule
undermine democratic consolidation, we consciously enter into a long-standing and
rich debate in the literature on sub-Saharan African politics. A number of authors
have previously and compellingly argued that the ongoing political influence of tra-
ditional authorities in the post-colony presents a significant block to democratic con-
solidation (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005). Mamdani (1996) and
Englebert (2000) were both particularly influential in arguing that African states and
democratic leaders have been engaged in a struggle with local traditional leaders over
power and political legitimacy in the post-colonial context.
On the other hand, a number of other authors have since argued that there is no nec-
essary trade-off between traditional leadership and democratic consolidation because
good governance is key to the legitimation of both elected and unelected officials in
Africa alike (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). As local political actors may
be kept accountable and good governance achieved through both electoral and non-
electoral means (Baldwin, 2015), there may be no necessary trade-off between sup-
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port for traditional leadership and elected leadership (Williams, 2004; 2010). Rather,
insofar as good governance requires co-operation between traditional authorities and
elected officials, it may be that legitimacy is a a rising tide that lifts all boats (Logan,
2013).6 We help adjudicate between these competing perspectives by exploiting ex-
ogenous variation in the form of colonial rule - something that is essential to conduct
causal inference given that the institutional influence of traditional leadership across
different ethnic groups is far from assigned randomly.
Specifically, and following on from the above theoretical framework, we will test the
following two key hypotheses:
H1: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support democracy as a
system of government
H2: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to turnout at elections
Our theoretical framework moreover predicts that this relationship is likely being
driven by greater contact to traditional leaders and greater respect for authorities in
indirectly ruled areas. Thus, whilst we primarily focus on support for democracy as
our outcome of interest, we will also test the following secondary hypotheses:
H3: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are more likely to contact traditional author-
ities
H4: Individuals in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to support questioning author-
ity
2.3 Historical Background
Namibia, or South-West Africa as it was formerly known, was colonized progres-
sively by Germany over the second half of the nineteenth century in the so-called
‘Scramble for Africa’. Immediately prior to colonization, the dominant ethnic groups
in Namibia were the Ovambo (Ambo), Herero, Nama, Bushmen (Kung), Heikum (San)
andDamara (Bergdama) (see Figure B1 in the Appendix). TheOvambo andHerero are
both Bantu-speaking groups who hadmigrated to Namibia during the great BantuMi-
gration over the 14th and 17th centuries, displacing and establishing predominance
over the Khoisan-speaking San, Damara and Nama. All of these groups had quali-
tatively similar political structures as measured by traditional form of succession of
the local headman (patrilineal heirs) and none had individual property rights. How-
ever, the means of subsistence differed. While the Ovambos depended on agricultural
farming, Herero andNama depended on animal husbandry and Bushmen andDamara
6. Such an argument has recently received support from Logan (2008), 2013 who has used cross-
national individual survey data to illustrate that greater trust and support for traditional authorities
does not negatively correlate with support for core democratic tenets.
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on gathering and hunting.7 Given that political authority among all groups in pre-
colonial Namibia was hereditary and patriarchal, we therefore refer to pre-colonial
society as undemocratic.8
WhenNamibia became a German protectorate in 1884, German settlement initially fo-
cused on the less densely populated southern and central coastal regions of Namibia
which they reached first and where land could be more easily acquired (Zimmerer,
2001). German colonial authorities then gradually expanded their territorial remit
from the coast by playing off warring local factions and remunerating a number
of indigenous elites for lost landholdings (German Colonial Office, 1919; Ofcansky,
1981). The Germans had planned on conquering the wealthier northern part of the
protectorate but in 1897, a critical event occurred that was to shape the spatial in-
cidence of direct and indirect rule: a rinderpest epidemic killed 95 percent of the
cattle herds in central and southern Namibia. The epidemic particularly devastated
cattle-dependent indigenous communities in central and southern Namibia because,
unlike agricultural communities in fertile northern Namibia, the arid nature of the
land prevented agriculture from being used as a feasible food-source substitute (Eckl,
2007; Miescher, 2012; Gewald, 2003). The rinderpest epidemic thereby provided a key
opportunity for German colonists to acquire large tracts of land in central and south-
ern Namibia relatively cheaply with lessened collective resistance from weakened
indigenous communities.
However, the epidemic also presented a dilemma to colonizers - there was little
prospect of quickly extending direct German rule to the relatively unaffected north-
ern areas of South-West Africa, yet continuing to allow free animal movement across
South-West Africawould potentially expose European herds to future devastating epi-
demics (Phoofolo, 1993). Shortly after the epidemic in 1897, therefore, the German
colonial government set up a veterinary cordon fence at the boundaries of where
its control extended in order to protect southern and central cattle herds from future
potentially rinderpest-infected animals from the north (Directorate of Veterinary Ser-
vices, 1996).
Irked by the rising cost of colonization in South-West Africa, in December 1905 the
Reichstag in Berlin passed a resolution stating that police protection in the colony
“should be restricted to the smallest possible area focusing on those regions where
our economic interests tend to coalesce”.9 The veterinary cordon fence in effect then
7. Information on local headmen taken from v72, data on property rights from variables v74 and
v75 and information on economic structures from variables v1-v5 in (Murdock, 1967). Given that we
will only compare support for democracy amongst individuals from the same ethnic group, the ethnic-
group specific pre-colonial differences reported inMurdock (1967) are not confounders for our empirical
design.
8. Taking care to again note that we refer to democracy in a procedural rather than substantive sense.
9. Resolution des Deutschen Reichstags vom 15. December 1905.
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Figure 2.1. The first map defining the Police Zone, issued in 1907
became a Police Zone boundary (see Figure 2.1 - the first map issued by colonial au-
thorities defining the Police Zone) and formed the dividing line between ‘white’ and
‘black’ Namibia – the area directly settled and directly ruled by German authorities,
and the area indirectly ruled through a system of indigenous elites.10 Trade and the
permanent movement of people between these two parts of South-West Africa was
restricted by the German authorities and European settlers consolidated control over
the Police Zone.
The timing of the rinderpest shock in 1897 thus created a number of counterfactuals
that we rely on for our identification strategy. As Miescher (2012) summarizes, “the
geographical location of the border reflected the limits of colonial power at the mo-
ment of its inception” (p.41). Cooperation on the part of the indigenous population
was essential to maintain the integrity of the cordon and prevent cross-border cattle
flows, and as such only those areas where the Germans exerted political control in
1897 were incorporated. No attempt was made to include the areas outside German
10. “The activities of the administration were concentrated in the southern and central regions of
the protectorate, the so-called Police Zone”. In the German original: “Die Taetigkeit der Verwaltung
beschraenkte sich auf das Zentrum und den Sueden des Schutzgebietes, die sogenannte ‘Polizeizone’,
waehrend der noerdliche Teil von der deutschen Verwaltung vorlaufig ausgenommen war.” (Zimmerer,
2001, p. 114).
INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN NAMIBIA 75
authority within the fenced territory; as Governor Friedrich von Lindequist optimisti-
cally put it, the areas in the far north would “temporarily need to remain outside the
cordon” (v. Lindequist, letter to Reichskanzler 1897 quoted in Miescher 2012 p.25).
The timing of the epidemic thus meant that areas such as Grootfontein where the Ger-
mans had triumphantly marched to in 1895 were included within the cordon fence.
However, settlements such as Sesfontein in Kaoko were not included within the cor-
don fence because the chief of Sesfontein, Jan Uixamab, refused to allow the cordon to
divide his grazing lands (v. Lindequist to Reichskanzler February 20, 1897, Miescher
2012 p. 25). In late 1897 a coalition of Herero chiefs led by Uixamab then rose up
in a last ditch effort to expel the Germans from Kaoko, but were defeated in March
1898 (Rizzo, 2009). By 1901 German troops were permanently stationed in Sesfontein
(Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 1901).
The timing of the epidemic in 1897 is thus of critical significance - given the 1907 Po-
lice Zone boundary eventually followed the cordon fence, settlements in northern
Namibia such as Grootfontein, Outjo and Fransfontein where the Germans had con-
solidated control in the years leading up to the epidemic were incorporated into the
German Police Zone whereas other nearby settlements where the Germans only es-
tablished control after 1897 such as Sesfontein were not. If the rinderpest epidemic
had occurred in 1895 or 1902 different boundaries defining the extent of the Police
Zone would have been drawn. Hence, whilst the fact that the Germans initially
colonized central and southern Namibia rather than northern Namibia may be en-
dogenous to factors such as strength of pre-colonial state institutions that may af-
fect contemporary political attitudes, the fact that the border defining the limits of
direct German control was drawn around areas of northern Namibia such as Groot-
fontein rather than Sesfontein was, we argue, driven by the idiosyncratic timing of
the rinderpest epidemic in 1897. Thus, we argue for the identifying condition that the
geographic extent of direct colonial rule in a small area of northern Namibia can be
considered exogenous to pre-colonial factors likely to affect contemporary political
attitudes.11
After the South Africans took control of South-West Africa during World War I, the
Police Zone boundary took on new forms and functions. Appendix Section B.2 pro-
vides more disaggregated detail on the small changesmade to the Police Line between
1907 and 1964. Initially fearing that the remaining German soldiers could ally with
indigenous forces in the northern areas beyond the Red Line, the South Africans is-
sued a new Martial Law Regulation in October 1916 restricting all Europeans to the
11. Indeed, the fact that European settlement never expanded further north meant that the most po-
tentially lucrative areas of Namibia never experienced direct rule - as the 1964 Odendaal commission put
it, “Okavangoland and Eastern Caprivi are undoubtedly the areas with the highest agricultural potential
in South West Africa” (Odendaal 1964 p.291) yet both areas experienced no European settlement.
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area within the Police Zone as mapped by the Germans (Waters 1918; Administrator
of South West Africa 1916). After World War I, movement between the two zones
continued to be restricted due to the desire of authorities to prevent the spread of
veterinary diseases (Moser, 2007).
The spatial division of South West Africa was further formalized by colonial author-
ities after the Odendaal Commission of 1964, which created a number of racially
demarcated ‘Homelands’ in northern Namibia to be administered by officially rec-
ognized chiefs. Provided they complied with the colonial administration, appointed
traditional leaders were afforded substantial political authority over subject popula-
tions (Keulder, 2000). The consequent construction of a visible physical border be-
tween the two parts of the country meant that the internal border became more
tightly controlled than ever (Odendaal, 1964). While the north was ruled by tradi-
tional authorities and customary pastoral and agricultural practices continued, the
indigenous population in the south was employed by the German and later South
African colonizers through a system of contract labor on white-owned farms and
factories (Moorsom, 1977).12 Figure B3 in the Appendix Section B.3 documents the
progressive extension of European farmland over the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury and, as such, the progressive destruction of traditional modes of governance and
subsistence in southern Namibia.
Over the period of South African administration, SouthWest Africa was treated as an
effective ‘fifth province’ of South Africa (Jansen, 1995). As such, after the introduction
of apartheid in South Africa in the late 1940s, the rule of law and electoral suffrage
only extended to the white population. White South West Africans participated in
South African elections, lived in strictly segregated neighborhoods, and monopolized
land and political office in directly ruled areas (Werner, 2007; Wolputte, 2007). Hence,
whilst indigenous populations in southernNamibia certainly had greater contact with
the colonial state including European farmers, police and district officials, it would
not be accurate to say that indigenous persons had greater access to the colonial
state in southern South West Africa. Under both German and South African admin-
istration, the colonial state remained closed to all but white South West Africans in
directly ruled areas (Aitken, 2007; Melber, 2015).
The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), a liberation party estab-
lished in 1960 on a platform to end apartheid and secure Namibian independence,
quickly emerged as the leading challenger to South African rule (Melber, 2015). Fol-
lowing an military stalemate between South African-led and Cuban-led forces in
12. In order to supply growing farm labor needs in southern Namibia, a great number of temporary
laborers were also brought from north of the Red Line on a temporary permit system; such workers
were required to return to their racial ‘homeland’ after one or two years working in the south (Melber,
1996).
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the Angolan Civil War, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was linked to
Namibian independence in peace talks in New York in 1988 (Herbstein and Evenson,
1989). The first fully free and fair UN-monitored elections in Namibia were then held
in 1989 and Namibia transitioned to independence (Udogu, 2011).
Since independence in 1990, Namibia has remained a successful, multi-party democ-
racy and it has been governed continuously at the national level by SWAPO. Namibia
has been consistently rated as ‘Free’ by FreedomHouse, has maintained a Polity score
above 6 in all of its post-independence periods and is generally regarded as one of sub-
Saharan Africa’s success stories (Radelet, 2010). Consistent with the development of
democracy in other directly ruled colonies (Lange, 2009), therefore, democracy in
Namibia was consolidated via early post-independence reforms that expanded racial
suffrage and that institutionalized elections as the means of resolving social conflict
at all levels of government.
Also reflecting the experience of other colonies, a within-country “reversal of fortune”
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002) occurred in Namibia whereby extractive13
colonial institutions were set up in the relatively densely populated areas of north-
ern Namibia, which were the poorest in the country at the time of independence in
1990 (Namibian Statistics Agency, 2011). The Namibia government under SWAPO
invested heavily in the northern regions after independence in order to support the
convergence of living standards in the two parts of the country, and differences in
poverty rates have gradually declined.
Electoral institutions across the country have been homogenized but the local institu-
tional influence of traditional leaders in the north persists to the present day. Namib-
ians living in the former Police Zone have only experienced a democratic governance
system since independence at all levels of government. The existence of elected re-
gional and local governments is enshrined in the Namibian Constitution.14 In an ex-
plicit rejection of the ethnic spatial organization of Namibia during the colonial era,
local and regional councils are mandated to cross former ethnic homelands.15 Whilst
Namibia is highly centralized fiscally, local elected councilors nevertheless exercise
important oversight over the provision of local education, housing, and utilities.16
13. Colonial institutions in directly ruled Namibia cannot be considered ‘inclusive’ from the perspec-
tive of the indigenous population, but nevertheless inclusive institutions as defined by Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2002) such as an independent judiciary, universal schooling and individual property
rights were instituted in directly ruled areas of Namibia that underpinned economic development.
14. Chapter 12 Article 102(1) states ‘For purposes of regional and local government, Namibia shall be
divided into regional and local units, which shall consist of such region and Local Authorities as may be
determined and defined by Act of Parliament’ and 102(3) states that ‘Every organ of regional and local
government shall have a Council as the principal governing body, freely elected’.
15. Article 102(2), Chapter 12 of Namibian Constitution.
16. M. Amutse, Regional Councillor Oshikuku Constituency, personal communication September
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On the other hand, in formerly indirectly ruled areas, traditional authorities have
proven successful in carving out a sphere of non-electoral political influence (Düsing,
2002). The legacy of strong, decentralized traditional leadership in northern Namibia
posed a challenge to the capacity of the newly independent Namibian state which
was largely unable to penetrate society in northern Namibia without the cooperation
of traditional authorities.17 The administration of communal land proved a locus
of conflict given that the new constitution vested all communal land in the state18
but communal land administration was formerly the sole prerogative of traditional
authorities (Devereux, 1996). In a compromise move in 2002, SWAPO instituted a
system of Land Boards to regulate communal land resources in northern Namibia
staffed by both traditional leader and elected representatives.19 Similarly, to formalize
the role of traditional authorities, a system of traditional leader registration has been
progressively rolled out since the 1990s whereby traditional leaders have been newly
able to apply for recognition by the central government (Friedman, 2006).20 SWAPO
has tried to insulate the electoral system and, arguably, its own power from challenge
by traditional leaders by restricting recognized traditional leaders from running for
elected office.21
As such, governance in formerly indirectly ruled areas of Namibia since 1990 has
been largely characterized by the increasing institutionalization of co-governance be-
tween elected officials and hereditary traditional leaders.22 In directly ruled southern
2015. M. Mutonga, Director of National Planning Commission of Namibia, personal communication
August 2015.
17. As one well-respected traditional leader put it to us when asked about the regional council, “if
they want to put up road or a clinic, then they have to come to me first”. (P. Kauluma, personal com-
munication September 2015). The necessity of traditional leader cooperation was corroborated by the
Deputy Director Rural Services in Ohangwena Region who, when asked about the possibility of ever
implementing an entirely top-down project, said “Of course the headman would not let you do that”.
(N. Ndaitwa, personal communication, September 2015). See more generally Keulder (2000).
18. “Land, water and natural resources…shall belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully
owned” Article 124, Constitution of Namibia.
19. The Communal Land Reform Act (2002), the implications of which were analyzed by Werner
(2003).
20. Recognition provides a number of benefits to leaders including receipt of an official salary, eligi-
bility for a position on the Council of Traditional Leaders which advises the government and the right
to sit on constituency and regional development committees where development projects in Namibia
are planned. (E. H. Weyulu, Senior Traditional Leader Oukwayenama, personal communication August
2015, G. Kamseb, Chief Regional Officer of Kunene Region Council, personal communication August
2015, K. Sinvula Deputy Director of Planning Kunene Regional Council, personal communication Au-
gust 2015).
21. Düsing 2002, N. J. P. Muharukua, Kunene Regional Councillor for DTA, personal communication
August 2015 andM. Tjimuine, Kunene Regional director for DTA, personal communication August 2015.
22. The effectiveness of traditional leaders as ‘development brokers’ (Baldwin, 2015) is appreciated
even by government officials whom one might think would find their competing authority bother-
some - as one regional official who works closely with traditional leaders in implementing development
INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN NAMIBIA 79
Namibia, on the other hand, traditional leaders play only a minor role.
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
We identify the effect of indirect colonial rule on democratic attitudes and behavior by
using the location of the Police Zone boundary in Namibia and applying a spatial re-
gression discontinuity design analogous to Dell (2010). The northern border between
directly and indirectly ruled territories delimited by the German Police Zone followed
the spatial extent of direct German control at the end of the rinderpest epidemic of
1897 (Directorate of Veterinary Services 1996, Miescher 2012). We argue that the bor-
der zone where the progressive extension of direct German rule was frozen can be
considered plausibly exogenous to pre-colonial political attitudes.23 To further estab-
lish the exogeneity of the border, we will demonstrate that there is no discontinuous
jump in pre-treatment geographic characteristics along the Police Zone boundary
used in our analysis including elevation, grass-cover, rainfall and livestock density.
We use the original map published by the Odendaal Commission in 1964 as digitized
by Mendelsohn (2002) to identify regions directly controlled by the colonizers and
those that were governed by traditional authorities during colonial times. To mini-
mize potential endogeneity, we only focus on the northern part of the former Police
Zone boundary focused around Etosha National Park as this part still largely rep-
resented the original boundary drawn in 1907 by the Germans when the Odendaal
Commission of 1964 formalized the border. Other parts of the border experienced
significant changes over time. The Appendix Section B.2 provides more historical
detail on these changes made to the Police Line between 1907 and 1964 to represent
the lack of major changes to the northern border.
We then created a 100km buffer zone around the plausibly exogenous boundary be-
tween these two zones (see Figure 2.2) and only focus on observations within this
buffer to ensure comparability.24 We chose a 100km buffer because individuals living
in this zone live in similar geographic, political and cultural environments. There
is a tradeoff between comparing individuals living in very similar environments (as
close to each other as possible) and still having enough observations for our analysis.
Based on power calculations we then decided to use a 100km buffer, which provides
us with enough observations to identify our effects of interests. While the 100km
is our preferred buffer size we also include estimations using observations from the
projects put it, “in general they are commendable. They are doing a good job”. N. Ndaitwa, personal
communication, September 2015.
23. In summary, “the Police Zone border was determined in Berlin, its location resulted from geo-
graphical considerations, previous colonial experiences in boundary-drawing, and arbitrary decisions
disconnected from actual on-site conditions” (Miescher, 2012, p.47).
24. We excluded those EAs inside Etosha National Park from the buffer area.
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Figure 2.2. Enumeration Areas and buffer zone
entire country and observations from a 50km buffer zone as robustness checks.
The outcome variables of interest used in this paper stem from the Afrobarometer
survey. Between 1999 and 2008, four survey rounds (1999, 2003, 2005, 2008) were
conducted, which covered questions about attitudes toward politics, the economy and
civil society. Afrobarometer uses random sampling methods, which are conducted
with probability proportionate to population size (i.e. more densely populated areas
have a higher probability of being sampled). Thus, “the sample design is a clustered,
stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample” (Afrobarometer.org).
The relevant question about “demand for democracy” (Bratton, 2004; De Aquino,
2015), our main outcome variable, asks about support for democracy.25 The main be-
havioral outcome that we focus on is voter turnout. We measure individual turnout
using a question asking whether the individual voted in the most recent national elec-
tion.26 Finally, to test our hypothesis that different attitudes toward authority and
25. “Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.”
26. We rely on self-reported data because official turnout data is not available at the EA level. This
level of disaggregation is necessary in order to clearly identify whether people live in the directly or
indirectly ruled areas.
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contact with traditional leaders are important mechanisms for the development of dif-
ferent attitudes toward democracy, we analyze responses to (i) a question about the
frequency of contact with traditional leaders and (ii) a question which asked whether
authorities should be respected or whether one should be allowed to question author-
ity in general (see exact wording of the questions in Appendix Section B.4).
The geographical location of the surveyed individuals is identified by enumeration
area.27 TheNamibian Statistics Agency divided Namibia into 4080 enumeration areas
for the 2001 census (see Figure 2.2), each comprises between 80 and 100 households.
Therefore, there are more enumeration areas in more densely populated regions. The
number of enumeration areas within the 100km buffer zone is 1247. Out of these
1247 enumeration areas, the Afrobarometer survey covered between 42 and 47 in in
each round. This constitutes a random sample of all enumeration areas in the buffer
zone. There are more enumeration areas in the northern part of the buffer as this
part is more densely populated than the southern part. We observe eight individuals
per enumeration area in each survey round. This gives us a maximum number of
1426 observations for the 100km buffer. This number of observations however differs
between specifications as not each question is asked in every survey round and we
eliminated observations where the responded answered “don’t know”.
Pre-colonial political structures and attitudes were ethnic-group specific. The Police
Zone border cuts through the pre-colonial territories of five different ethnic groups
(Ovambo, Kavango, Nama/Damara, Herero and Caprivi, see Figure B1 in the Ap-
pendix). The Murdock (1967) data suggests that pre-colonial modes of subsistence
differed between these communities, which may in turn have affected the political
structures and thereby political attitudes. We therefore include ethnic fixed effects in
all specifications so as only to compare individuals from the same ethnic group and
thereby ensure that pre-treatment attitudes did not differ between the direct and in-
directly ruled areas. We use self-reported ethno-linguistic data from Afrobarometer
and all ethnic groups are represented in both parts of the buffer.
Survey round fixed effects are included in order to account for the different timing
of the Afrobarometer survey rounds. The border also cuts through seven (out of
fourteen) administrative regions28 so that we can compare individuals who face the
same regional institutions with each other by including region fixed effects. This is
important in order to account for differential institutional performance, which is an
important predictor of support for democracy (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi,
2005). Whilst Namibia is highly centralized politically, elected regional councillors
27. Details for how to apply for the restricted geographic data used in this project are available at
http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-use-policy.
28. The border cuts through Kavango, Kunene, Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana, Oshikoto, Otjozond-
jupa.
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nevertheless play an important role in lobbying for and allocating central funds.
There are no significant differences in terms of income, education, gender and age be-
tween individuals in the northern and southern part of the buffer zone (see discussion
in Section 2.6.1).29 We nevertheless add individual-level controls to some specifica-
tions as they are also important determinants of political attitudes (Bratton, Mattes,
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) and help us to identify the effects more precisely. We mea-
sure individual income through a lived poverty index based on Mattes, Bratton, and
Davids (2003) by taking the principal component of responses to questions about
access to food, water, healthcare, fuel and cash income. We also constructed mea-
sures of education (highest level attained), age (in years) and gender (binary) using
responses from Afrobarometer (see exact wording of the questions in the Appendix
Section B.4). For summary statistics see Table B1 in the Appendix.
In our preferred specification we include distance to Windhoek as a control variable
because it is likely to capture variation in observables and unobservables that affect
political attitudes such as trade or information penetration. It thus ensures that we
are not only picking up a linear trend in terms of proximity to the capital.
For robustness and to help rule out alternative mechanisms we also include speci-
fications with the following controls: subjective evaluation of the performance of
local government councilors, livestock suitability and a urban/rural dummy. Bratton,
Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) found that the most important predictor of sup-
port for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is the performance of the government. We
therefore control for the performance of local governance councils measured with the
respective Afrobarometer question (see Appendix Section B.4) to ensure that our es-
timated effects are not driven by differences in institutional quality at the local level.
We include livestock suitability30 as further proxy for economic well-being in each
of the predominantly rural communities, which rely on cattle rearing as an impor-
tant source of income (Mendelsohn, 2002). Moreover, it helps to eliminate concerns
about pre-colonial differences in pastoral and agricultural suitability, which may in
turn have affected the political processes of different communities within the same
ethnic group.
We are aware that some of these control variables may be “bad controls” and thereby
lead to post-treatment control bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The perceived per-
formance of local government officials, urbanization as well as income are potential
29. As these variables are post-treatment characteristics and may be affected by the treatment itself
we consider them as potential mechanisms rather than as suitable balancing variables.
30. Livestock suitability is measured as “maximum biomass of livestock that can be supported on a
long-term, sustainable basis by the available grazing” in kg/hectare (Mendelsohn, 2002 p. 150). We
assume that these geographic conditions are constant over time and therefore use a ten-year average
(1995-2005) of the variable.
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Figure 2.3. Regression discontinuity plot
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A local linear regression discontinuity plot representing how support for democracy differs according to
distance from the Red Line border, obtained from amultivariate regressionmodel with a vector of binary
indicator variables identifying respondent ethnicity, survey round and region. Circle size corresponds
to the number of respondents in each bin.
outcomes of our treatment. We therefore also present specifications without these
controls.
Our baseline specification includes ethnicity and survey round fixed effects because
these are both crucial requirements for our identification strategy. These specifica-
tions are spatial regression discontinuity designs, as discussed in Dell (2010), with
distance to Windhoek as running variable because distance to the capital is the po-
litically and economically most relevant geographic dimension in our context. In
addition, we present specifications which control flexibly for geographic location.31
The baseline RDD estimation equation is thus:
𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼 𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 + X
′
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠𝜸 + 𝜂𝑒 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜓𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠
Y expresses demand for democracy of individual i, living in enumeration area d in
region r, belonging to the ethnic group e, being surveyed in round s. Indirectrule
is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual lives in an enumeration area
which belonged to the indirectly or the directly ruled part of Namibia. X is a set of
31. Second order polynomials of distance distance to Windhoek and to the Police Zone boundary as
well as local linear polynomial in longitude and latitude.
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Table 2.1: Indirect rule and geographic characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Savanna Grasscover Average Elevation Carrying Livestock
Rainfall Capacity Density
Indirect colonial rule 0.131 12.27 0.523 4.853 -0.377 15.00
(0.121) (11.45) (1.694) (20.36) (0.307) (11.03)
Distance Windhoek -0.0343 -5.417 0.115 3.145 0.0106 26.01***
(0.0330) (7.095) (0.847) (11.14) (0.179) (8.301)
Observations 1,418 1,410 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418
𝑅2 0.105 0.302 0.786 0.369 0.803 0.539
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean of DV 0.99 54.97 41.17 10.58 4.21 75.21
Results from OLS regressions including regional fixed effects and an urban/rural dummy. The sample consists of
observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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control variables, which includes individual-level characteristics such as age, gender
and dummies for income and education.32 It also include distance to Windhoek as
running variable. 𝜂𝑒 are ethnicity fixed effects, 𝜇𝑠 are survey-round fixed effects and
𝜓𝑟 are region fixed effects.
We identify the effect of indirect colonial rule on democratic attitudes by OLS esti-
mation and also show specifications using (ordered) probit estimations because our
outcome variables are discrete.
As discussed above, the identifying assumption for this RD identification strategy is
that all other unobservable factors are continuously related to distance to the north-
ern Red Line border. This assumption implies a testable implication that observable
pre-treatment covariates will have a continuous distribution across the northern Red
Line. Ideally, we could show that pre-1897 political and economic characteristics do
not change discontinously at the Police Zone boundary. However no such data exists.
We can demonstrate that the border cuts through pre-colonial political territories (see
Figure B1). Moreover, as geographic variables are commonly seen as important deter-
minants of pre-colonial development, we collected data on a number of geographic
variables to substantiate the continuity of ‘pre-treatment’ variables across the north-
ern Red Line. We compiled EA-level data on elevation, grass cover, savannah cover,
carrying capacity and livestock density from Mendelsohn (2002).
Table 2.1 demonstrates that these geographic covariates do not differ discontinuously
at the northern Red Line border.33 This test of continuity of observed covariates is
evidence in favor of the identifying assumption of continuity of unobservables and
therefore that the regression discontinuity design is a valid one (Lee and Lemieux,
2010).
2.5 Results
Living in the formerly indirectly ruled part of Namibia decreases the probability that
people think that a democratic government is preferable to any other type of gov-
ernment. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the discontinuous drop in support for democracy
at the Police Zone border.34 The plot confirms that attitudes toward democracy dis-
cretely change at the internal border dividing formerly directly and indirectly ruled
areas of Namibia.
32. X𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠 = ∑4𝑛=0 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠 + ∑
8
𝑚=0 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠
33. We use contemporary data assuming that geographic conditions are roughly constant over time.
34. Negative values correspond to EAs located inside the Police Zone (south) and positive values
correspond to EAs outside the Police Zone (north). The smallest bin only contains 24 observations and
we are therefore not able to credibly graphically represent the effects for smaller bin sizes. The size of
the circles corresponds to the number of observations per bin.
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Table 2.2: Effect of indirect rule on support for democracy and voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Support Support Voting Voting Voting
democracy democracy democracy
OLS OLS O Probit OLS OLS Probit
Indirect colonial rule -0.262*** -0.203* -0.309* -0.211*** -0.162* -0.549*
(0.0950) (0.119) (0.179) (0.0483) (0.0880) (0.310)
Distance Windhoek -0.0346 -0.0399 -0.0373 -0.0904
(0.0752) (0.113) (0.0565) (0.212)
Observations 1,347 1,322 1,322 734 718 716
𝑅2 0.029 0.051 0.059 0.291
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 165 165 91 91 91
Mean of DV 2.399 2.399 2.399 0.722 0.721 0.721
Results from OLS and (ordered) probit regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education dummies
and poverty index dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered
by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Columns (1) and (4) in Table 2.2 present raw comparisons of political attitudes and be-
havior between indirectly and directly ruled areas. These specifications include only
ethnicity, region and survey round fixed effects, which are minimally required to
draw causal inference in our context. Columns (2) and (5) present our preferred RDD
specification including also individual level controls35 and distance to Windhoek as
running variable. Columns (3) and (6) show that the effects are also statistically sig-
nificant when applying a (ordered) probit model because the dependent variables are
discrete.
The magnitude of the effect on democratic attitudes is in the range of a fourth of a
standard deviation of the dependent variable (i.e. living in the formerly indirectly
ruled areas decreases support for democracy by 0.2 on a scale from 1 to 3). The co-
efficient decreases slightly when adding distance to Windhoek and individual level
controls.
Moreover, people in the indirectly ruled part of the buffer report that they vote sig-
nificantly less (15-20 percentage points) than people living in the directly ruled part.
This corresponds to around a third of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
This indicates that weaker democratic attitudes are associated with less reported vot-
ing - the essential political act in a democracy - and thus that indirect colonial rule
indeed presents a block to democratic consolidation both in an attitudinal and be-
havioral sense. These results provide confirmatory evidence for H1 and H2: people
living in formerly indirectly ruled areas indeed support democracy less as a system
of government and turnout less at elections.
Table 2.3 presents evidence on potential mechanisms linking indirect colonial rule
and contemporary political attitudes as outlined in the theory section. We theorized
that contact to traditional authorities is an important mechanism for persistence in
the effects of indirect colonial rule on contemporary democratic consolidation in sub-
Saharan Africa. Our results (Table 2.3, columns (1)-(3)) confirm H3 as contact to
traditional leaders increases by around 0.4 points (on a scale of 0-3) if an individual
lives in an indirectly ruled area of Namibia rather than in a directly ruled area. We
also theorized that living under a hierarchical local governance system in indirectly
ruled areas has socialized individuals into having greater respect for authority. The
results in columns (4), (5) and (6) provide suggestive evidence in favor of H4 as the
evidence indicates that people in the north do tend to respect authorities more.36
We discuss further empirical evidence against other potential causal mechanisms in
35. The coefficients on the individual-level control variables are reported in the Appendix in Table B3.
Figure B4 inAppendix Section B.7.2 represents the regression discontinuity plot when adding individual-
level controls.
36. This effect goes beyond the effect on contact with traditional leaders as we hold contact with
traditional leaders constant across specifications (4), (5) and (6).
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Table 2.3: Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders and respect for authority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contact Contact Contact Respect Respect Respect
TL TL TL authority authority authority
OLS OLS O Probit OLS OLS O Probit
Indirect colonial rule 0.388** 0.417* 0.734* 0.269** 0.268* 0.322*
(0.170) (0.244) (0.405) (0.115) (0.161) (0.186)
Distance Windhoek -0.0240 -0.0360 -0.00524 -0.0169
(0.141) (0.212) (0.0967) (0.109)
Observations 1,413 1,387 1,387 1,361 1,335 1,335
𝑅2 0.150 0.185 0.133 0.148
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 165 165 165 165 165
Mean of DV 0.696 0.702 0.702 2.431 2.432 2.432
Results from OLS and (ordered) probit regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education
dummies and poverty index dummies. Columns (4)-(6) additionally include contact with traditional leaders as control
variable. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration
Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Section 2.6.
2.5.1 Alternative RD polynomials
This section shows that the effect of indirect colonial rule on contemporary politi-
cal attitudes holds when controlling for the geographic location of the individuals
in a flexible manner. We first control for a local linear polynomial in longitude and
latitude as suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2014), which allows us to take the mul-
tidimensionality of the discontinuity into account (Dell, 2010). We also present spec-
ifications with a one-dimensional running variable (distance to Windhoek as in the
baseline and distance to the Police Zone boundary).37 In order to control for these
one-dimensional measures more flexibly we include second order polynomials.
Table 2.4 shows that the negative effect of indirect colonial rule on support for democ-
racy and turnout is largely robust across different spatial regression discontinuity
specifications. The positive effect of indirect colonial rule on contact to traditional
leaders and respect for authorities is similarly robust across different spatial regres-
sion discontinuity specifications (see Table B4). Hence, the evidence is largely sup-
portive of hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4.
2.5.2 Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our results to the inclusion ofmore controls, we also included
performance of the government, livestock suitability and an urban/rural dummy as
control variables because these factors may bias the estimated coefficients (see Tables
2.5 and 2.6). The size of the effect of indirect colonial rule on support for democracy
is -0.29 when adding all controls at the same time (column (5)). That corresponds to
around a third of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. It is however larger
than the baseline effect (column (1)), which may be caused by bad controls, which are
outcomes of the treatment themselves. Nevertheless, the results confirm that there is
still a significant negative effect of indirect rule on support for democracy even when
taking potential confounders into account. The effect of indirect rule on voting also
remains statistically significant negative throughout all but one specifications (Table
2.6). The effect size is also substantially larger when compared to the baseline and
should similarly be interpreted with caution.
The results for support for democracy also hold when not only focusing on observa-
tions in the 100km buffer zone but using a sample from the entire country and also
when using a 50km buffer zone (see Appendix Tables B5 and B6). The results for vot-
ing are not robust to changing the buffer size. The sample size reduces to 390 when
restricting the sample to the 50km buffer and therefore there is likely not enough vari-
37. In these specifications we also add regional fixed effects to better account for the exact geographic
location of the individuals.
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Table 2.4: Different specifications of RD polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Support Support Voting Voting Voting
democracy democracy democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.208* -0.246* -0.259*** -0.192** -0.127 -0.216***
(0.111) (0.127) (0.0956) (0.0952) (0.0815) (0.0496)
Observations 1,347 1,347 1,347 734 734 734
𝑅2 0.022 0.029 0.029 0.052 0.063 0.060
Lat/Lon ✓ ✓
Dist. Windhoek quadr ✓ ✓
Dist. Boundary quadr ✓ ✓
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 165 165 91 91 91
Mean of DV 2.399 2.399 2.399 0.722 0.722 0.722
Results fromOLS regressions. Columns (1), and (4) include a local linear polynomials in longitude and latitude. Columns
(2), and (5) include a quadratic polynomial in distance to Windhoek. Columns (3), and (6) include a quadratic polynomial
in distance to the boundary. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered
by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.5: Effect of indirect rule on support for democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Support Support Support Support Support
democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.203* -0.310** -0.234** -0.215* -0.294**
(0.119) (0.121) (0.118) (0.121) (0.128)
Distance Windhoek -0.0346 -0.00746 -0.0302 -0.0326 -0.00593
(0.0752) (0.0787) (0.0767) (0.0767) (0.0788)
Performance government 0.00192 -0.00661
(0.0289) (0.0284)
Carrying Capacity -0.0103 -0.0357
(0.0357) (0.0422)
Urban -0.0205 -0.0491
(0.0713) (0.0874)
Observations 1,322 1,291 1,347 1,347 1,266
𝑅2 0.051 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.052
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 165 165 165 165
Mean of DV 2.399 2.398 2.399 2.399 2.397
Results fromOLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education dummies and poverty index
dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration
Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Effect of indirect colonial rule on voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting
Indirect colonial rule -0.162* -0.201** -0.148 -0.169* -0.217**
(0.0880) (0.0808) (0.0903) (0.0916) (0.100)
Distance to Windhoek (decimal degrees) -0.0373 -0.00726 -0.0384 -0.0333 -0.00465
(0.0565) (0.0519) (0.0575) (0.0572) (0.0566)
Performance government 0.0324 0.0207
(0.0251) (0.0231)
Carrying Capacity 0.0105 0.00227
(0.0231) (0.0325)
Urban 0.00622 0.0304
(0.0455) (0.0604)
Observations 718 698 734 734 682
𝑅2 0.291 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.291
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 91 91 91 91 91
Mean of DV 0.721 0.723 0.722 0.722 0.723
Results fromOLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education dummies and poverty index
dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration
Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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ation left to estimate the effect on voting precisely given that we include a number
of fixed effects and control variables.
In addition we created placebo buffers by shifting the location of the former Police
Zone boundary one degree latitude north and south respectively. When running
these regressions we do not find any significant effects on support for democracy or
voting (Tables B7 and B8), which confirms that our results are unique to this historical
meaningful Police Zone boundary. As an additional robustness check we clustered
the standard errors on a constituency level, which reduces the number of clusters
from 165 to 44 (see Appendix Table B9). The main results still hold.
2.6 Discussion of other Potential Mechanisms
It is difficult to move from cleanly identifying the effect of compound ‘treatments’
such as indirect colonial rule to pinpointing the precise causal mechanisms at work.
Many institutional, social and economic factors differed between indirectly and di-
rectly ruled areas of Namibia during the colonial-era. In order to substantiate the
institution of traditional leadership as a likely causal mechanism connecting colonial-
era governance structures and post-colonial political attitudes, we have shown that
greater contact to traditional leaders and greater respect for authority is still persis-
tent in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia.
In this section, we demonstrate that other potentially important causal mechanisms -
including economic development, education, political socialization, sorting, contem-
porary institutional quality - do not differ across formerly indirect and directly ruled
areas of northern Namibia. Thus, this section demonstrates that there is an absence of
evidence in favor of other potentially important causal mechanisms connecting the
form of colonial rule and contemporary democratic attitudes in northern Namibia.
2.6.1 Individual Characteristics
Income, education, age and gender are important individual characteristics that deter-
mine political attitudes. None of these factors differs significantly between indirectly
and directly ruled areas (see Table 2.7), suggesting that there is an absence of evidence
that demography is an important causal mechanism linking the form of colonial rule
and contemporary political attitudes.38
38. The difference in support for democracy has remained persistent despite efforts on the part of
the Namibian government to raise the incomes of Namibians north of the Red Line after independence.
Moreover, education levels do not differ significantly likely because missionaries founded schools long
before the first colonizers reached Namibia. Even during colonial times, missionaries were as active at
providing education for indigenous Namibians in the south as in the north.
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Table 2.7: Balancing table for the buffer zone: individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poverty index Education Gender Age
Indirect colonial rule -0.226 -0.139 0.0392 3.441
(0.310) (0.394) (0.0444) (2.690)
Distance Windhoek 0.0110 -0.0457 -0.00166 -0.479
(0.168) (0.215) (0.0217) (1.632)
Observations 1,404 1,406 1,418 1,418
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean of DV 2.55 3.81 0.50 35.80
Results from OLS regressions controlling for distance to Windhoek and an urban/rural
dummy. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors
(clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.6.2 Economic Conditions
Table 2.8 provides further evidence that economic conditions do not differ signifi-
cantly today across direct and indirectly ruled areas of our buffer zone. Whether
measuring economic development through night time lights, infrastructure develop-
ment or homelessness, levels of economic development do also not differ significantly
between indirectly and directly ruled areas of our buffer zone.39 There is thus an ab-
sence of evidence that contemporary differences in terms of political attitudes are
driven by different levels of economic development. In any case, as we have demon-
strated in ourmain results, controlling flexibly for respondent poverty, education, age
and gender does not alter the robust relationship between the form of colonial rule
and contemporary political attitudes and in fact tends to strengthen the magnitude
of the estimated effects.
39. Satellite data on night lights come from The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and are averaged over the period 2001-2008. We use composites, which are “made using all
the available archived DMSP-OLS smooth resolution data for calendar years”. The infrastructure index
is calculated by taking the first principal component of a series of Afrobarometer questions about the
existence of a paved road, a sewage system, electricity grid and water systems in the enumeration
area and data on EA-level homelessness stem from the 2001 census published by the Namibia Statistics
Agency.
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Table 2.8: Balancing table for the buffer zone: EA characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Night lights Bad infrastructure Homeless
Indirect colonial rule -2.034 0.217 -28.83
(2.045) (0.176) (25.49)
Distance to Windhoek 3.468** -0.0725 8.652
(1.528) (0.102) (7.179)
Observations 1,418 1,418 1,418
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean of DV 6.98 0.36 4.15
Results from OLS regressions controlling for distance to Windhoek and an urban/rural
dummy. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Standard errors
(clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.6.3 Political Socialization
Political socialization over one’s lifetime is of course an important determinant of fu-
ture political attitudes and different colonial experiences in the north and south may
have led to different attitudes toward democracy. Importantly, however, the indige-
nous population of Namibia across the direct and indirectly ruled araas of Namibia
had the same (absence of) experience with electoral democracy during the colonial
era. In South West Africa, the ‘rule of law’ and electoral democracy only applied to
the white population. Different lengths of participation in democracy thus does not
represent a confounder between the north and the south.
It could be on the other hand that the introduction of democracy was seen as a greater
‘liberation’ in the south relative to the north. For example, it may have been that
differences in levels of repression during the liberation struggle of the 70s and 80smay
have led to a greater demand for democracy in the south. To test this argument, we
see whether the effect of indirect colonial rule differs for individuals who experienced
liberation and those who did not. Table B10 in the Appendix demonstrates that there
is no interaction effect between age and living in the formerly indirectly ruled areas.
That means that the effect of living in the north on democratic attitudes does not
differ between young and old people. These results also hold when using a binary
age measure40 (see Table B10 in Appendix). Given the persistent effects of indirect
rule on contemporary political attitudes of both young and old Namibians, there is
an absence of evidence that our effects are being driven by historical factors such as
40. Dividing the sample into those younger than the 25𝑡ℎ age percentile (24 years) and those older
than that. The younger people experienced the most part of their political socialization after 1990.
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memories of the liberation struggle.
2.6.4 Sorting
During German and South African rule, permanent migration between the two parts
of the country was prohibited and thus colonial-era sorting is not a confounder. We
cannot entirely rule out the effect of selective sorting after independence in 1990,
however we believe this is unlikely to act as an important confounder. In northern
areas of Namibia, land is communally held and community ties are consequently
extremely close. Moreover, migration statistics from the Namibian Statistics Agency
suggest that permanent migration from the north, where it has occurred, has been
economic in nature as the young have moved to the larger cities of the south such
as Windhoek or Walvis Bay far south of our study area to look for jobs. To control
for the factors that might affect individual propensity to migrate, we control for age
and education in our specifications - neither of which changes the results. Hence,
though it cannot be completely ruled out, it is unlikely that selective sorting explains
our results (Moorsom, 1977; Melber, 1996).
2.6.5 Contemporary Institutions
Other than the greater importance of traditional leaders in northern Namibia, con-
temporary institutions do not differ between the northern and southern areas in our
sample. In order to ensure that our effects are not different by differing performance
of local government officials as theorized by Williams (2010) and Logan (2013), we
have previously included controls for the individuals’ evaluation of the performance
of local government councils. Moreover, Namibia is extremely centralized politically
because, after independence, the Namibian government made a great effort to ho-
mogenize governance between the two parts of the country (Werner and Odendaal,
2010; Melber, 2015; Düsing, 2002; Keulder, 2000). Finally, we can use Afrobarometer
data to show that people living north and south of the border do not systematically
evaluate the effectiveness of government institutions differently in a way that would
bias towards our results (see Table 2.9).
Individuals on both sides of the former Red Line border think that governmental
officials are similarly receptive. The coefficient on fear of unjust arrest, which is an
indicator for despotism of officials, also does not differ significantly. Trust in courts
does not differ between the two parts. Trust in police is even significantly higher in
the north, which would bias against finding an negative effect of indirect colonial rule
on support for democracy. Finally, support for the ruling party SWAPO is also higher
in previously indirectly ruled areas than in directly ruled areas. That suggests that
lower support for democracy in the north is not driven by frustration at the outcome
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Table 2.9: Balancing table
(1) (2) (3)
Direct rule Indirect rule Difference
Government officials listen 1.22 1.26 -0.048
(1.06) (1.08) (0.11)
Trust in police 1.78 1.91 -0.13*
(0.85) (0.88) (0.070)
Trust in courts 1.83 1.91 -0.085
(0.92) (0.95) (0.067)
Fear of unjust arrest 3.93 3.83 0.097
(0.73) (0.93) (0.091)
Swapo Support 0.35 0.53 -0.18***
(0.48) (0.50) (0.034)
Observations 254 1,164 1,418
of the electoral process.41
Moreover, we include fixed effects for the seven regions that the settlement boundary
cuts through in our baseline specification. This ensures that we only compare individ-
uals living close to each other on the same part of the boundary, who are governed
by the same contemporary national and regional institutions.
2.7 External Validity
Whilst we have chosen to focus on Namibia in order to try to cleanly identify the
effect of colonial rule on contemporary support for democracy, it is natural to ques-
tion whether results stemming from a single country are generalizable. Theoretically,
we believe that the ‘demand-side’ mechanisms outlined in this paper are general-
izable because contemporary contact with traditional leaders is actually more fre-
quent elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa than in Namibia and it has been suggested
that the legitimacy of traditional leaders has undermined the consolidation of democ-
racy elsewhere on the continent (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005).42
41. The greater support for SWAPOmay in part reflect the institutional capacity of traditional leaders
to mobilize support for the ruling party in indirectly ruled areas, as in contemporary South Africa (De
Kadt and Larreguy, forthcoming)
42. Indeed, as Lange (2009) points out in the context of post-colonial Sierra Leone, “the system of
rule through chiefs was hardly questioned because it was accepted and viewed by both officials and the
public as appropriate. Indeed, even the Sierra Leoneans who rebelled against the chiefly misrule in the
mid-1950s asked for new chiefs, not a new system of rule” (p. 197)
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Moreover, we show in Appendix Section B.8 that there is empirical evidence that the
relationship between indirect colonial rule, contact to traditional leaders and lower
support for democracy is generalizable across the continent. Pooling Afrobarometer
responses from across countries and controlling for ethnicity, standard demographic
characteristics and level of development, indirect colonial rule is negatively associ-
ated with individual support for democracy, turnout43, and positively associated with
contact to traditional leaders. Although these results cannot be interpreted as causal,
they are nonetheless suggestive that the documented within-country effects of indi-
rect colonial rule in Namibia are generalizable to the rest of the continent.
2.8 Conclusion
The results presented in this study show that indirect colonial rule has persistent
effects on contemporary political attitudes and behavior. We identified the effect of
indirect rule by exploiting a unique natural experiment in Namibia. Due to the effects
of a 1897 rinderpest epidemic, Namibia was divided into a southern region directly
settled and ruled by colonial authorities and a northern region that was indirectly
ruled through a system of appointed indigenous tribal elites, leading to exogenous
variation in the form of colonial rule amongst members of the same ethnic group.
Applying a spatial RDD,we found that individuals in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia
are less likely to support democracy as a form of governance and participate in voting
at elections.
Our evidence suggests that the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not de-
mographic factors such as education or income but rather are institutional - specif-
ically, the legacy of colonial governance institutions (Lange 2009). Despite the low
procedural inclusiveness of hereditary systems of traditional leadership in indirectly
ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa, traditional leaders are nonetheless usually seen as
far more effective and trustworthy than elected leaders (Logan, 2008; Baldwin, 2015).
We therefore theorize that the institution of traditional leadership in sub-Saharan
Africa has acted as an parallel legitimate governance system that has socialized indi-
viduals in indirectly ruled areas to accept non-electoral systems of government. This
paper thereby contributes to a long-running debate in comparative politics (Mam-
dani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Williams, 2010; Logan, 2013) - our results suggest that
the hereditary system of traditional leadership institutionalized by indirect colonial
rulemay indeed present a stumbling block to contemporary democratic consolidation
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Our findings have potentially broad implications for our understanding of processes
of democratization in the post-colonial context. Indirectly ruled countries are on av-
43. This result is not statistically significant though the coefficient is in the theorized direction.
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erage relatively autocratic today (Hariri, 2012; Lange, 2009). Our evidence suggests
that a causal mechanism underlying this important aggregate cross-national relation-
ship is potentially cultural - Namibians in indirectly ruled areas are less likely to
believe that democracy is the only legitimate form of government or participate in
the electoral process. The relatively autocratic nature of indirectly ruled areas of the
world today may, therefore, not only be due to a lack of ‘supply’ of democracy from
post-independence elites who successfully captured less inclusive political systems.
Rather, it may also be due to weaker general ‘demand’ for electoral democracy as a
system of government in indirectly ruled areas.
Whilst our evidence suggests that indirect colonial rule plays an important role in
shaping individual attitudes toward democracy, we do not wish to imply a mono-
causal explanation for variance in contemporary political culture in sub-Saharan
Africa. Colonization is not destiny - the legacy of indirect colonial rule, whilst impor-
tant, can only explain part of the variance inNamibia’s contemporary political culture.
Rather, we want to highlight the fact that the ongoing parallel existence of undemo-
cratic local governance structures can partially undermine support for democracy
even in the context of a functional, largely successful national democratic polity. This
has potentially broad implications for democratization processes in other indirectly
ruled sub-SaharanAfrican countries, where systems of traditional leadership still play
an important role in local governance and national democracy is not as consolidated
as in Namibia.
Moreover, the fact that the institutional legacies of indirect rule may weaken support
for core democratic tenets in sub-Saharan Africa does not invalidate the extremely
important and valuable governing roles that traditional authorities currently play
in their communities. Indeed, we have argued that it is likely in part because non-
electoral mechanisms such as strong social ties have proven so effective in keeping
traditional leaders accountable and responsive to the needs of their communities and
thus more effective than elected officials (Baldwin, 2015) that support for electoral
democracy as a system of government is weakened in areas with influential tradi-
tional leaders. Despite the presence of a trade-off between influential local traditional
institutions and democratic consolidation, therefore, the policy mechanisms for im-
proving overall quality of governance in sub-Saharan Africa in the future remain
more unclear and is a currently fruitful area of research.44 Ultimately, we hope that
our findings documented in this paper encourage further research about the com-
peting legitimacy of different institutional configurations and the historical legacies
that continue to shape political culture in both sub-Saharan Africa and the wider
world.
44. As Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015) show, introducing elections for traditional authorities may
actually have counter-productive effects on community collective action.
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Appendix B.1: Ethnic Groups Prior to Colonization
Figure B1. Ethnic groups prior to colonization (Murdock, 1967)
Appendix B.2: Red Line Changes Over Time
In this section we provide greater detail on the changes made to the location of the
Red Line between 1897-1990. The firstmap of the Police Zonewasmade in 1907 by the
colonial department in Berlin, in response to a decree issued by the German Reichstag
in 1905 to restrict police protection in South West Africa (Department of Veterinary
Services 1996). In northern Namibia, the 1907 boundary defining the Police Zone
followed the veterinary cordon fence established ten years earlier (Miescher 2012).
Reserves outside the Police Zone were restricted from European settlement (Waters,
1918).45
Between 1907 and 1937, the area covered by the boundary of the Police Zone par-
tially expanded west and east. The exact location of the Red Line in the west and
east, unlike the areas in the north bordering the Native and Game Reserves which
were defined in 1907, was not documented in writing until 1928 despite appearing on
maps (Prohibited Areas Proclamation, 1928). Throughout the 1920s, farmers thus had
some leeway to incorporate new farms immediately outside the eastern and western
boundary of the Police Zone by having such lands formally surveyed. Moreover, the
45. The boundary of legal European settlement remained unchanged as of the 1911 farm map (Besitz-
standkarte)
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Figure B2. Red line changes over time
Changes in boundaries defining area of legal European settlement between 1907-1990. Sources: Karte
des unter polizeilichen Schutzder Regierung zu stellenden Gebietes in Duetsch-Sudwest Afrika 1907;
Verodnung betreffend Bildung von Wildreservaten in dem sudwesafrikanischen Schutzgebiet 22 March
1907, SouthWest Africa - Suidwes Afrika 1937, Suidwes Afrika - SouthWest Africa 1955, Suidwes Afrika
- South West Africa 1966. National Archives of Namibia, Waters (1918) and Mendelsohn (2002)
Red Line was extended by authorities to the international border with Bechuanaland
and to the Atlantic coast in 1926 (see South West Africa - Suidwes Afrika 1926). This
was apparently done by authorities in Windhoek in order to better convince South
African authorities that the Red Line represented an impermeable veterinary bound-
ary, necessary to allow the ongoing export of cattle from SouthWest Africa (Miescher
2012 p. 96).
Three months after the end of World War II, South African authorities established
a commission to enquire into policy changes needed to secure the ‘social security’
of European persons in South West Africa (Botha, 2000). Among a number of top-
ics investigated by the Lardner-Burke commission was the possibility of surveying
and leasing new farmers for settlers. In order to meet the goal of “a farm for ev-
ery settler”, the commission ultimately recommended a dramatic expansion of the
Police Zone in order to accommodate an extra 1,127 farms (Government of South
West Africa, 1946). This expansion was, however, opposed by the colonial veterinary
service who feared extending European farms further north proximate to potentially
diseased cattle (Botha, 2000). To accommodate these competing demands, the author-
ities in 1947 partially adopted the recommendations of the commission - extending
the Police Zone west of Fransfontein and moving the Police Zone in the northeast
along the 19th degree of latitude to the 19th degree longitude (Government Notice
No. 375, 1947). The north-eastern border was shifted slightly again along a further
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parallel northeast in 1961 to create more farms (Government Notice No. 222, 1961).
In a sense, the recommendations of the Lardner-Burke commission provide further
evidence for the exogeneity of the Police Zone boundary. The commission (unsuc-
cessfully) recommended a significant expansion of farms in the area north of the
Police Zone, thus indicating that such areas in our indirectly ruled buffer zone would
have been suitable for European settlement had the original veterinary cordon fence
been located further north.
The final major change to the Red Line was due to the Odendaal Commission of 1964.
The commission was a political response to the rise of apartheid and African nation-
alism (Melber, 2015). In order to legitimate ongoing segregation between Europeans
and Africans, the Commission recommended the creation of a number of African
homelands which would be ruled on a ‘traditional’ basis (Odendaal, 1964). The pro-
portion of land allocated to African reserves almost doubled and correspondingly
the area where Europeans were legally allowed to settle actually shrunk significantly
(Republic of South Africa, 1964). For example, in the west of Fransfontein, in order
to create the new Damara homeland the commission recommended the official pur-
chase of hundreds of European farms to be allocated to the Damara (Odendaal, 1964).
The northern border between European and African areas remained, however, un-
changed.46 After the Odendaal commission of 1964, no further changes were made
to the area delimiting European settlement. The Red Line was eventually dissolved
following Namibian independence in 1990.
Thus, the changes to the boundaries of European settlement between the establish-
ment of the veterinary cordon fence and the final boundary formalized in 1964 as rep-
resented in figure B2 can be summarized as follows: there was a gradual increase and
then significant reduction in the land allocated to European settlers in the western
and eastern portions of the Red Line; the bulk of the northern boundary remained un-
changed; some expansion of the Red Line beyond the original cordon fence did occur
in the north-east and north-west so the exogeneity of the final border is not perfect.
However these changes were small and were largely to bring the border in alignment
with degrees longitude and latitude, which is quite arbitrary. Thus, whilst as in all
historically oriented work it is difficult to rule out all other competing explanations,
the historical record is nonetheless quite suggestive that the northern location of the
Red Line border was exogenous to pre-colonial confounders.
Appendix B.3: Extension of European Farmland 1911-1964
This figure demonstrates the progressive extension of European farmland in South
West Africa. In the early 1900s, European settlement was primarily focused in central
46. For example, see the 1966 farm map as digitized in figure B2
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and southern Namibia around Windhoek. Over the course of the first half of the
twentieth century, Europeans settlers gradually ‘filled out’ most of the Police Zone.
In north-eastern and north-western Namibia, the Red Line contracted in parts after
the Odendaal Commission of 1964 (see figure B2) which meant that some European
farms were allocated to traditional authorities.
Figure B3. Extension of European farmland 1911-1964
(a) Farmland 1911-1964
(b) Farmland 1964-1990
Sources: Besitzstandkarte 1911, South West Africa - Suidwes Afrika 1921, South West Africa - Suidwes
Afrika 1937, Suidwes Afrika - South West Africa 1966. National Archives of Namibia, Mendelsohn
(2002).
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Appendix B.4: Afrobarometer Survey Questions
Afrobarometer survey questions uesed in this paper (Afrobarometer, 1999, 2003, 2005,
2008).
Outcome variables
• Support for democracy: Which of these three statements is closest to your
own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be
preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government
we have.
1= Statement 2: Non-democratic preferable, 2=Statement 3: For someone like
me, it does notmatterwhat kind of governmentwe have, 3=Statement 1: Democ-
racy preferable
• Voting: With regard to the most recent national elections, which statement is
true for you?
0= You decided not to vote
1= You voted in the elections
We dropped observations from respondents who reported that they could not find
the polling station, were prevented from voting, did not have time to vote or not
vote for some other reason. This constitutes less than 3% of the sample.
• Contact traditional leader: During the past year, how often have you contacted
any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them
your views: A traditional ruler?
0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often
• Respect for authority: Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society we
would like to have in this country. Which of the following statements is clos-
est to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.
Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of lead-
ers.
Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority.
1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree
with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2
Control variables
• Poverty Index: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family
gone without:
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– Enough food to eat?
– Enough clean water for home use?
– Medicines or medical treatment?
– Enough fuel to cook your food?
– A cash income?47
0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always
In order to construct the poverty indexwe predict the first principal component
of these five variables and then generate 5 different poverty groups based on
this component (with group 1 being the poorest and group 5 being the richest,
i.e. never without any of these five necessities).
• Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Pri-
mary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ High school, 5=Secondary
school completed/High school, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than uni-
versity, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate
• Respondent’s gender:
0=Male, 1=Female
• Performance of local government councilor: Do you approve or disapprove
of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve
months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Your Elected Local
Government Councillor?
1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve
47. Other studies also include a question about lack of electricity. This question is however not in-
cluded in Afrobarometer rounds 3-5 for Namibia.
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Appendix B.5: Summary Statistics
Table B1 and Table B2 summarize the main variables of interests for the buffer zone.
The number of observations in Table B1 differs as some variables are not available in
all four survey rounds.
Table B1: Summary statistics for buffer zone: individual characteristics
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Support for democracy 2.40 0.83 1 3 1352
Voted in last election 0.72 0.45 0 1 742
Contact traditional leader 0.69 1.01 0 3 1421
Trust traditional leaders 1.91 0.91 0 3 1029
Respect authority 2.43 1.01 1 4 1369
Performance government 2.88 0.79 1 4 1360
Gender 0.49 0.50 0 1 1426
Age 35.74 14.79 18 92 1426
Education 3.81 1.85 0 8 1414
Poverty group 2.55 1.31 1 5 1412
Table B2: Summary statistics for buffer zone: EA characteristics
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Indirect colonial rule 0.83 0.38 0 1 165
Distance to border (in km) 66.24 23.63 5 99 166
Distance to Windhoek (in decimal degrees) 4.49 0.70 2 5 166
Distance to Windhoek (in km) 499 75 287 591 166
Carrying Capacity 4.19 1.04 2 6 166
Urban 0.83 0.38 0 1 166
Night lights 6.46 13.12 0 52 166
Infrastructure Index 0.64 0.47 0 1 166
Homeless people 4.40 22.18 0 212 166
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Appendix B.6: Overview Individual-Level Control Variables
Table B3: Indirect rule and support
for democracy
(1) (2)
Support democracy Voting
Indirect colonial rule -0.203* -0.162*
(0.119) (0.0880)
Distance Windhoek -0.0346 -0.0373
(0.0752) (0.0565)
Education=0 -0.312* -0.525***
(0.165) (0.0938)
Education=1 -0.426** -0.329***
(0.201) (0.103)
Education=2 -0.203 -0.188**
(0.139) (0.0809)
Education=3 -0.306** -0.174*
(0.140) (0.0937)
Education=4 -0.130 -0.0901
(0.134) (0.0781)
Education=5 -0.125 -0.109
(0.136) (0.0800)
Education=6 0.0426 -0.0396
(0.158) (0.0938)
Education=7 -0.115 -0.00128
(0.182) (0.104)
Poverty group=1 -0.0832 0.123**
(0.0761) (0.0469)
Poverty group=2 -0.163* 0.157***
(0.0852) (0.0546)
Poverty group=3 -0.0968 0.152***
(0.0706) (0.0459)
Poverty group=4 -0.271*** 0.0510
(0.0976) (0.0576)
Age 0.00105 0.0154***
(0.00193) (0.000927)
Gender 0.0728* -0.0156
(0.0416) (0.0342)
Observations 1,322 718
𝑅2 0.051 0.291
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 91
Mean of DV 2.399 0.721
Results from OLS regressions. The sample consists of observa-
tions from the 100km buffer zone. Reference group for edduca-
tion is group 8 (highest level of education) and group 5 (richest
group) for poverty group. Standard errors (clustered by Enumer-
ation Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix B.7: Robustness Checks
B.7.1 RDD Specification
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Table B4: Indirect rule and support for democracy: alternative RDD specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contact Contact Contact Respect Respect Respect
TL TL TL authority authority authority
Indirect colonial rule 0.229 0.529* 0.411** 0.302* 0.247 0.241**
(0.220) (0.282) (0.169) (0.155) (0.186) (0.115)
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,413 1,361 1,361 1,361
𝑅2 0.145 0.152 0.153 0.126 0.131 0.133
Lat/Lon ✓ ✓
Dist. Windhoek quadr ✓ ✓
Dist. Boundary quadr ✓ ✓
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 165 165 165 165 165
Mean of DV 0.696 0.696 0.696 2.431 2.431 2.431
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education dummies and poverty
index dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone.. Standard errors (clustered by
Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.7.2 Regression Discontinuity Plot with Individual Controls
Figure B4. Regression discontinuity plot
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A local linear regression discontinuity plot of difference in support for democracy from the Red Line
border obtained from a multivariate regression model with a vector of binary indicator variables iden-
tifying respondent ethnicity, survey round, individual controls and region. Bin size corresponds to the
number of respondents
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B.7.3 Different Buffer Sizes
The results are robust to using observations for the entire country and for a 50km
buffer rather than only focusing on the buffer zone. When decreasing the size of
the buffer the number of observations is too small using voting as an outcome and
therefore the effect cannot be precisely estimated.
Table B5: Indirect rule and support for democracy: different buffer sizes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Entire 50km 50km
Country Country Buffer Buffer
Indirect colonial rule -0.0941*** -0.100** -0.161* -0.182**
(0.0328) (0.0501) (0.0881) (0.0848)
Distance Windhoek -0.0232 -0.0346
(0.0250) (0.0900)
Observations 4,656 4,565 620 606
𝑅2 0.008 0.037 0.044 0.092
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 571 571 77 77
Mean of DV 2.424 2.420 2.382 2.381
Results fromOLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, education, gen-
der dummies and poverty index dummies. The sample consists observations for the en-
tire country and a 50km buffer respectively. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration
Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B6: Indirect rule and voting: different buffer sizes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Entire 50km 50km
Country Country Buffer Buffer
Indirect colonial rule 0.0200 -0.0473 -0.0963 -0.0694
(0.0240) (0.0422) (0.0638) (0.0636)
Distance Windhoek 0.00479 -0.142**
(0.0178) (0.0552)
Observations 2,711 2,664 392 386
𝑅2 0.036 0.185 0.066 0.246
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 335 335 48 48
Mean of DV 0.733 0.733 0.747 0.749
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, ed-
ucation dummies and poverty index dummies. The sample consists observations for
the entire country and a 50km buffer respectively. Standard errors (clustered by Enu-
meration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.7.4 Placebo Buffer
We created placebo buffers by shifting the location of the former Police Zone bound-
ary one degree latitude north and south respectively. We do not find any signifi-
cant effects on support for democracy or voting, which confirms that our results are
unique to this historical meaningful Police Zone boundary.
Table B7: Indirect rule and support for democracy: placebo buffers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support for Support for Support for Support for
democracy democracy democracy democracy
Placebo indirect (south) 0.0532 -0.160
(0.119) (0.168)
Placebo indirect (north) -0.105 -0.0276
(0.0840) (0.0993)
Distance Windhoek 0.198 -0.0535
(0.128) (0.123)
Observations 324 318 927 914
𝑅2 0.067 0.169 0.028 0.084
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 42 42 114 114
Mean of DV 2.349 2.358 2.383 2.380
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education dummies
and poverty index dummies. The sample consists of oberservations from the placebo buffer zone. Stan-
dard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B8: Indirect rule and voting: placebo buffers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voting Voting Voting Voting
Placebo indirect (south) -0.00805 -0.140
(0.0800) (0.0945)
Placebo indirect (north) 0.0278 0.116*
(0.0591) (0.0645)
Distance Windhoek 0.0225 -0.0271
(0.106) (0.0608)
Observations 186 184 546 539
𝑅2 0.078 0.341 0.073 0.286
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 23 23 68 68
Mean of DV 0.720 0.717 0.722 0.722
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender, ed-
ucation dummies and poverty index dummies. The sample consists of oberservations
from the placebo buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.7.5 Different Clustering
Table B9: Indirect rule and support for democracy and voting: clustering SE on a
constituency level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Support Voting Voting
for democracy for democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.178** -0.203* -0.122* -0.162*
(0.0768) (0.112) (0.0615) (0.0895)
Distance Windhoek -0.0346 -0.0373
(0.0719) (0.0497)
Observations 1,347 1,322 734 718
𝑅2 0.019 0.051 0.049 0.291
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
# clusters 44 44 38 38
Results from OLS regressions. Individual-level control variables are age, gender education dummies
and poverty index dummies. The sample consists of observations from the 100km buffer zone. Stan-
dard errors (clustered by Constituency) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.7.6 Interaction Effects
Finally, we analyzed interactions between indirect rule and age using both the re-
ported age and a binary age measure (Table B10). The binary measure divides the
sample in people older and younger than 24, who are the so-called ‘born free’ gener-
ation. Neither of the estimations yields statistically significant effects of the interac-
tion. This demonstrates that the effect of indirect colonial rule on political attitudes
does not depend on age.
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Table B10: Interaction between indirect colonial rule and age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Support Voting Voting
for democracy for democracy
Indirect colonial rule -0.109 -0.109 -0.325* -0.229*
(0.187) (0.144) (0.169) (0.120)
Distance to Windhoek -0.0390 -0.0285 -0.0382 -0.0270
(0.0780) (0.0755) (0.0559) (0.0529)
Indirect rule x Age -0.00282 0.00494
(0.00461) (0.00366)
Age 0.00307 0.0110***
(0.00438) (0.00345)
Indirect rule x Old dummy -0.142 0.163
(0.134) (0.108)
Old dummy 0.198* 0.415***
(0.116) (0.0963)
Observations 1,317 1,322 718 718
𝑅2 0.048 0.054 0.294 0.365
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
# clusters 165 165 91 91
Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and age. Individual-level
control variables are age, gender, education dummies and poverty index dummies. The sample consists
observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix B.8: External Validity
In this subsection we examine how the variation in political attitudes by form of
colonial rule is reflected at the cross-national level. Whilst these results cannot be
considered causal, they are nonetheless suggestive that there is some external valid-
ity for our better identified natural experimental evidence. We use the cross-national
Afrobarometer Round 4 dataset compiled by Robinson (2014) because Robinson stan-
dardized ethnic group names across different countries. This means that, by taking
ethnic group fixed effects, we are able to mimic our analysis in Namibia by only ex-
amining within-ethnic group variation in support for democracy.
Our independent variable of interest, indirect colonial rule, is a country-level variable
that varies from 0 to 1. This variable captures the proportion of a country’s colonial
court cases that were decided on a ‘customary’ basis rather than a formal court of law,
thus giving a measure of the ‘indirectness’ of colonial rule (Lange, 2004). Because this
measure is only available for British colonies, Hariri (2012) interpolated it for other
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and it is his interpolated measure that we use.
We are interested in the effect of indirect colonial rule on contemporary political
attitudes and behaviour net of the confounding variables of democratic and economic
development. We thus control for an individual’s experience with democracy after
the third wave (Polity IV score average from 1991-2005) and economic development
(log GDP per capita). Because treatment is assigned at the country-level, we cluster
our standard errors at the country-level. Otherwise the specification remains the
same as in our specifications in Namibia - we include age, gender, education dummies,
poverty index dummies and ethnic fixed effects.
Even when only examining within ethnic-group variation, individuals in countries
that were ruled more indirectly are less likely to support democracy and more likely
to contact traditional leaders.48 Whilst they are also less likely to turnout at elections,
the difference is not statistically significant. These results should be interpreted with
caution given that this is a non-random sample of countries in sub-Saharan Africa
(biased towards more democratic countries) and the basis of assignment to treatment
is unknown. Nevertheless, they show that there is suggestive evidence that the rela-
tionship between the form of colonial rule and contemporary political culture is not
just limited to in Namibia but rather holds more generally in sub-Saharan Africa.
48. This data does not have responses to “respect for authority” as in our Namibian subset
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Table B11: Effect of indirect rule on support for democracy and contact with traditional leaders across
Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support Support Turnout Turnout Contact Contact
democracy democracy TL TL
OLS O Probit OLS O Probit OLS O Probit
Indirect colonial rule -1.599*** -3.403** -0.170 -0.504 0.653* 1.222*
(0.312) (1.348) (0.151) (0.559) (0.357) (0.643)
Mean Polity IV -0.0878*** -0.195** -0.00934 -0.0275 -0.000436 -0.00727
(0.0232) (0.0901) (0.00548) (0.0214) (0.0225) (0.0384)
Log GDP p.c. 0.0407 0.0161 -0.0336 -0.136* 0.0297 0.0205
(0.0652) (0.109) (0.0219) (0.0812) (0.0415) (0.100)
Observations 16,461 16,461 18,530 18,530 18,597 18,597
𝑅2 0.070 0.142 0.180
Ethnicity FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
# clusters 15 15 15 15 15 15
Mean of DV 2.612 2.612 0.753 0.753 0.508 0.508
Individual-level control variables are age, gender, education dummies and poverty index dummies. Data on indirect rule
at the country-level is taken from Lange (2004). Estimations based on Afrobarometer round 4 (all countries included).
Standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3
INDIVIDUAL LIFE HORIZON INFLUENCES
ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY
3.1 Introduction
The emergence and stability of political regimes crucially depends on the support
for these regimes in the population. A strong preference for democracy in the pop-
ulation can destabilize autocracies and lead to democratization, whereas a lack of
support for democracy may lead to a breakdown of democracy (Linz and Stepan,
1996). Surprisingly little is known about the determinants of individual preferences
for democracy. Traditionally, the literature has focused on macro-determinants that
foster democratic attitudes and that include, in particular, economic development,
education, and inequality (Lipset, 1959; 1960; Almond and Verba, 1963; Persson and
Tabellini, 2009). Recent work has shifted attention to the analysis of survey data to
explore individual support for democracy and its determinants. The results of this lit-
erature indicate that support for democracy is higher in democracies (Inglehart, 2003;
Inglehart and Welzel, 2003), and affected by perceived government effectiveness (Ma-
galhaes, 2014).
An increasing body of evidence suggests that preferences in various domains, includ-
ing political preferences, are influenced by the societal context as well as individual
life experiences (Fehr and Hoff, 2011) and modernization in general (Inglehart and
Welzel, 2010). Retrospective experiences, such as macroeconomic shocks or the so-
cial and institutional context during childhood and adolescence have been shown to
influence preferences for redistribution later in life.1 For political preferences, recent
1. See, for instance, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) or Luttmer and Singhal (2011). Related
evidence for risk tolerance has been reported by Malmendier and Nagel (2011) or Dohmen et al. (2012).
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evidence has shown that also the individual support for democracy is influenced by
the individual experience with democracy, in terms of the length of time an individual
spent under a democratic regime (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015).2
While this body of evidence suggests that political preferences are to some extent
endogenous with respect to the overall environment and to events or experiences
in the past, little is known about how the individual life horizon and future orienta-
tion affect political preferences. Do young individuals have a systematically different
predisposition toward democracy than older ones? Is the remaining life expectancy
relevant for the attitudes toward the political regime? And can the influence of age
effects be separated from the role of the expected length of the remaining life?
From a theoretical point of view, retrospective experiences should matter less for
regime preferences than the beliefs or expectations about the personal benefits from
alternative political regimes in the future. The regime preferences of forward-looking
individuals should thus be influenced by the future benefits or costs expected from
a particular regime as well as by the time horizon over which they are expected to
accrue, as suggested by the literature on the determinants of democracy (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006, e.g.). A prominent example of this argument has been made in
the context of former colonies, where the quality of the institutions set up by the
colonizers has been found to be crucially related to their life expectancy (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; 2003). Greater life expectancy implies a greater incen-
tive to set up inclusive institutions that allow for political participation, secure private
property and provide checks against power abuse by the state or the government, i.e.,
democratic regimes, in particular if the implementation of such institutions is costly
and time intensive. Building on the idea of a youth bulge, according to which the
presence of a large share of young adults within the population provides a favorable
environment for civil conflict Urdal (2006), Cincotta and Doces (2012), and Weber
(2013) provide evidence that the age composition of the population affects the like-
lihood of the establishment of liberal democracies or the likelihood of dictatorships,
respectively. Likewise, a considerable body of evidence in social psychology has es-
tablished a link between individuals’ awareness of mortality or threats to their life,
and authoritarian attitudes (Sales, 1973; Doty, Peterson, andWinter, 1991; Echebarria-
Echabe and Fernandez-Guede, 2006). The nexus between salience of mortality and
political attitudes has been confirmed in numerous studies (see Burke, Kosloff, and
Landau (2013) for a recent meta analysis). Recent work by Foa and Mounk (Foa and
Mounk, 2016a; 2016b) on the decreasing support for democracy inWestern countries,
particularly among the young, has sparked an intense debate about “democratic de-
consolidation”.3 However, a study that provides systematic evidence regarding the
2. Recent work by Roth and Wohlfart (2017) uses a similar approach to explore the effect of experi-
enced inequality on the preferences for redistribution.
3. See the Online Exchange on “Democratic Deconsolidation” on the website of the Journal of Democ-
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influence of age and the remaining life expectancy on the preferences for democratic
political regimes is still missing.
This study reports results from an empirical study that explores the effect of the ex-
pected length of the remaining life faced by individuals of different ages on individual
attitudes toward democracy. The identification strategy is based on individual-level
observations for political regime preferences for a panel of countries and on varia-
tion in the remaining years of life across age-gender-country-period cells. Building
on work in demography by Sanderson and Sherbov (Sanderson and Sherbov, 2005;
2013), this approach distinguishes between chronological age and a forward-looking
definition of age reflected by remaining life expectancy. This allows controlling for
other individual-level factors that might influence individual preferences for the polit-
ical regime, as well as potential confounds at the country level such as economic and
institutional factors, health infrastructure, or life expectancy. The evidence shows
that support for democracy increases with age, but declines with expected proximity
to death. Increasing age while keeping the remaining years of life fixed as well as in-
creasing remaining years of life for a given age group both contribute to the support
for democracy.
3.2 Data and Methodology
3.2.1 Data
The analysis is based on individual-level survey data collected as part of the World
Value Surveys. The World Value Surveys are nationally representative surveys that
are conducted repeatedly in almost 100 countries, using a common questionnaire that
contains consistent and comparable sets of questions on various topics. The relevant
questions for this study relate to the individual assessment of democracy as a form of
governing a country (see Appendix Section C.1.1 for details regarding text and cod-
ing). In addition to the subjective assessment of democracy as form of governance, we
use alternative questions regarding the subjective importance associated with living
in a country that is governed democratically, with having a parliament and elections
rather than a strong leader, and an assessment of democracy as best form of govern-
ment, as well as indices that combine these questions. The same questions have been
used previously in research on democratic attitudes (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schün-
deln, 2015; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003). Summary statistics of all outcome variables
are provided in Appendix Table C1.
These data are combined with information about the years until the expected death of
an individual of a given age and gender living in a particular country at a given point
in time. Data about the remaining years of life of an individual is taken from period
racy.
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life tables assembled by the United Nations (United Nations, 2015), which contain
the respective information for each country for age brackets of five years for both
genders and is available for different periods. Table C2 in the Appendix contains
summary statistics. Variation in remaining years of life is plausibly exogenous to
individual preferences for a political regime and is thus suited for addressing the
research question.
The empirical analysis is conducted using a sample with survey information from the
World Value Survey rounds 3-6 (1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014) for
an unbalanced panel of 93 countries for which information is available for the rele-
vant questions regarding individual attitudes toward democracy. The pooled sample
for the main specification consists of 267,426 individual observations. Figure 3.1(a)
captures the average attitude toward a democratic political system across countries,
based on individual responses for the most recent survey wave of the World Values
Survey available in each country. Figure 3.1(b) displays the corresponding life ex-
pectancy at age 40 for all countries contained in the estimation sample for the year
in which the most recent survey wave was elicited.
3.2.2 Methodology
To identify the effect of age and remaining years of life, the empirical strategy exploits
variation in the remaining years of life that an individual of a given age and gender
faces in the respective country at the respective point in time, therefore relying on
variation across age-gender-groups in a country across time. Concretely, the estima-
tion framework is based on a panel data set for age-gender-country-period cells and
is given by
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡 =
𝛼 +
𝑇
∑
𝜏=1
𝛽𝜏ℐ (𝜏 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡)
+
97
∑
𝑎=15
𝛿𝑎ℐ (𝑎 = 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿ℐ𝑎,𝑔,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡
where 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡 measures the survey response regarding
attitudes toward democracy by an individual 𝑖 with age 𝑎 ∈ [15, 97] and gender
𝑔 ∈ {𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒} in country 𝑐 at time (survey year) 𝑡 . 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡
measures the remaining years of life that this individual respondent can expect to
live according to the most recent (period) life tables for this country. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡 is
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Figure 3.1. World maps of individual democratic attitudes and individual life ex-
pectancy
(a) Individual attitudes toward democracy
(b) Remaining years of life
Panel (a): World map of attitude toward democracy. Country averages for the estimation sample of
individual responses for the most recent survey wave available in each country. Authors’ calculations
are based on microdata from World Values Survey. Panel (b): World map of life expectancy in terms
of remaining years of life at age 40. Country averages for the estimation sample of countries of the
respondents to the World Values Survey contained in the estimation sample, for the year in which the
most recent survey wave was elicited. Authors’ calculations are based on period life tables. White color
indicates excluded country (both panels).
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the age of the respondent. By estimating a distinct coefficient for each year of re-
maining life expectancy (the vector of 𝛽-coefficients) and for each age (the vector
of 𝛿-coefficients), this empirical specification provides flexible semi-parametric esti-
mates of the respective patterns of the effects of remaining years of life and of age
on attitudes toward democracy. The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡 contains individual information
about socio-demographic characteristics, such as number of children, marital status,
income, and education level. Finally, ℐ𝑎,𝑔,𝑐,𝑡 denotes a vector of binary indicator
variables that account for systematically different democratic attitudes by gender,
country and period cells. Richer specifications also include interactions, allowing for
period-specific country effects and gender-specific age effects. The baseline estima-
tion is conducted by least squares, the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑐𝑡 allows for clustering at the
country-age-gender-period level.
The identifying assumption underlying this estimation approach is that there are no
unobserved factors at the age-gender-country-year level that are correlated system-
atically with individual remaining years of life, or age. Covariates at the age, gender,
country and period level also account for factors that might affect democratic atti-
tudes. To account for country or period-specific factors that might affect the attitudes
toward democracy, the specification of the empirical model includes country and pe-
riod effects, which capture factors such as the quality of democratic institutions, po-
litical and civil liberties, ruling parties, the overall health status and life expectancy
at birth of the population. The same is true for country-specific historical events that
influence the attitudes toward democracy. Age effects account for age-specific pat-
terns that are correlatedwith health and political attitudes.4 Gender effects or in some
specifications age-specific gender effects account for differences between women and
men that might be linked to culture or development. To account for country-specific
time trends in political attitudes and health we include country-period effects in some
specifications.
With this estimation framework, the identification of the effects of remaining life
years and age on attitudes toward democracy is based on within-country variation in
remaining years of life across age-gender cells and over time. The use of information
from life tables corresponds to quasi-experimental variation in the sense of an inten-
tion to treat approach, since individual life styles or factors directly related to the
quality of or attitudes toward political institutions are not correlated with remaining
years by construction and thus do not affect the estimates. In particular, endogeneity
stemming from a third factor that is related to both the subjective life expectancy
4. Without additional assumptions, this estimation approach does not allow for a decomposition of
age and cohort effects due to collinearity. However, the estimates for the effects of remaining years of
life and age obtainedwith this panel identification approach cannot be driven by cohort effects, provided
that political attitudes are persistent along cohort lines, an assumption that appears to be in line with
existing evidence (Sears and Funk, 1999).
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and the preference for democracy, as for instance with victims of political violence in
autocracies who expect to only live a short period of time as consequence of ensuing
health damages, or with individuals planning to conduct a suicide attack, is ruled out
by this approach. Notably, such endogeneity concerns prevent the use of subjective
health assessments or individual assessments of remaining years of life in terms of
subjective life expectancy for the purpose of this study. In focusing on objective life
table information, our analysis also differs from the literature that focuses on the role
of mortality salience, e.g., in the context of terror attacks, for political attitudes, see,
e.g., Burke, Kosloff, and Landau (2013).
3.3 Results
The estimation results reveal a significant gradient in the attitudes toward democ-
racy with remaining life expectancy. Figure 3.2(a) visualizes the effect relative to the
base category of individuals with 40 remaining life years. The effect is non-linear
and monotonically increasing in remaining life years. Holding age fixed, individuals
that are closer to their expected end of life value democracy less than individuals that
can still expect to live for 25 years or more. This effect is distinct from the age effect
according to which individuals value democracy more at older ages (Figure 3.2(b)).
Relative to the base category of 40-year olds, age is associated with more positive
attitudes toward democracy, with older individuals having significantly more posi-
tive attitudes toward democracy. The age profile is approximately linear except for
the tails. The coefficients of remaining life years and general age-patterns (shown
in Figure 3.2) are estimated jointly within the same estimation framework. This im-
plies that these coefficients correspond to variation in attitudes toward democracy in
response to the respective category, holding all other covariates fixed. Figure C1 in
the Appendix displays the respective cell frequencies, suggesting that the empirical
pattern is not driven by outliers.
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Figure 3.2. Effect of remaining years of life and age on subjective assessment of
democracy
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(b) Effect of age
Coefficient estimates obtained from a multivariate regression model (3.1) with controls for age and a
vector of binary indicator variables that identify gender, country and period cells. Dotted lines represent
+/− 1.96 standard deviation bands around the respective coefficient estimate (95% confidence interval).
The results are reproduced in parametric multivariate regression settings with a
quadratic specification of the effect of remaining years of life, see Table 3.1, col-
umn (1). Restricting the estimation sample to individuals age 60 and younger to
reduce potential collinearity between age and remaining years delivers almost iden-
tical point estimates (Table 3.1, column (2)). In order to rule out that individual socio-
economic background conditions such as family status, education and income, trust,
or cohort-specific factors such as individual experience with a democratic system
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015) that are related to age or life expectancy af-
fect the results, we also conduct estimations based on an extended specification, with
similar findings, see Table 3.1, column (3). The results of this analysis reproduce ear-
lier findings that individual experience with democracy shapes the preferences for
democracy.
The results reported in Table 3.1, imply that an increase of twenty remaining life years
while holding everything else fixed is associated with attitudes toward democracy
that are more favorable by about a third of a standard deviation of the world sample.
This appears to be a significant effect, especially in light of the discrepancies in life
expectancy across the world.
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Table 3.1: Effect of remaining years of life on democratic attitudes:
parametric estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Full Under 60 Full
Remaining Life Years 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Remaining Life Years2 -0.000137∗∗∗ -0.000134∗∗∗ -0.000140∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Democratic Capital 0.00412∗∗∗
(0.0012)
Country FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Age FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Gender FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Children ✓
Marital Status ✓
Trust ✓
Education Dummies ✓
Income Dummies ✓
R2 0.080 0.080 0.096
N 267,426 230,502 198,026
Cluster 2,909 1,966 2,455
Least Squares estimates. Columns (1) and (3) are based on the full sample, col-
umn (2) is based on the sample of respondents aged ≤ 60 years. Standard errors
(clustered by country-age group-gender-survey round) in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.4 Additional Findings
The results are robust with respect to alternative specifications of the estimation equa-
tion. Columns (1) and (2) in Table C3 in the Appendix replicate the main findings,
column (3) shows that the baseline results are robust to applying an ordered logit
model because the dependent variable is ordinal, and columns (5) and (6) show that
the results are robust to different combinations of control variables (family status,
education and income, trust, experience with a democratic system). Figure C2 shows
that the life expectancy and age patterns are very similar across these alternative
specifications. Next, we add age-gender and country-period fixed effects (Table C4
and Figure C3) to demonstrate that the results are not driven by age-specific gen-
der characteristics or country-specific time trends. Moreover, restricting attention to
cross-country variation (see Figures C4 and C5 in the Appendix) does not affect the
findings, suggesting that the identification approach is unlikely to be driven by time-
varying third factors. The results regarding the influence of remaining years of life
and age on democratic preferences also extend to alternative measures of democratic
preferences that have been used previously in the literature (see Table C5 and Figures
C6-C9 in the Appendix).
One challenge for identification in this context is the systematic correlation between
age and remaining years of life (see Table C6 and Figure C10). This correlation is
highest for the cells with high ages and low remaining life years. To investigate
the sensitivity of the results with respect to potential empirical multicollinearity, we
conduct several tests. Estimates of variance inflation factors for the estimates for re-
maining years of life obtained on the full sample do not reveal evidence for excessive
multicollinearity (see Figure C11).5 Alternatively, we analyzed restricted samples of
individuals of age 60 years and younger (see Figures C12 and C13), or 40 years and
younger (see Figures C14 C15). This reduced the correlation between age and remain-
ing years of life. The sample of individuals under 60 years of age uses information
for 230,502 observations from 93 countries for the World Value Survey rounds 3-6
(1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014). The correlation between age and
remaining years of life is -0.876 in the sample restricted to ages ≤ 60. The correlation
is -0.687 in the sample restricted to ages ≤ 40. The estimation results based on this
restricted sample reveal similar patterns. Finally, even extreme multicollinearity be-
tween regressors does not violate the assumptions for unbiasedness of the coefficient
estimates.
5. VIFs exceed 6, except for values of remaining years of life between 10 and 15, where they rise
almost up to 8; variance inflation factors for age are below 5 throughout.
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3.5 Conclusion
This study has presented novel evidence that support for democracy increases with
age, but declines with expected proximity to death. This indicates that longevity
plays a crucial role for the support for democracy. More experience in life in general,
as reflected by a greater individual age while holding other factors fixed, is associ-
ated with more favorable attitudes toward democracy as political system. A greater
individual life expectancy, as reflected by the expected remaining years of life, also
implies a more favorable attitude toward democracy. These results hold above and
beyond controlling for the usual macro-determinants and retrospective experiences,
such as individual exposure to democratic institutions, that have been shown to affect
support for democracy in the existing literature.
The results have implications for policy. Individual democratic attitudes are key for
the viability of democratic regimes and these attitudes appear to be weakened by
short life horizons. Many developing countries exhibit non-democratic or weak in-
stitutions, deficient health infrastructure and poor health conditions, high mortal-
ity, violent conflicts, and generally gloomy perspectives for individual lives. These
conditions thus constitute a stumbling block to democratization. Increasing the life
expectancy for any given age group under these conditions can be expected to con-
tribute to the support for democracy in a country. At the same time, this would imply
an increase in age for a given remaining years of life, with similar consequences for
democratic attitudes.
Conversely, the results point at potentially detrimental consequences of declining
life expectancy for the support for democracy. In developing countries, falling life
expectancy as consequence of epidemics or conflicts is predicted to undermine pop-
ular support for democracy. Our study also raises a note of caution for developed
countries in which life expectancy has been stalling recently (Xu et al., 2016). In light
of considerable heterogeneity in the projections of life expectancy across developed
and developing countries (Kontis et al., 2017) the findings suggest the possibility of
heterogeneous prospects for the popular support for democracy across theworld. The
results also provide a new aspect to ongoing discussions about the stability of democ-
racy in aging societies, which has largely focused on policies (Lee and Mason, 2011;
Goldstone, Kaufmann, and Duffy Toft, 2012), but less on the public support for the po-
litical system at large. By highlighting the potential effects of health improvements
on support for democracy our results provide a novel perspective on the potential
outcomes of health interventions and improved health infrastructure.
Future work is needed to address the link between political attitudes and institutions
as well as the link between life expectancy and future orientation to corroborate the
policy relevance of our results. In this respect, our study addresses two important
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points that deserve more attention. First, while the importance of individual atti-
tudes toward democracy for the political system has been emphasized previously
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015), more evidence is needed to establish the
link between individual support for democracy and the emergence and stability of
democratic institutions. Second, while remaining years of life is likely to be a critical
determinant of future orientation by affecting the life horizon of an individual, direct
evidence for this link is scarce. Some recent work on time preferences suggests that
life expectancy indeed affects individual future orientation in terms of patience and
time preference (Falk et al., 2015). More work is needed to establish this link at the
individual level and to uncover the causal pathways by which age and remaining life
expectancy affect attitudes toward democracy.
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Appendix C.1: Data Sources and Sample Preparation
C.1.1 World Value Survey
The primary data source for the empirical analysis is survey information from the
World Value Survey (WVS) available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The vari-
ables of main interest regarding preferences for democracy are contained in survey
rounds 3-6 (1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014). The analysis is con-
ducted using an unbalanced panel of all 93 countries for which information is avail-
able for the relevant questions regarding individual attitudes toward democracy. This
panel data set comprises 267,426 individual responses. The relevant WVS questions
read:
E117: ”I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you
think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it
is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?
Having a democratic political system”
• 1: Very good
• 2: Fairly good
• 3: Bad
• 4: Very bad
To facilitate the interpretation, the responses to this question have been recoded by
reversing the scale as 5-𝑖, so that in the empirical analysis the responses are:
Attitude toward Democracy: Having a democratic political system
• 1: Very bad
• 2: Bad
• 3: Fairly good
• 4: Very good
The analysis is focused on question E117 because it it available formost survey rounds.
In the robustness analysis, the following alternative questions have been used:
E114: ”I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you
think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it
is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”
• 1: Very good
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• 2: Fairly good
• 3: Bad
• 4: Very bad
E123: ”I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a demo-
cratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree
or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?
Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”
(reversed scale)
• 0: Strongly disagree
• 1: Disagree
• 2: Agree
• 3: Strongly agree
E235: ”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democrati-
cally? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “abso-
lutely important” what position would you choose?”
• 1: Not at all important
• …
• 10: Absolutely important
IW-Index: Inglehart and Welzel index created based on questions E114, E116, E117
and E123. It ranges from -6 (pro-autocracy) to +6 (pro-democracy).
Table C1: Summary Statistics: Outcome Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
E117 3.35 0.74 1 4 267,426
E114 2.76 1.03 1 4 253,469
E123 2.24 0.74 0 3 99,833
E235 8.45 2.02 1 10 144,461
IW-Index 2.72 2.24 -6 6 89,748
C.1.2 UN Life Tables
Expected remaining years of life is constructed using life expectancy at exact age x
(years), 𝑒(𝑥), from UN Life Tables provided by the United Nations, Department of
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Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects:
The 2015 Revision. The variable is defined as ”average number of remaining years of
life expected by a hypothetical cohort of males/females alive at age x who would be
subject during the remaining of their lives to the mortality rates of a given period.”
The variable is available at the country level in 5-year intervals and for 5-year age
brackets, separately by gender. The data were matched to the corresponding WVS
waves 6 for 5-year age brackets, which we match to the age reported in the WVS.
We could not match data for the following countries, which are covered in the WVS:
Andorra, Taiwan (both not available in UN Life Tables) and Serbia and Montenegro
(covered as individual countries in UN Life Tables).
C.1.3 Countries Included and Summary Statistics
The sample for our baseline regression comprises all 93 countries contained in the
WVS. Countries that could not be matched with the UN Life Tables were eliminated
from the sample. This applies to the following countries: Andorra, Taiwan (both
not available in UN Life Tables) and Serbia and Montenegro (covered as individual
countries in UN Life Tables). As robustness checks we conducted the same analy-
sis with different dependent variables. For these regressions the composition of the
sample depends on the availability of data for the dependent variable (see Table C1).
Further robustness analysis has been conducted for a sample of cross-sectional data
from WVS round 6 (2010-2014) for 58 countries.7
Table C2: Summary statistics: explanatory variables (used in baseline specification)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Remaining years of life 35.91 13.73 2 68 267,426
Age 40.68 16.06 15 97 267,426
Gender 0.49 0.50 0 1 267,426
Children 0.72 0.45 0 1 267,426
Most people can be trusted 0.26 0.44 0 1 256,534
Education 4.78 2.22 1 8 250,941
Income Steps 4.69 2.31 1 10 246,655
Democratic capital by age (PolityIV) 12.76 11.04 0 37 242,125
6. Wave 3: 1995-2000, Wave 4: 2000-2005, Wave 5: 2005-2010, Wave 6: 2010-2015.
7. Argentina, Armenia Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Iraq, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
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Appendix C.2: Cell Frequencies
Figure C1. Determinants of subjective attitude toward democracy
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Appendix C.3: Alternative Specifications
Figure C2. Comparison of sepcifications
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Main specification (solid line), main specification with democratic capital as control (dashed line), main
specification with democratic capital, children, marital status, trust, education dummies and income
dummies as controls (dotted line).
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Table C3: Effect of remaining years of life on democratic attitudes: parametric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Age<60 O Logit Full Full
Remaining 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗
Years (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0088) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Remaining -0.000137∗∗∗ -0.000134∗∗∗ -0.000368∗∗∗ -0.000119∗∗∗ -0.000140∗∗∗
Years2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Democratic 0.00448∗∗∗ 0.00412∗∗∗
Capital (0.0011) (0.0012)
Country FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Gender FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Children ✓
Marital Status ✓
Trust ✓
Education ✓
Income ✓
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
N 267,426 230,502 267,426 242,125 198,026
Cluster 2,909 1,966 2,909 2,613 2,455
Standard errors (clustered by Country-Agegroup-Gender-Survey Round groups) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C4: Effect of remaining years of life on democratic attitudes: More
flexible specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Remaining Years 0.00767∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0025)
Remaining Years2 -0.0000940∗∗∗ -0.000260∗∗∗ -0.000213∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Country FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Age group FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Gender FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round x Country FE ✓ ✓
Age group x Gender FE ✓ ✓
R2 0.09 0.08 0.09
N 267,426 267,426 267,426
Cluster 2,909 2,909 2,909
Standard errors (clustered by Country-Agegroup-Gender-Survey Round groups) in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure C3. Extended specification including interactions of fixed effects
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Appendix C.4: Cross-Sectional Results
Figure C4. Cross-sectional analysis
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Figure C5. Cross-sectional analysis
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Appendix C.5: Other Outcomes
Table C5: Effect of remaining years of life on democratic attitudes: alternative measures
of democratic attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E117 E114 E123 E235 IW Index
Remaining 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗
Years (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0053)
Remaining -0.000185∗∗∗ -0.000140∗∗∗ -0.000194∗ -0.000245∗∗∗ -0.000187∗∗∗
Years2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Country FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Gender FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey round FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R2 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.20
N 267,426 253,469 99,833 144,461 89,748
Cluster 2,909 2,903 1,181 1,610 1,160
Dependent variables are standardized (mean 0 and standard deviation 1) to facilitate comparison of coeffi-
cients. Standard errors (clustered by Country-Agegroup-Gender-Survey Round groups) in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure C6. Outcome variable: E114 (Strong leader)
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Figure C7. Outcome variable: E123 (Democracy may have its problems but is better
than other forms of government )
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Figure C8. Outcome variable: E235 (Importance of democracy)
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Figure C9. Outcome variable: IW Index
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Appendix C.6: Correlation between age and remaining years of life
Table C6: Correlation between age and remaining years of life
(1) (2) (3)
Age Age<60 Age<40
Remaining years of life -0.925 -0.876 -0.687
Figure C10. Correlation between age and remaining years of Life
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C.6.1 Variance Inflation Factors
Figure C11. VIFs: full sample
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C.6.2 Estimations for Subsamples
Figure C12. Subsample: under 60 years old
(a) Effect of remaining years (b) Effect of age
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Figure C13. Subsample: under 60 years old
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
A
tti
tu
de
 to
w
ar
ds
 D
em
oc
ra
cy
0 20 40 60 80
Remaining Life Years
(a) Effect of remaining years
-.4
-.2
0
.2
A
tti
tu
de
 to
w
ar
ds
 D
em
oc
ra
cy
10 20 30 40 50 60
Age
(b) Effect of age
Figure C14. Subsample: under 40 years old
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Figure C15. Subsample: under 40 years old
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HEALTH ON THE NILE: THE CURSE OF LIVING
DOWNSTREAM
4.1 Introduction
Urbanization and industrialization characterize economic development worldwide.
Standards of living seem to be higher in urban and industrial areas, which promise
job opportunities, better infrastructure and public good provision. Therefore many
people are attracted to these areas. But one important downside of urbanization and
industrialization is pollution. This is particularly problematic in developing countries
as the institutional framework is usually weak and environmental regulation is not
enforced. Industrial wastewater and sewage containing toxic substances are often
discharged into rivers. Hence, water pollution is a particular concern associated with
high population density and industrial activity. The WWF calls it “one of the most
serious ecological threats we face today” (WWF, 2017) and the WHO estimated that
more than 360,000 children under 5 years die due to diarrhea, as a result of poor access
to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene (WHO, 2017c).
Water pollutants are spread by moving water, and so the flow of rivers through cities
and past industrial plants determineswhich households are affected by pollutedwater.
We use this quasi-experimental variation in exposure to pollutants and examine the
effect of pollution on children’s health. We construct a novel panel dataset based on
geocoded DHS survey data between 1992 and 2014, geocoded factory locations and
finely gridded population density in Egypt. We aggregate this data for 75 segments
along the Nile. We then estimate the effect of population density and the existence of
a factory on the health of children living up- or downstream of the pollutant. Further,
we use information on the opening year of factories. We are thus able to exploit
temporal and spatial variation in water pollution and to hold region and time specific
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factors constant.
We find a negative effect of urbanization (measured by population density) and fac-
tory presence on health for the downstream population whereas we do not find a neg-
ative health effect on the upstream population. This differential health effect is most
likely caused by water pollution and suggests that factories and agglomerations emit
pollutants into the Nile, which worsen health outcomes. The effect does not seem
to be driven by sorting as we do not find differential wealth effects. Further results
show that the negative health impact of urban and industrial areas can be mitigated
by access to clean drinking water. Moreover, we find that in the case of urbanization
the negative health effect is localized and vanishes with increased distance between
the pollutants and the population. In contrast, we find evidence that cumulative in-
dustrial pollution over several upstream grids still has detrimental health effects. This
is due to the different nature of pollutants. While industrial pollution is to a large ex-
tent persistent due to its chemical composition, pollution caused by agglomerations
degrades more rapidly.
With this study we contribute to a large body of literature, which links water pollu-
tion to poor health outcomes in developing countries. First, we add methodologically
to the existing literature. Based on our unique dataset we exploit both spatial and tem-
poral variation in pollution and are therefore able to deal with potential endogeneity
issues, as for instance systematic differences between upstream and downstream lo-
cation and time-specific shocks. Second, we directly examine the health effects of the
two most important pollutants, urban areas and industrial plants. Third, our study
adds a highly relevant case, namely the Nile in Egypt, to the body of literature. More-
over, while most other studies linking water pollution to poor health outcomes only
focus on specific cases we provide an extensive analysis of the effects along the entire
course of the Nile river in Egypt.
There are a few papers that are methodologically related to our approach analyzing
differential effects on the population depending on the relative location to the pol-
lutant. Duflo and Pande (2007) compare agricultural productivity and vulnerability
to rainfall shocks in Indian districts downstream of a dam with other districts. They
thereby assume that people living downstream of a dam tend to benefit while those
living in the vicinity or upstream do not. Garg et al. (2016) show for Indonesia that
human bathing in upstream villages increases diarrheal incidence, while bathing of
downstream villages has no effect. Romero and Saavedra (2016) examine health ef-
fects of mines in Columbia and find that while mothers living in the vicinity of a
mine are positively affected, mothers living downstream from a mine are negatively
affected.
Methodologically less related but relevant in the context of water pollution is a study
by Brainerd and Menon (2014), who show that water quality has an effect on infant
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and child health in India, exploiting seasonal and geographic variation in the use of
fertilizers. Greenstone and Hana (2014) also focus on India and study the impact of
environmental regulations on infant mortality. They find however no significant ef-
fect of water regulations. Ebenstein (2012) uses variation in water pollution across
river basins in China and shows that lower water quality is associated with a higher
digestive cancer death rate. Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) find that water
privatization in Argentina decreases child mortality using variation in ownership of
water provision across time and space. Another strand of literature deals with the
effects of water pollution on other outcomes such as labor productivity. A recent
study by Zhang and Xu (2016) finds for example a positive effect of a water treat-
ment program in China on education. Zivin and Neidell (2013) provide an overview
over quasi-experimental evidence on the negative effects of pollution on individual
well-being in general and Currie et al. (2014) provide an overview over the literature
about early-childhood exposure to pollution and health and human capital outcomes
later in life. This literature predominantly finds significantly negative effects of water
pollution on health and human capital. While our study confirms this relationship
for the case of Egypt it goes beyond the existing literature by studying two of the
most hazardous pollutants, agglomerations and industrial plants.
Egypt provides an ideal setting to study health effects of water pollution. The Nile
river is the country’s onlymajor river and around 90% of Egyptians live in the Nile val-
ley and are thus directly or indirectly affected by polluted water. The Nile is the ‘life
artery’ of Egypt and constitutes the most important freshwater resource for almost
all water demands. The Nile water can thus reach human organisms through fish-
ing, irrigation, the groundwater (which is for instance used for washing) and even as
drinking water. The Nile’s water quality has been deteriorating over several decades
due to the disposal of industrial effluents and human sewage (Wahaab and Badawy,
2004; El-Ayouti and Abou-Ali, 2013; Ali et al., 2014; Abdel-Satar, Ali, and Goher,
2017). Abdel-Satar, Ali, and Goher (2017) document spatial differences in the mea-
sured water quality of the Nile, which reflect “combinations of natural and human
activities”. In our study we focus on industrial activities and urbanization, which
generate industrial wastewater and human sewage that are often disposed into the
Nile. Water pollution is a serious concern as around 40% of the Egyptian popula-
tion does not have access to ’safely managed’1 sanitation (WashWatch, 2017), which
fosters the transmission of diarrhoeal diseases. These diseases are particularly dan-
gerous for children, who are extremely sensitive to dehydration and the related loss
of electrolytes (WHO, 2017a). According to UNICEF, diarrhea is the second leading
cause of death among under 5 year old children in Egypt (3,500 to 4,000 under 5 year
old children die of diarrhea every year (UNICEF, 2017)). Egypt thus constitutes a com-
1. ‘Safely managed’ sanitation refers to improved sanitation facilities that are not shared with other
households and where excreta are safely disposed of in site or transported and treated off site.
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pelling case to study the hazardous effects of water pollution on children’s health.
4.2 Health Impact of Industrial and Urban Water Pollution
Water pollutants can be broadly classified into biodegradable and non-biodegradable
pollutants. Biodegradable pollutants consist of organic matter that is broken down
into simple organic molecules by natural agents like water, oxygen and micro-
organisms. These molecules eventually return into the environment.2 However, the
speed rate of the degradation process differs strongly by material (e.g. paper towels
naturally take approximately 1-2 weeks whereas a plastic bottle takes 100 years to
biodegrade). At the extreme, non-biodegradable substances are entirely resistant to
natural degradation processes - they are environmentally persistent and bioaccumu-
late.
So called Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) constitute a great environmental con-
cern. These materials are widely resistant to natural degradation processes and are
particularly toxic to living organisms (Schwarzenbach et al., 2010).3 POPs are used
in agriculture, manufacturing and industrial processes (e.g. fertilizers) but can also
emerge unintentionally as by-products of industrial production (e.g. dioxins in textile
production) (Krizanec and Le Marechal, 2006).
Urban sewage mainly consists of “raw sewage” containing excrement and debris (e.g.
sanitary towels or plastic). However, in developing and emerging economies the or-
ganic part of urban sewage like bacteria, parasites as well as viruses constitute the
major health concern (Schwarzenbach et al., 2010). Diseases caused by the respective
bacteria and viruses can involve gastro-enteritis, diarrhea, typhoid, cholera, but also
respiratory diseases like the Acute Severe Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) involving
heavy cough as major symptom (Feachem et al., 1983). An important cause of water-
borne illness is the Escherichia coli bacterium that is commonly found in intestines
of humans and animals. Five groups of pathogenic excreted viruses are particularly
important: adenoviruses, enteroviruses (including poliovirus), hepatitis A virus, re-
oviruses and diarrhea causing viruses (especially rota virus).
In contrast, the dominant pollutants in industrial sewage are non-degradable pol-
lutants such as POPs. They constitute around 95% of industrial effluents in Egypt
(Dahshan et al., 2016) and have hazardous effects on human health (WHO, 2017b).
The most toxic are so called dioxins and dioxin-like compounds (Krizanec and Le
2. The level of organic pollution is measured by the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). Two coun-
teracting effects determine the BOD: The organic pollution load and natural cleaning.
3. The POP ‘Dirty Dozen‘ are aldrin, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, hexachloroben-
zene, mirex, toxaphene, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dioxins and furans. POPs have been subject
of two international environmental treaties, the StockholmConvention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(2004) and the Aarhus Protocol (1998).
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Marechal, 2006).4 Dioxins are considered to have detrimental effects on the immune
system making people more vulnerable to acute infections. Further, they can dam-
age the gastrointestinal tract, organs and the reproductive system. In industrialized
countries the use of many of these substances in production processes is forbidden
and particular technologies are in place to destroy material containing POPs. Devel-
oping and emerging economies however often lack regulations and funds to pursue
consequent environmental strategies to combat POPs. Industrial waste water may
also contain harmful components of inorganic pollutants including heavy metals like
lead, cadmium, mercury and arsenic. The related health effects are however expected
to unfold after long-term exposure and often only emerge later in life. Given our re-
search design we are not able to detect these effects.
4.3 Data
Our analysis is based on a panel data set of 78 river segments and 7 time periods
between 1992 and 2014. The spatial dimension of the dataset is based on equally
spaced 10x10 square kilometer grids along the course of the Nile. We include grids,
whose center is located within a radius of 30km from the river line. This captures
the entire Nile valley and thereby the vast majority of Egypt’s population as only
few people live in the desert regions beyond the Nile valley. In addition we create
a subsample, which only includes grids that intersect with the Nile. In Egypt the
Nile runs relatively straight from its southern border with Sudan northwards into the
Mediterranean Sea. Accordingly, we group grids by latitude. Employing this strategy,
we obtain 78 horizontal river segments (see Figure 1). We exclude the Nile delta,
as the river disperses into multiple arms so that the population may be affected by
polluted water from several sources and a clear assignment is not possible anymore.
The temporal dimension of the dataset is determined by the availability of DHS survey
waves for Egypt. All, factory-, population density and household DHS data contain
geographic coordinates. We use geospatial software to aggregate all data for each
segment.5
To assess health outcomes of children we use data from the Demographic and Health
Survey. The survey is conducted by USAID and collects detailed health and demo-
graphic data for a wide range of developing countries. For Egypt there are seven
survey rounds available that contain geographic coordinates of the surveyed house-
holds for the years 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2014.6 We employ data from
4. The main groups of dioxins are polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDDs) and polychlorinated
dibenzofurans (PCDFs). Polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) are also chlorinated hydrocarbons with a sim-
ilar structure as dioxin (Umweltbundesamt, 2018).
5. Following, we use the terms segment and grid interchangeably, referring to the 78 horizontal
segments along the Nile.
6. In order to ensure respondent confidentiality, the longitude/latitude information are randomly dis-
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the survey’s ‘Individual Recode’ asking women about their own and their children’s
health. Accordingly, for data on children’s health we use questions asking whether
any child had diarrhea (H11), fever (H22) or cough (H31) during the two-week period
before the survey. We construct binary variables (0 indicating that no child had the
respective illness and 1 indicating that at least one child suffered from the illness) and
combine them to a one-dimensional health index by taking the average of the three
measures.7
We also construct a wealth index for each of these households (DHS only provides a
wealth index from 2003 onwards). The DHS index is based on households’ ownership
of selected assets. We follow the same methodology and take the first principal com-
ponent of the following survey items, which are covered in all surveys since 1992:
type of toilet facility (dummy variables), possession of radio, TV, refrigerator, bicycle
and electricity and type of floor material (dummy variables). Our newly constructed
index highly correlates with the index provided by DHS for rounds 2003-2014 (corre-
lation coefficient: 0.8). For ease of interpretation we normalize the measure to scale
the range in [0, 1].
In addition we examine sub-samples with respect to the source of drinking water.
The indicator variable turns 1 if drinking water is piped into dwelling and remains
0 if public taps, the Nile, wells and springs are the household’s source of drinking
water.
We thus obtain information on children’s health and household characteristics for
2500 households in 1992 and up to 4400 households in 2014 along the Nile river grid,
which amounts to 23,700 households in total. These households are grouped into 3200
clusters , which are georeferenced (the points in Figure 4.1 represent the clusters).8
Finally, we aggregate the health data to the river segment level, which leaves us with
data on children’s health for 78 segments at 7 points in time. We observe on average
22 DHS clusters per year and river segment.9
placed. “Urban clusters contain a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 2 kilometers of error. Rural clusters
contain a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 5 kilometers of positional error with a further 1% of the rural
clusters displaced a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10 kilometers” (http://dhsprogram.com/What-We-
Do/GPS-Data-Collection.cfm). Given that our segments span around 40 x 10 kilometers there should
only be few cases in which a DHS cluster is mistakenly allocated to the previous or subsequent segment.
In these cases we only introduce random noise and measurement error, which would bias our results
towards zero.
7. We also construct an alternative health index based on the first principal component. The corre-
lation is 0.999 and we therefore use the former index, which is easier to interpret.
8. 242 clusters in 1992, 433 clusters in 1995, 395 clusters in 2000, 391 clusters in 2003, 614 clusters in
2005, 530 clusters in 2008 and 724 clusters in 2014.
9. The median number of grids per year and river segment is 9.
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Figure 4.1. Nile river grid and DHS cluster
HEALTH ON THE NILE 153
In our main specification we use population density data as a continuous measure for
the level of urbanization in each grid. Data on population density on a 2.5 arc-minutes
grid is obtained from the Gridded Population of the World Database (v3) provided by
the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). The data provides esti-
mates of population density based on counts consistent with national censuses and
population registers in 5 year intervals. To match the years to our DHS waves, we
take the value closest to the respective DHS year. We then also aggregate them to the
river segment level. As the population is concentrated around the Nile and the fringes
of the Nile valley are sparsely inhabited, the highest rather than average population
density in each segment is the relevant measure to determine the extent of pollution.
In an additional specification we use cities as binary measure for urbanization. Cities
are defined by the “World Cities Database” and we focus on Egyptian cities with at
least one million inhabitants along the Nile (ordered by total population: Cairo/Giza,
Asyut, Aswan, Minya, Beni Suef, Quena, Sohag).
Figure 4.2. Nile river grid
Finally, we use data on plant establishment to measure industrialization. Data on
industrial plants comes from the “Plants Database” of Industrial Info Resources, a
provider of global market intelligence. The database tracks the 368 most important
industrial facilities in Egypt.10 The data provides geographic coordinates as well as
10. Plants are considered ‘important’ if they qualify for industry-specific criteria, e.g. mines with
capacity of 250.000 tons per anum and greater.
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opening and closing dates, which enables us to conduct comparisons of health out-
comes across both, space and time. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time
this data is used for scientific purposes in the context of analyzing health effects of
industrialization. We select all 65 plants, which are located within our grid. The in-
dustry types represented in our sample involve power plants, chemical processing,
metals and minerals, and pulp, paper and wood production. The Nile provides ap-
proximately 65 percent of the industrial needs for fresh water used in the production
process and receives approximately 57 percent of industrial effluents. It has been
shown that industries in our sample produce toxic wastewater with detrimental ef-
fects on human health (Megahed et al., 2015; Balabanič et al., 2017). An indicator
variable denotes whether there existed a plant in a river segment at a certain point
in time. Summary statistics on all variables of interest are provided in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.3. Factories along the Nile in Egypt
4.4 Urbanization
4.4.1 Empirical Framework
To estimate the effect of urbanization on children’s health we exploit variation in
population density across space. Although we use our panel dataset spanning seven
time periods, the variation in population density mainly stems from spatial differ-
ences whereas there is relatively little idiosyncratic variation in population density
over time. We estimate the effect of population density upstream of grid i on the
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Health Index 0.72 0.12 0 1 459
Wealth Index 0.67 0.14 0 1 459
Population Density (in 10K per sqkm) 0.25 0.45 0 4 539
Factory (binary) 0.23 0.42 0 1 539
Cumulative Popualtion Density (weighted) 0.06 0.05 0 0 539
Cumulative Factory Presence (weighted) 0.06 0.06 0 1 539
Population share with access to piped water 0.73 0.24 0 1 459
Distance along Nile (from south to north) 481.03 286.03 0 921 539
health index in grid i. To control for neighboring population density with potential
spill-over effects we also control for population density downstream of the respective
grid. At the same time this serves as an important placebo check. According to our
assumption that water pollution affects upstream and downstream population differ-
entially we do not expect strong health effects for population living upstream of the
pollutant. Population density in the same grid is an important control variable as it
is correlated with population density in the previous and following grids and may
affect health in grid i. We thus estimate the following model in order to identify the
effect of upstream population density on health:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4.1)
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 denotes the health index in grid i at time t, 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑖𝑡 is the population
density in the grid directly upstream of grid i at time t and 𝛽 therefore constitutes
the coefficient of interest. 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the population density downstream of
grid i at time t. By including 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑡 we are able to take advantage of the
quasi-experimental setting that only upstream pollution affects health in grid i while
downstream pollution should have no negative effect. Further, we use DHS wave
fixed effects, 𝜎𝑡 , to capture common time trends in urbanization and health. We also
include 10 region fixed effects, 𝜎𝑟 , to compare households within the same subna-
tional administrative unit, which are exposed to the same institutional, economic,
and cultural environment. In additional specifications we include distance along the
Nile and population density in grid i as control variables. Distance along the Nile is
measured from the southern border of Egypt and constitutes an important control
variable that captures linear trends along the Nile such as downstream increases in
cumulative pollution or factors related to the distance from Cairo. Finally, we also
show that our results are robust to including region-year fixed effects to control for
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all region-specific changes over time such as changes in health legislation or enforce-
ment of regulations. This specification uses the variation in population density as
pollutant most efficiently as it captures the localized effects. Section 4.6 presents
results for a cumulative measure of population density.
The correlation between population density in two contiguous grids is however rather
high (0.72) and therefore multicollinearity may be an issue when estimating OLS.The
coefficients would not be biased but standard errors tend to be very high in the pres-
ence of multicollinearity. Estimates of variance inflation factors for the estimates for
𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑖𝑡 are however below 5 and thus do not reveal evi-
dence for excessivemulticollinearity. In the baseline specificationwe cluster standard
errors at the grid level. Tomore precisely account for both, cross-Sectional spatial cor-
relation and location-specific serial correlation we conduct robustness checks using
Conley standard errors with a spatial HAC correction (Conley, 1999; 2008).11 Spatial
autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease with distance up to a cutoff of 100 km
and we account for serial correlation across all seven time periods.
Our main identifying assumption is that upstream population density is uncorrelated
with unobserved factors that are correlated with health and that affect the down-
and upstream population differentially. We use data on upstream polluting behavior
rather than data on local pollution levels and are therefore not relying on correlating
local pollution with local health outcomes - in fact we even control for local pop-
ulation density and thereby capture all factors associated with both local level of
urbanization and local health.
The inclusion of downstream population density as a placebo check rules out all con-
cerns related to urbanization effects besides water pollution (such as working condi-
tions in cities, health care provision, air pollution, risk of contagion). If water pol-
lution is a relevant channel downstream population density should not affect health.
A remaining concern threatening our identifying assumption is sorting. Particularly,
poorer people may sort into more polluted areas and accordingly settle downstream
of high population densities. To address this concern we estimate the effect of both,
upstream and downstream population density on wealth in order to check for sys-
tematic differences.
4.4.2 Results
We find that upstream population density has a significantly negative effect on health.
An increase in population density by 10,000 inhabitants per sqkm, which corresponds
to 2 standard deviations, decreases the health index by roughly 5 percentage points,
which corresponds to half a standard deviation of the health index (see Table 4.2).
11. We rely on STATA code by Fetzer (2014).
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Table 4.2: Effects of urbanization on health
(1) (2) (3)
Health Health Health
Upstream Pop Density -0.0428*** -0.0455*** -0.0506***
(0.0130) (0.0116) (0.0124)
Downstream Pop Density 0.0260 0.0272* 0.0296
(0.0174) (0.0154) (0.0180)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Year x Region FE ✓
N 450 450 450
Cluster 74 74 74
Mean DV 0.72 0.72 0.72
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered from
diarrhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream
PopDensity is population density in the grid upstream of grid i. Downstream Pop
Density is population density in the grid downstream of grid i. Controls include
distance along Nile and population density in grid i. Standard errors (clustered
by grids) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
This increase corresponds to one additional disease in every 6th household.12 The
effect remains statistically significant when including distance along the Nile and
population density in grid i as control variables (column (2)) and also when adding
year-specific region fixed effects (column (3)). These results are also robust to using
Conley spatial HAC standard errors, which account for both, spatial- and temporal
correlation of the standard errors (see Table D1). The negative effect of downstream
population density on health is significantly different from the (positive) effect of
upstream population density (p-value of 0.00). Hence, the negative health effects are
unique to the downstream population. This indicates that population density affects
health through water pollution as it is tied to the direction of the river flow.
In order to further substantiate water pollution as a driver of the observed negative
12. The health index is an average over the number of diseases (diarrhea, cough and fever) per house-
hold, which is then averaged across all households in the grid. Accordingly, if the health index increases
from 0 to 1 all three diseases will occur in all households within the grid. If the health index increases
by 1/3 there will be on average one additional disease in every household. As the health index increases
by 0.05, there will be on average 1/6 additional disease in every household or in other words: one more
disease in every 6th household.
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Table 4.3: Effect heterogeneity: role of piped water
Health
(1) (2)
Piped Water<0.75 Piped Water>0.75
Upstream Pop Density -0.0796*** -0.0416**
(0.0155) (0.0159)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
N 177 270
Cluster 58 73
Mean DV 0.71 0.73
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered from di-
arrhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream Pop
Density is population density in the grid upstream of grid i. Controls include
distance along Nile and population density. The sample is split according to the
fraction of households with access to piped water. Standard errors (clustered by
grids) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
health effects on the downstream population, we take into account the households’
source of drinking water. For this analysis we calculate the fraction of households
within a grid that have access to piped water and split the sample at the mean of
this variable (75%). We find that the effect of upstream population density is almost
twice as large in grids where drinking water of less than 75% of households comes
from clean sources (these households use public taps, the Nile, wells and springs)
as opposed to grids where more than 75% of households have access to clean water
(Table 4.3). The negative health effect is considerably mitigated by the access to clean
drinking water. This again points to water being the crucial link between pollutants
and diseases.
4.4.3 Robustness
To address sorting as a potential concern we analyze whether there are differential
effects of urbanization on wealth given the relative location of the household to the
pollutant. In fact we replicate our analysis from the previous section using wealth as
outcome. We find that both, downstream and upstream population density have posi-
tive, albeit not statistically significant effects on wealth (see Table 4.4). The upstream
and downstream coefficients in Table 4.4, do not differ significantly from each other
(p-value of 0.84). This shows that there is no heterogeneity in wealth outcomes de-
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Table 4.4: Effects of urbanization on wealth
(1) (2) (3)
Wealth Wealth Wealth
Upstream Pop Density 0.0295 0.0346* 0.0255
(0.0449) (0.0178) (0.0206)
Downstream Pop Density 0.0468 0.0256 0.0350
(0.0444) (0.0242) (0.0280)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Year x Region FE ✓
N 450 450 450
Cluster 74 74 74
Mean DV 0.72 0.72 0.72
Wealth is a wealth index, which lies between 0 and 1 and is averaged
over all households living in grid i. It is based on households’ ownership
of selected assets. Upstream Pop Density is population density in the
grid upstream of grid i. Downstream Pop Density is population density
in the grid downstream of grid i. Controls include distance along Nile
and population density in grid i. Standard errors (clustered by grids) in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
pending on the geographic location of households indicating that sorting between up-
and downstream locations based on wealth is unlikely. Hence, more polluted water
downstream of agglomerations does not prevent wealthy people from living there
(unlike air pollution caused by industrial activity in 19th century Britain (Heblich,
Trew, and Zylberberg, 2016).
We also include wealth as control variable in an additional specification (Table D2
in Appendix) because it may be an omitted variable in the main specification. The
results are robust to the inclusion of this additional control variable. This however
introduces bad control bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) as wealth itself is an outcome
of the treatment.
As additional robustness check we estimate the same model using only grids that
intersect with the Nile river rather than grids within a 30km radius.13 We expect the
effect to be stronger for people living extremely close to the river as opposed to people
who live on the fringe of the Nile valley, close to the desert. The disadvantage of
13. The number of river segments (grids grouped by latitude) is still similar. The sample size only
reduces by 26 segment-year cells due to missing DHS observations).
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using this subsample is however that we observe fewer DHS clusters in each segment
(though the most affected ones).14 Table D3 in the Appendix shows that the negative
effect of population density on downstream health is indeed stronger than for the
main sample (the effect size is 30% - 40% larger). In contrast, the effect on the health
of the upstream population is significantly positive in all specifications estimated for
this subsample. These findings stress the asymmetric health effects of population
density.
Finally, we focus on large and densely populated cities as themost severe cases of con-
centrated pollution. To do so, we restrict our sample to grids surrounding large cities,
excluding all other observations. We thus only compare grids located downstream
of a city to grids located upstream of the same city rather than comparing all grids
in the region.. The downside of this approach is the limited number of observations
given that there are only 6 major cities along the Nile.15
We estimate the following model:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑖 + 𝜎𝑐 + 𝜎𝑡 + X𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4.2)
where 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 denotes health in grid i at time t. 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑈𝑖𝑡 indicates whether the grid
is “treated”, this indicator variable turns 1 if the city is located upstream of grid i
and zero if the city is located downstream of gird i. 𝜎𝑐 denotes city cluster fixed
effects. Each of these clusters contains three grids: the grid where the city is located,
the upstream (control) and the downstream (treatment) grid. The city cluster fixed
effects thus ensure that we only compare grids around the same city. 𝜎𝑡 denotes time
fixed effects and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables for grid i, including distance along
the Nile and population density.
We find that children living downstream of a city are significantly sicker than chil-
dren living upstream of the same city. Specifically, their health index is 4 percentage
points lower, which corresponds to 0.4 standard deviations of the health index for
this sample. This provides further evidence for asymmetric health effects of agglom-
erations. Children living downstream of these pollutants exhibit significantly worse
health outcomes than children living upstream.
14. We here observe on average 16 DHS cluster per segment-year cell as opposed to 20 in the main
sample.
15. We exclude Cairo from the regression because we cannot specify a unique downstream grid. The
city is located at the end of the river stream and spreads across the Nile Delta, which we have excluded
from the analysis.
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Table 4.5: Case study: effect of cities on health
(1)
Health
City Upstream -0.0413*
(0.0182)
Year FE ✓
City FE ✓
Controls ✓
N 112
SE 6 City Cluster
The sample is restricted to grids that are
located directly upstream or downstream
of a city. Health is the share of house-
holds in each grid where no child suffered
from diarrhea, fever or cough in the past
14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. City
Upstream is a binary variable, which indi-
cates whether a city is located upstream
of grid i (=1) or whether a city is located
downstreamof grid (=0). Controls include
distance along Nile and population den-
sity. Standard errors (clustered by grids)
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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4.5 Industrialization
4.5.1 Empirical Framework
In this section we analyze the impact of water pollution caused by industrial plant
openings close to the Nile on children’s health. Information on the opening date of in-
dustrial plants allows us to exploit temporal variation in addition to spatial variation
to estimate the health effect of industrial water pollution. Applying a difference-in-
difference strategy we compare health changes of children living downstream of a
factory with health changes of children in unaffected grids.16 We estimate the fol-
lowing model:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4.3)
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 denotes health in grid i at time t. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑈𝑖𝑡 indicates whether a factory is
located in the upstream grid at time t and thus constitutes a binary treatment vari-
able. 𝜎𝑖 are grid fixed effects, which account for grid specific factors, as for instance
potential systematic differences between northern and southern areas.17 𝜎𝑡 denotes
time fixed effects, which account for health trends over time. 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term and
standard errors are clustered on a grid level.
In an additional specification we include population density as a control variable in
order to account for changes in population density caused by the opening of a factory,
which at the same time may influence health.18 We also apply a placebo check by
estimating the effect of a downstream factory on health.
Since we control for all grid-specific and time-specific factors the only threat to iden-
tification would be an event that occurred simultaneously with the factory opening
and affects downstream and upstream health differentially. As this seems rather un-
likely, we are confident that water pollution caused by the factory contributes to poor
health outcomes.
4.5.2 Results
Wefind that a factory located upstream affects children’s health negatively. The effect
is however only marginally significant (see Table 4.6, columns (1) and (2)). The effect
appears to be quantitatively sizable - the opening of an upstream factory decreases
16. The variation in this set-up stems from 31 factories (out of the 65), which opened between 1992
and 2014.
17. Here we can exploit temporal variation within the grid and are therefore able to include gird fixed
effects as opposed to our specification in Section 4.4.1.
18. It becomes obsolete to control for distance along the Nile as this variable is time-invariant and is
captured by grid FE.
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Table 4.6: Effects of industrialization on health
(1) (2)
Health Health
Upstream Factory -0.0763* -0.0751*
(0.0429) (0.0421)
Downstream Factory 0.00857 0.0113
(0.0430) (0.0423)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Grid FE ✓ ✓
Pop Density ✓
N 450 450
Cluster 74 74
Mean DV 0.72 0.72
Health is the share of households in each grid where no
child suffered from diarrhea, fever or cough in the past
14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream Factory indi-
cates whether a factory is located in the grid upstream
of grid i. Downstream Factory indicates whether a
factory is located in the grid downstream of grid i.
Standard errors (clustered by grids) in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control for population den-
sity is included.
the health index by roughly 8 percentage points, which corresponds to roughly 0.7
standard deviations of the dependent variable. In other words, the factory opening
leads to an additional child disease in every 4th household. Contrary, we find that
a downstream factory has no effect on health. These results are also robust to using
Conley spatial HAC standard errors, which account for both spatial and temporal
correlation of the standard errors (see Table D4).
In order to further examine water pollution as driver of the negative health effects
we again split the sample into grids with less than 75% of households with access
to piped water and grids where more than 75% of households have access to piped
water. We find that the effect of an upstream factory is highly significant and twice
as large for the group with less than 75% of households with access to piped water
and turns insignificant for grids where more than 75% of households use piped water
as drinking water. This demonstrates that children who have contact with industrial
wastewater aremore likely to fall sick than childrenwho have access to clean drinking
water.
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Table 4.7: Effect heterogeneity: role of piped water
Health
(1) (2)
Piped Water<0.75 Piped Water>0.75
Upstream Factory -0.101*** -0.0450
(0.0257) (0.0574)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Grid FE ✓ ✓
N 177 277
Cluster 58 74
Mean DV 0.71 0.73
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered from
diarrhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Up-
stream Factory indicates whether a factory is located in the grid upstream
of grid i. Controls include distance along Nile and population density. The
sample is split according to the fraction of households with access to piped
water within each grid. Controls include distance along Nile and popula-
tion density. Standard errors (clustered by grids) in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.5.3 Robustness
To tackle the potential concern of sorting due to polluting factories we examine the
effects on wealth. Table 4.8 shows that there are no statistically significant effects of
factories (both upstream and downstream) on wealth. The coefficients on upstream
and downstream factories are also not statistically different from each other (p-value:
0.49), which suggests that there is no sorting based on wealth around factories.
One might argue that control grids may in fact be “treated” by a factory two or three
grid further upstream. Even though this would only bias our coefficients towards
zero we address this issue twofold. First, to account for accumulating pollution we
construct a cumulative measure (see Section 4.6). Second, we construct factory clus-
ters to better distinguish between treated and control grids. We therefore generate a
new sample where geographically close factory grids are defined as factory clusters.
We define grids that are located downstream of the entire factory cluster as treated
grids and grids, which are located upstream of the cluster as control grids. In 2014,
we for example observe six factory clusters consisting of 3 to 16 individual grids (as
opposed to 22 individual factory-grids). Instead of grid fixed effects we include fac-
tory cluster fixed effects and thereby directly compare children living upstream to
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Table 4.8: Effects of industrialization on wealth
(1) (2)
Wealth Wealth
Upstream Factory -0.0374 -0.0399
(0.0279) (0.0263)
Downstream Factory -0.0119 -0.0171
(0.0160) (0.0150)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Grid FE ✓ ✓
Pop Density ✓
N 450 450
Cluster 74 74
Mean DV 0.72 0.72
Wealth is a wealth index, which lies between 0 and 1
and is averaged over all households living in grid i. It is
based on households’ ownership of selected assets. Up-
stream Factory indicates whether a factory is located
in the grid upstream of grid i. Downstream Factory
indicates whether a factory is located in the grid down-
stream of grid i. Control for population density is in-
cluded. Standard errors (clustered by grids) in paren-
theses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.9: Case study: effect of factory clusters on health
(1)
Health
Factory Upstream -0.0926*
(0.0552)
Year FE ✓
Factory Cluster ✓
Controls ✓
N 80
Mean DV 0.73
Sample consists only of grids, which
are directly located upstream or down-
stream of an industry cluster (consec-
utive grids that are characterized as
industrial area). Health is the share
of households in each grid where no
child suffered from diarrhea, fever or
cough in the past 14 days. It lies
between 0 and 1. Factory Upstream
indicates whether a factory cluster
is located upstream of grid i (=1) or
whether the factory cluster is located
downstream of grid i (=0). Controls in-
clude population density and distance
along Nile. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are bootstrapped, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
children living downstream of the same factory cluster.19 Due to the small number
of observations we bootstrap the standard errors.
We again find that children living downstream of a factory are significantly sicker
than children living upstream. Specifically, their health index is around 9 percentage
points lower, which corresponds to roughly 0.8 standard deviations of the dependent
variable (Table 4.9, column (1)). This provides further evidence for adverse health
effects of the presence of industrial plants.
19. For each factory cluster we observe health in two grids (upstream and downstream) over 8 years.
As these clusters change over time (due to factory openings and closings) we only observe 5 of these
clusters over the entire sample period
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4.6 Cumulative Pollution
Finally, we shift the focus from localized pollution to cumulative pollution along the
Nile. Here we analyze the aggregate effects of population density and factory pres-
ence over all grids located upstream. To do so, we weight population density and
factory presence respectively by the inverse of the distance to grid i. This weighting
accounts for cumulative pollution as people living downstream are not only exposed
to pollution from the previous grid but also to water pollution originating in grids
further upstream.
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 =
78
∑
𝑗=1
1
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 ∗ 𝐼 (𝑗 < 𝑖)
The mean of the weighted population density is 0.06 and the standard deviation 0.05.
We applied the same formula to calculate the weighted factory presence, which has
a mean of 0.07 and a standard deviation of 0.06. We assume linear degradation of
pollutants in this setting. In an alternative specification we weight by the inverse of
the quadratic distance, which gives closer grids a higher weight as compared to linear
weighting. We include this measure as regressors in specification 4.1 (see Section
4.4.1).
We do not find an effect of the cumulative population density measure on health, irre-
spective of the weighting function (Table 4.10, columns (1) and (2)). While we detect
negative health effects of population density in the adjacent upstream grid (Section
4.4.2) we do not identify a statistically significant effect of cumulative population den-
sity. This finding suggests that the negative health effect of population density is lo-
calized. The effects of the cumulative factory measure are in turn highly statistically
significant (Table 4.10, columns (3) and (4)). If a factory opens 10km upstream (in-
crease of weighted factory measure by 0.1) the health index decreases by 0.02 points
which corresponds roughly to 0.2 standard deviations of the health index. The results
reflect a key difference between the two types of pollution in terms of degradability.
While organic pollutants in urban waste are subject to natural cleaning and dilution,
large fractions of industrial pollution are not. In line with this pattern we observe
that the effects of urbanization decline more rapidly with distance to the pollutant
than the effect of industrial pollution on human health.20 Finally, we also include
both sources of pollution in the specification at the same time and find that the ef-
fect of cumulative factory presence remains statistically significant negative while
the effect of cumulative population density remains insignificant.
20. Depending on industry type the scale of biodegradability can vary, e.g. slaughter houses contain
higher extend of biodegradable components whereas chemical plants or pulp and paper mills contain
higher content of persistent organic pollutants.
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Table 4.10: Distance weighted treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Health Health Health Health Health
Pop Dens (weighted by distance) -0.190 -0.0994
(0.153) (0.149)
Pop Dens (weighted by distance2) -1.542 -0.904
(2.160) (2.412)
Factory Presence (weighted by distance) -0.231*** -0.222***
(0.0712) (0.0714)
Factory Presence (weighted by distance2) -0.804** -0.745***
(0.309) (0.267)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
N 459 459 459 459 459 459
Cluster 76 76 76 76 76 76
Mean DV 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered from diarrhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies
between 0 and 1. The weights on population density and factory presence are constructed as the inverse of the linear distance
and quadratic distance respectively. Pop Dens (weighted by distance or distance2) and Factory Presence (weighted by distance or
distance2) constitute cumulative measures of pollution, which are based on all grids that are located upstream of grid i. Control for
distance along Nile is included. Standard errors (clustered by grids) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4.7 Conclusion
Using a newly constructed, geo-coded dataset for Egypt we find detrimental effects
of urban and industrial water pollution on health. Our research design exploits the
direction of the river flow as natural experiment, where population density and in-
dustrial plant location constitute the sources of urban and industrial pollution.
We find a strong negative impact on the health of children who live downstream of
an agglomeration. Children living upstream are not negatively affected. This hetero-
geneity of health outcomes suggests that urbanization affects health through water
pollution. The opening date of industrial plants allows us to employ a difference-in-
difference strategy to analyze the health effect of industrialization. Here we also find
a significantly negative effect on the health of children living downstream of a factory
while children living upstream are again not affected.
The health effects of urbanization and industrialization are strongest for grids where
a significant proportion of households uses untreated water as source of drinking wa-
ter. This finding substantiates the argument that the water transmits diseases caused
by the pollutants. Finally we show that the cumulative effect of factories along the
course of the Nile is significant whereas we do not find a cumulative effect of popula-
tion density. This finding reflects the difference between these two different sources
of pollution in terms of degradability. While organic pollutants in urban waste dilute,
large fractions of the industrial pollutants are persistent. The health effects of water
pollution caused by urbanization are therefore expected to decline more rapidly with
distance to the pollutant than the effect of water pollution caused by factories.
The findings of this study have important implications for policy in developing coun-
tries. In order to improve health outcomes it is important to put environmental reg-
ulations in place and to enforce them. This is particularly important for countries
that are industrializing rapidly and are positioned on the polluting trajectory of the
Environmental Kuznet Curve21. Weak political and legal institutions are however a
stumbling block to regulation. It is thus important to fight corruption, promote law
enforcement and increase awareness for sustainable growth. In addition the interna-
tional community has to support developing countries in these efforts as they often
do not have the resources and technologies needed for environmental protection.
In Egypt, various authorities are in charge of water management and quality control,
which leads to ambiguous responsibilities.22 Water quality thus has to become a
priority for the Egyptian government and it has to assign responsibilities clearly.
21. It illustrates that over the course of development pollution first increases and then decreases again.
22. “The absence of a single administrative body in charge of water management and quality improve-
ment from the High Dam to the riverbed, and up to the point where it [water] is delivered to people’s
homes, is the reason behind water pollution in Egypt.” (Kareem Khaled, 2015).
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Moreover, adverse health effects of urbanization have to be taken into account for
city planning in developing countries. The direction of the river flow determines
who is affected most by water pollution and thereby leaves people living downstream
worse off. As long as there is no environmental protection in place governments
have to work on improved sanitation in these areas. Institutional changes are thus
key to reduce the detrimental health effects of industrialization and urbanization in
emerging economies.
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Appendix D.1: Appendix
Table D1: Effect of urbanization on health using Conley spatial HAC standard errors
(1) (2) (3)
Health Health Health
Upstream Pop Density -0.0428 -0.0455* -0.0457*
(0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0275)
Downstream Pop Density 0.0260 0.0272 0.0274
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0276)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Region x Year FE ✓
N 450 450 450
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered
from diarrhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies between 0 and 1.
Upstream Pop Density is population density in the grid upstream of grid i.
Downstream Pop Density is population density in the grid downstream of
grid i. Controls include distance along Nile and population density. Con-
ley spatial HAC standard errors estimated, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D2: Including wealth as control
(1) (2) (3)
Health Health Health
Upstream Pop Density -0.0412*** -0.0437*** -0.0499***
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0122)
Downstream Pop Density 0.0286* 0.0285* 0.0307*
(0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0179)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Year x Region FE ✓
N 450 450 450
Cluster 74 74 74
Mean DV 0.72 0.72 0.72
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered from
diarrhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream
PopDensity is population density in the grid upstream of grid i. Downstream Pop
Density is population density in the grid downstream of grid i. All specifications
include wealth in grid i as control. Other controls include distance along Nile
and population density. Standard errors (clustered by grids) in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D3: Subsample: only includes grids which intersect with Nile
(1) (2) (3)
Health Health Health
Upstream Pop Density -0.0599*** -0.0571*** -0.0649***
(0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0126)
Downstream Pop Density 0.0384** 0.0387*** 0.0412***
(0.0156) (0.0133) (0.0147)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
Year x Region FE ✓
N 424 424 424
Cluster 71 71 71
Mean DV 0.72 0.72 0.72
Data for segments along the Nile is only based on grids that intersect with NIle
river (information from grids that are located close to the desert is excluded).
Health is the share of households in each grid where no child suffered from diar-
rhea, fever or cough in the past 14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream Pop
Density is population density in the grid upstream of grid i. Downstream Pop
Density is population density in the grid downstream of grid i. Controls include
distance along Nile and population density. Standard errors (clustered by grids)
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D4: Effect of industrialization on health using Conley spatial HAC standard
errors
(1) (2)
Health Health
Upstream Factory -0.0763* -0.0751*
(0.0410) (0.0405)
Downstream Factory 0.00857 0.0113
(0.0517) (0.0510)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Grid FE ✓ ✓
Pop Density ✓
N 450 450
Health is the share of households in each grid where no
child suffered from diarrhea, fever or cough in the past
14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream Factory indi-
cates whether a factory is located in the grid upstream
of grid i. Downstream Factory indicates whether a fac-
tory is located in the grid downstream of grid i. Pop-
ulation density in grid i is included as control variable
in column (2). Conley spatial HAC standard errors esti-
mated, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D5: Including wealth as control
(1) (2)
Health Health
Upstream Factory -0.0759* -0.0752*
(0.0410) (0.0425)
Downstream Factory 0.0112
(0.0424)
Year FE ✓ ✓
Grid FE ✓ ✓
Pop Density ✓ ✓
N 457 450
Cluster 75 74
Mean DV 0.72 0.72
Health is the share of households in each grid where no
child suffered from diarrhea, fever or cough in the past
14 days. It lies between 0 and 1. Upstream Factory indi-
cates whether a factory is located in the grid upstream
of grid i. Downstream Factory indicates whether a fac-
tory is located in the grid downstream of grid i. All
specifications include wealth and population density in
grid i as controls. Standard errors (clustered by grids)
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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